



M. DUMOURIER.



M. DUMOURIER.

Duperrier Dumouriez (C. F.) General

MEMOIRS OF
GENERAL DUMOURIER,

WRITTEN BY HIMSELF.

COMPREHENDING THE

Conferences and Correspondence

WITH

LOUIS XVI.

THE MINISTERS, GENERALS, AND THE PRINCIPAL
MEMBERS OF THE CONVENTION,

THE

DIFFERENT SOCIETIES,

AND LEADING MEN OF FRANCE, FLANDERS, GER-
MANY, HOLLAND, ENGLAND, SPAIN, ITALY,
AND OTHER PARTS OF EUROPE.

FORMING A

COMPLETE HISTORY OF THE WAR,

AND

OTHER IMPORTANT OCCURRENCES,

From the Year 1789, to the present Time,

Translated from the original, by D. M O O R E.

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THE Work, of which this is a faithful Translation, was originally printed in French, in two Volumes, under the immediate Inspection of the Author. The English Edition is not an abridged one, but comprises the whole of General Dumourier's two Volumes, compressed into one, by being printed on a Letter of a smaller Size ; and the Price being so much inferior to that of the Leipfic Edition, the Public cannot but be gratified in having access to a compendious History of all the Events that have taken place on the great Continent of Europe, from the Year 1789 to the present time, written by a man personally concerned in the Occurrences, and drawing such materials as did not come under his observation in his public capacity, from Documents of the most indisputable Authenticity.—It is now only to be added, that this Translation was undertaken at the Suggestion of General Dumourier, who has furnished the present Editor with several Additions to, and various Illustrations of, the Original Work.

PREFACE.

P R E F A C E.

ABANDONED by mankind, and an outcast of society ; to avoid the effects of the phrenzy and fanaticism of his countrymen, who pretend that they shall rescue the world from a monster of perfidy by plunging a dagger into his heart ; compelled to the sad necessity of flying from city to city for refuge, to escape being made a victim to some barbarous assassin, whose avarice has been excited by the price put upon his head by the national convention ; obliged to take up his abode among strangers, under the disguise of a feigned name, and quietly to hear his conduct and his actions scrutinized with equal severity and injustice by corrupt journalists in the pay of the different courts of Europe, whose commendations apply only to the favourites of fortune, while the unhappy emigrants are objects of their most inveterate resentment, though with as little reason as the Jacobins are inflamed against the writer of these volumes, who was carressed by courts and ministers at the time of his quitting the army, but is now defamed and persecuted for having published to the world his sincere opinions and undisguised sentiments :—oppressed by these complicated hardships, he yields to the duty imposed upon him, by a proper regard to his own character, in thus giving to the world these memoirs of his life.

In the journals of Europe numberless fabrications have appeared so extravagant and inconsistent, and descriptions been given of him, so little resembling each other, seems that his very existence, as well as his character, to have become an enigma.

In the *Courier of Europe*, he is represented with the force of Hercules, the gallantry and licentiousness of Mark Anthony, the treachery of Hannibal, the cruelty

ty of Sylla, and the military and political talents of Cæsar; they have also attributed to him, the possession of immense riches in the English funds. The Journals of the Lower Rhine, on the contrary, describe him as possessing talents, but being deficient in judgment. This opinion, Dumourier regards as true praise, for he was never desirous of being thought subtle, or practised in the art of changing his opinions according to his interests. He has always had fixed principles and a determined character. His mind was formed by the study of Plutarch; and he has mixed too little with men, to be known by any but a select few. Excepting during his travels and his wars, he has lived surrounded only by his books, and his chosen friends, of whom the greater part no longer exist. Far from esteeming the maxim of the Epicurians, which recommends the concealment of our actions, his whole life shall be exposed to the observation and judgment of his contemporaries. Already poor, calumniated, proscribed, and all that mankind regard as miserable, he has nothing to lose by this conduct, but on the contrary he has every thing to gain, since men of elevated and upright minds, who read these memoirs, will become his friends. With such men only he desires to live, and he shall always regard them as his fellow citizens, to whatever country they may belong.

Fabius Maximus, the celebrated dictator, he who alone was able to check the victorious Hannibal, and whom Dumourier earnestly endeavoured to imitate in his campaign against the king of Prussia, made this observation to Paulus Emilius, when he went with Varro to command the army, "Let him not fear who thirsts for glory; for, although we often find that true merit is eclipsed for a time, we have never known it to be entirely lost; it bursts at last through the clouds which encircle it, and appears arrayed in its bright and genuine colours."

Dumourier's sentiments were like those of Fabius, but
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their situations were widely different. Fabius resided on his estate with his family, exposed indeed to the calumnies of a faction, but honoured in the senate, and by all the sages of Rome. They regarded his counsels, and preserved him in the command of the army, nor had ingratitude effaced the many services he had rendered his country, or destroyed the expectation of his still rendering them many more. Fabius was thus enabled to follow the bent of his mild and moderate disposition; and wait, in tranquillity, the progress of truth and justice. Such are not the happy circumstances of Dumourier; and, however short a time he may have to live, it will be too long if it be stained with the injustice of the public opinion. Not only therefore, for himself, his contemporaries, and his country, to whom he may one day be useful, but in justice to his friends, his relations, his advocates, he is obliged to repel the calumnies which follow him, and to dissipate the cloud which obscures the truth. This he will do by an honest and accurate detail of such facts as are important, and of which he was a competent witness.

He is influenced by these reasons to change the order of his memoirs, and first submit to the public a narrative of the circumstances of the year 1793. These are the more important, as they will enable the reader to foresee the issue of the strange events that have lately happened in Europe, in studying the nature of their motives and causes. If general Dumourier have stated any of them erroneously, his contemporaries are competent to detect his injustice, but he has surely this great reason for speaking the truth, that he may not increase the number of his enemies. He describes the French as they really are, and not such as Europe has hitherto regarded them, who seem to believe that the whole French nation are without religion, without honour, or humanity. The French being engaged in a bad cause, we are compelled to regard them with horror; but prudence will not permit

permit us to despise them. They have displayed a magnificent courage; and, had they followed the opinion of virtuous and experienced men, this period of their history would have been as honourable as it is now disgraceful and wretched.

Their licentious excesses have unhappily destroyed the liberties of Europe; and the example of their misfortunes, has induced every people to believe that they had better peaceably wear their chains, than fall into an anarchy that can never end but in absolute despotism.

Two questions naturally present themselves, to which Dumourier's justification ought to reply, by stating the motives of his conduct, which appears to be in contradiction with his declared opinions.

It is asked "why Dumourier, after the arrest of Louis on the 10th of August, refused to obey the orders that he had received from another general, to make the soldiers renew their oath of fidelity to the king?"

At this time Dumourier had under his command, ten thousand men in the camp of Maulde, near Tournay, and the Austrians who had a much larger army, were indefatigable in harassing his troops. Dillon had been sent to supersede the general in his command. The ministers were evidently inimical to the revolution; and, as we shall see in the course of these memoirs, pursued a conduct that was the cause of the king's misfortunes. The circumstances of the frightful scene of the 10th of August, were not accurately known in the camp. To engage the troops to renew their oath, according to the orders of general Dillon, was to prejudge the cause of the people, to unfold the standard of rebellion against the nation, and to engage the army in a dispute respecting parties, at the very moment when we had a foreign enemy to combat; and the inevitable consequence would have been to have exposed the unfortunate Louis to the daggers and vengeance of the populace.

It is also demanded, "how can Dumourier justify his conduct at the time when a convention was appointed for the purpose of abolishing the monarchy and establishing a republic, of acknowledging the authority of this convention, and giving his sanction to the destruction of the monarchy and to the assumed power of the republic?"

Soon after the general's refusal to give the oath to the troops in the camp of Maulde, Fayette deserted his army, and Dumourier was ordered to take the command in his stead.

The king of Prussia entered Champagne with a formidable body of troops; and terror and treason insured success. Longwi and Verdun were taken. Dumourier, being in force in his camp at Grandpre, assembled his army at St. Menehould. The history of France does not present so dangerous a crisis. The 20th of September, the day on which the convention declared France to be a republic, Dumourier and Kellerman repulsed the Prussians, who had attacked them at Valary. The two armies were in sight of each other, and every day threatened to come to an engagement; and this surely was not the moment to engage in quarrels respecting the form of government! The enemy were to be driven back from the territories of France. The country was to be saved. Besides, the people were incensed against the king, whom they regarded as a traitor. To have maintained his prerogative at such a period, would have been looked upon as an act of treachery, and would have deprived Dumourier of the confidence of his countrymen, and thereby have left France an easy prey to the enemy.

The Prussians having retreated, Dumourier began the campaign in the Low Countries, and it was not till he had gained the Belgians for allies, and acquired influence by his success, that he had any reason to hope he could give peace to his country, deliver the imprisoned king, and establish on secure foundations
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the constitution of 1789. After that period, circumstances arose so extremely contrary to all possible expectation, and Dumourier's journey to Paris, and the horrible murder of Louis XVI. so clearly convinced him of the guilty aims of the convention and implacability and power of the Jacobins, that the general resolved, at all hazards, to separate the cause of the country from that of the monsters by whom it was governed. His plan was bold. No other person in France had means in his power for that purpose, so apparently well founded. But every circumstance turned against him, and above all, the inconstancy of his army.

The apparent contradiction between Dumourier's political principles and his military conduct has drawn upon him the unjust reproaches of many of the emigrants, and of several persons of good sense, who could only judge from their mistaken view of the facts. As minister of foreign affairs, Dumourier has certainly shewn a sincere attachment to the constitution; of this his dispatches, and his discourses to the assembly, are an abundant proof. He has equally opposed republicans and royalists. He procured the dismissal of three ministers of the former party, without leaguering himself with the court faction; and in consequence he was exposed to the fury of the Jacobins, who loudly demanded his being sent to the prison of Orleans. The public opinion of Dumourier's principles at that period, was so decided, that the following couplet was placed at the bottom of his portrait :

Inflexible soutien du trône, et de la loi,
Il fut ami du peuple, il fut ami du Roi*.

Being afterwards appointed to the command of the army, he had neither time nor inclination to concern

* Inflexible supporter of the throne and of the law, he was at once the friend of the people and of the king.

himself in the intrigues and crimes of Paris. He was solely employed in repelling the enemy.

He is notwithstanding, reproached with never having changed his party, till he was no longer victorious; but the reproach is unjust; for, in the first place, he never changed his party since, although he quitted the republicans, with whom he had long been disgusted, yet he did not join the royalists; and, that no doubt might remain respecting his opinion, he instantly proclaimed his desire of re-establishing the constitution of 1789. Secondly, his sentiments were constantly in opposition to those of the convention, the Jacobins, and the minister of war, during the time of his expedition into Belgia, from the month of November, as may be seen in his correspondence with Pache, published in January 1793.

In January, he sent to the convention four memorials, against the tyrannical decree of the 15th of December, and he neither presented himself to the convention, nor to the society of Jacobins; on the contrary, he delivered his resignation at that period. Thirdly, compelled for his personal safety to return to the army, he persevered in opposing the tyranny and injustice of the convention.

On the 12th of March, he wrote the well-known letter to the convention, which was considered by the Jacobins as so great a crime. Hence, before he went to engage the prince of Cobourg, and to decide the fate of France and her enemies on the plain of Nerwinde, his quarrel with the convention was open and proclaimed. He was proscribed. He was therefore, compelled to overthrow the convention or perish.

General Dumourier was bitterly reproached for not separating himself from the republican party, till after he had been vanquished, in a letter written by the elector of Cologne, to the general, which was published with a cruel ostentation, which that prince might have foreborne against a man, then unfortunate and a fugitive. But surely it is to be supposed, that this prince will

will regret the injustice done to general Dumourier, when, by reading of these memoirs he shall be convinced that the charge was unmerited. None of the wrongs the general has endured, has afflicted him so much as this, the author of it being held in such just estimation throughout Europe.

All the nations of Europe must be sensible, that their most important interests are involved in the catastrophe of the French revolution. If the belligerent powers should re-establish the monarchy, the vengeance of the nobles, and consequent proscriptions will fall on the greater part of the people. But, as the people are fortunately the most numerous body, as they have enjoyed the blessings of liberty, and felt the advantage of holding the sovereign power in their hands, the triumph of the nobility and clergy, will be but momentary; it will endure no longer than while the foreign troops are enabled to support their pretensions.

Fresh rebellions may be expected every day; and another revolution, more terrible than the present may restore the people to the exercise of the sovereignty. But if, by the imbecillity of the allied powers, the national convention and the Jacobins are enabled to maintain the republic, then will their system of fraternization be exercised with irresistible force; and finally, not only the neighbouring nations, but the most distant countries will imitate the rebellion of France, and all Europe be reduced to a state of anarchy and confusion, while by a grand and rapid revolution, the existing governments of the world will be hastened to an end. There is a just medium, however, which the sensible part of the French nation eagerly desire to be adopted, and which would assure general tranquillity to Europe: and this is the establishment of a limited monarchy in France.

It is become the duty of the sovereigns of Europe to direct their efforts to the attainment of this end; and it is only by so doing that they can secure the

safety of the monarch who shall mount the throne of France. It is the only bond of universal peace.

Admitting that the ancient monarchy cannot be restored in France, it is certain the species of democracy, which exists there at present, cannot be of long duration.

Too much reliance has been given to abstract notions on this important matter, which may be easily reduced to a few simple truths. There is no political constitution which will not render a people happy, if it be the choice of the people, and if the government be enabled to act without any other restraint than that of the law.

A monarchical government is exclusively suited to large and populous nations, because such only are enabled to provide for the expences of monarchy. The republican form is better suited to small and poor countries, because it is administered with less expence. In the former, there is a unity of power, which constitutes the perfection of government; and it also includes secrecy and promptitude, without which great and complicated affairs cannot be successfully conducted. Aristocracy is necessary in a republic; drawing together the authorities that otherwise would be without union, and excluding the tyranny that results from the arbitrary will of a people governing themselves. Pure democracy will always produce an inconsistent and ineffectual government, because it neither admits of union of opinions, nor of prudence, promptitude, nor secrecy; and includes in itself principles that beget disorders among, and are entirely subversive of the happiness of the people.

Whether ancient or modern, all the known republics have been meliorated by aristocracy. We must not even except Athens, which was devoid of success and splendour, excepting when its councils were directed by Aristides, Themistocles, Cymon, and Pericles; and was reduced to slavery, at first by Sparta, and afterward by Philip of Macedonia, when the democracy

mocracy triumphed, and when its affairs were no longer conducted by celebrated men.

The extent of our commerce, our wealth, our luxuries, the civilization of our manners, in a word, all the enjoyments on which are founded the splendor and happiness of our age, are opposed to the establishment of a republic. If we will have a perfect equality among men for the basis of our political union, we must go back to the simplicity of the first ages, cast away our advantages, and return to a state of nature. A government founded on equality can be nothing more than the contract of a savage people, for the first time assembled in society.

In this respect the French have been guilty of an unaccountable error. They compare themselves to the ancient Romans ; but Brutus in freeing Rome from the Tarquins who were detestable tyrants, and in abolishing royalty, was better informed of the interests of men, than to establish equality and democracy. He preserved the royal authority, while he divided it between two consuls, to whom he left the Lictors, the Fasces, and the axe, as well as all the real attributes of royalty. He new-modelled the sovereign power, by ordaining that the hands which held it should be changed every year. Yet the consuls were taken from the senate, that is to say, from the aristocracy. Afterwards indeed, new changes took place in the government, when bold plebians attacked the privileges of the senate by their decemvirs and tribunes. But the government remained five hundred years an aristocracy ; and, when people had made innovations, if the senate had not conceived the sublime policy of rendering the Roman people a nation of conquerors, its government would have resembled that which we have seen since in the republic of Florence : always feeble, always agitated by civil wars, and open to the invasion of every ambitious neighbour, Rome would have been conquered, or would have become a dower, or a heritage like Florence ; and scarcely would history

tory have spoken of that city, which her aristocracy rendered the most celebrated of the universe.

That species of a republic founded by Brutus may be considered as a mixed government; extending only over a small territory, it would have been impossible to have re-established a system of this kind, after the death of Cæsar, or Tiberius, or Nero. The circumstances of the Roman empire, at that period, would have destroyed the republican spirit in its birth. The bounds of the empire were too much enlarged; the Romans were too rich; luxury, arts, and all the enjoyments that spring from them, had spread their influence too much to accord with the austerity of a republic. Liberty does not necessarily demand a republican government. England is a proof, that a people may be free under a monarch. Liberty consists in being free from obedience to all laws but those that the people themselves have made. The law is the sanctuary in which the sovereignty resides; and kings, or other magistrates to whom the executive power is delegated, being subject to the law, the people are as free as they can be consistently with their happiness. Such are the bounds of true liberty, and all beyond is anarchy,

It will be attended with no difficulty to prove that a republic cannot now be established, without the destruction of those very advantages which distinguish the age. We cannot obtain that object, without confounding property, and forcing the minds of men to submission by terror and crimes. To be a republic, we must first be in a state of anarchy; but does anarchy conduct to equality and liberty? No. It overthrows all established order; and, in the place of hereditary authority, substitutes that of the populace, which being directed by less reasonable principles, necessarily exercises an insupportable tyranny; of which France is an example.

There can be no equal division of the palaces and rich property of the nobility and clergy, which become the

the prey of those miscreants that are the most depraved and daring ; and perhaps, one day we may see the Ex-capuchin Chabot, Lord of Chantilly ; Bazire, Lord of Chambord : and Merlin, Lord of Chanteloupe ; and filling the places of the great Condè, the Marechal de Saxe, and the Duke de Choiseul. Perhaps we shall see changes a thousand times more extravagant and ridiculous. And what good will result to the people by these hideous changes ? They will still have masters. But of what a new and contemptible character.

Such disasters are at present confined to France, but its democratic or rather monstrous republic cannot exist but by the spreading of anarchy among its neighbours. Thus her interest, and every part of her policy, (which she is not even desirous of concealing) consist in preaching and propogating anarchy. As experience proves that it easy to deceive and betray a people in preaching liberty to them, (since it is less difficult to create confusion than to restore order,) and as the poor is in every country more numerous than the rich and the noble, it is feared that, tempted by the example and support of the licentious people of France, all nations will imitate her excesses and turbulence, and anarchy become universal.

These disorders, with all their attendant miseries are inevitable, if the foreign powers are unable to stop the progress of the French revolution. The forces employed by the allies are so great, that success is infallible if they be directed by wisdom and prudence. But if the allies abuse their power and rob the unfortunate family, whose defender they avow themselves to be, the excess of the French people will be justified, and the same dangers and misfortunes will again desolate Europe.

This subject has been more fully discussed by general Dumourier in another work, which he has delivered to persons who have promised to convey it to the Emperor, and he hopes for the sake of mankind, that it will not be neglected or forgotten.

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Notwithstanding general Dumourier has contended for the necessity of founding every well regulated government on an aristocracy, it is not to be understood that he would grant all rights and privileges to the nobles, and nothing to the people. Nobility was in its origin the reward of virtue; and the titles, honours, and feudal rights attached to it, are the legitimate property of their descendants, and nothing could be more unjust than to deprive such of the nobility as have not borne arms against France, of any part of their hereditary rights. But nobles should have no privileges in the eye of the law, either in engrossing of places, or in exemption from duties. In a free government, all are equal in this respect, and, a nobleman is a simple citizen. He has no just claim to the acquisition of places, but by his services, his talents and his virtues. He has the advantages of education, leisure, and the example of his ancestry. Of these it is his duty to avail himself; but those are only his just advantages; and in this system is to be found the only true equality that has existed among any people, either ancient or modern.

Supposing the members of the convention, and the general of the French armies, to have been raised from among the vulgar; it does not therefore follow, that the decrees of the former, or the military conduct of the latter should excite the disdain and the indignation of Europe, but because they are criminal, ignorant, cruel, and absurd.

A state may exist without a king, a court, or a nobility; but it is not true, that a great and powerful nation can exist without nobility, for nobility being the reward of virtue, becomes a motive not easily to be destroyed in the descendants men of virtue.

But this is only applicable to nobility, as it existed in its origin, for that which is sold by kings is a wretched abuse, the offspring of their avarice, and will cease of itself as a ridiculous vanity, when titles shall no longer be attended with pecuniary privileges,
which

which the public opinion has for ever abolished in France, and which, if an attempt be made to restore it by foreign powers, will but serve to produce another revolution.

That kind of aristocracy considered by general Dumas as necessary to all government is that of virtue and talent. To govern men, to sit in judgement upon crimes, or to decide on questions of property, to instruct men in the duties of religion, to conduct the citizens of a great empire in war, are employments that must be studied as other employments are. The declaration of the rights of man, and the constitution to which it served as a basis, will instruct the future king of the French, in what manner it is his duty to select those who are to aid him in the government of the kingdom. The right of choosing such men is the noblest attribute of royalty. Let us examine that sublime constitution, and we shall find that no condition can be found more happy for a wife and virtuous man than that of a king of France.

Permit me, Frenchmen to exhort you to listen to the temperate and informed part of Europe, again adopt with sincerity, that true code of philosophy, and your monarch will be respected and powerful, your nobility will again become worthy of their ancestors, your clergy pious, worthy, and useful, and you will be the happiest nation of the world.

This is the ardent and zealous wish of a man whom you would destroy because he saved your country, and has always spoken with sincerity; whom the emigrants have loaded with calumnies, because in quitting his country, he would not turn his arms against her like themselves; whom the ministers of foreign courts have declared to be a dangerous man, because he asserts that the sovereign power resides in the people. No sufferings will induce him to alter either his opinions or his conduct, or abate his wishes for your happiness, since the conduct of a wise man will always be

be influenced by reason, and not the change of fortune.

Ye sovereigns of Europe, be persuaded, that the persecuted man whom ye seem to condemn, and refuse the asylum, which he ought to find among you, although having no other title than a pure and honest mind, is influenced by the love of mankind, which inspires him with respect for all just authority; that he is actuated by the desire of seeing peace restored to all nations; and that he abhors war, and renounces it for himself, even in the service of his country, excepting when he shall deem it necessary for stopping the progress of injustice and ambition.

THE

M E M O I R S
OF
GENERAL DUMOURIER.

FOR THE YEAR 1793.

C H A P I.

State of Affairs in France.

I N the preliminary article, the people of France are represented as bravely contending for the preservation of their liberties and independence, which, it must be confessed were obtained by proceedings in their nature too violent to justify the expectation that the future conduct of the convention would be influenced by the calm dictates of moderation. The splendid conquests they had acquired, inspired them with the notion that they must necessarily be invincible to all subsequent exertions of their enemies. They were no longer solicitous to cultivate the friendship and confidence of the public, who had congratulated them on their successes, and received them with open arms. While victories only presented themselves to their imaginations, they

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assumed a tyrannical controul over the minds of the public, by the agency of turbulent and restless associations, arbitrarily despoiling them of their property, and leaving them alike destitute of moral physical liberty. Every respectable statesman had retired, for the purpose of avoiding the democratical persecutions of the terrible society of Jacobins.

The king was imprisoned, and well meaning people of every description were pointed out as fit objects of persecution, under the denomination of Moderates, Feuillan's, or political intriguers. The constitution being subverted, Paris was in possession of the Federates, who had been invited thither by the Girondine faction, but who, on their arrival, were induced to espouse the cause of the Jacobins. Pethion, Brissot, and the other leaders of the Girondines, were threatened by the Jacobins with execution by the guillotine; but their denunciations of vengeance were most violent against general Dumourier, whom Marat, Robertspiere, and the leaders of the Jacobine society distinguished as the protector and chief instrument of the party described by the title of the "The Politicians." The prejudice thus excited against general Dumourier was wholly destitute of foundation; for, so far from having attached himself to either party, he considered them as equally inimical to the prosperity of France, which he had every reason to believe could only be secured by a revolution that would annihilate them both. To effect this purpose, his army seemed to be the most effectual resort, but the next chapter will explain how fallacious was the reliance on that resource.

France had now assumed a delusive appearance of prosperity, which elevated the expectations of the nation, and particularly of the prevailing party: but, in fact, she had rendered herself odious to foreign powers, while imbecility prevailed at home.

By the acquisition of Savoy, the boundaries of the French empire, towards Italy, were extended to the Alps,

Alps, and the surrender of the country of Nice, was an additional aggrandizement to the republic ; but the accession of these territories to the dominions of France, was only the result of violence.

In all the towns, clubs were instituted, each consisting of an inconsiderable number of men, whose very existence depended on a change in the system of government ; and these were supported by the sanction of the Jacobine soldiers dispersed in the different armies. Their rash determinations immediately operated with the force of established law. Resolutions were passed, without even the ceremony of putting questions to the vote, and every decision was obtained by threats and force.

From the foot of the Alps, from the mountains in the principality of Basle, from Mayence, Liege, and from various parts of Belgium, addresses of a patriotic tendency, were procured to be transmitted to Paris ; and the national convention supposed, or affected to suppose, that in consequence of foreigners having resorted to our standard, the inestimable blessings of liberty were secured.

It may be said, that Geneva was converted into a club of republicans : and upon being appointed minister of finance by the Girondine party, Claviere yielding to his ancient resentments against his native country, made a sacrifice of general Montesquiou, who, in the discharge of his military duty, in the vicinity of Geneva, had exerted his endeavours for the preservation not only of that city, but also of all Switzerland, from the pernicious influence of the Jacobine party. Deceived by the artifices of Gobet, bishop of Paris, and Ringler, his nephew, two contemptible adventurers, the principality of Porentruy adopted the dangerous reveries that had been so industriously propagated, and incorporated itself with the French nation.

Worms, Spire, and Mayence were in possession of Cuffine ; but he had failed in his attempt upon Coblenz, and had evacuated Francfort, after having pro-

voked the abhorrence of the inhabitants against the avaricious and turbulent spirit of a people, who had converted the torch of philosophy into the means of lighting up the flames of discord.

An army under general Bournonville was interposed between the forces commanded by Custine and those under Dumourier in the Netherlands. But after a favourable opportunity had been lost of attacking Treves with advantage, this army was nearly ruined in a disgraceful expedition against the same city. One third of this general's forces were destroyed, and the remainder was under the necessity of retreating into cantonments in Lorraine, for the purpose of recruiting.

Availing themselves of the advantage afforded them by this retreat, the Prussians and Austrians so regulated their positions, that, connected as they were with Coblenz, Treves, and Luxembourg, all communication between the armies of Custine and Dumourier was effectually cut off. Thus the plan for a joint operation of the two armies could be no longer pursued; the combination thereof having been disarranged by the pride and arrogance of Custine, the ignorance of the convention, and the treachery of Pache, Meunier, and Hassenfratz, who being intrusted with the management of the war department, had contrived to disorganize the armies, and withhold the necessary means of subsistence, for the purpose of effecting the ruin of Dumourier.

The Netherlands were under the controul of the French forces called the army of Belgia, comprehending the forces commanded by Dumourier, the army of the Ardennes, and that under general Valence. The latter consisted only of fifteen thousand men. Aix-la-Chapelle, and the banks of the Meuse, were occupied by the two armies.

Numerous clubs kept all the cities of Belgia in a continual state of agitation. Commissioners were dispatched by the convention with orders to carry into effect

effect the unpopular decree of the 15th of December, wherein the sequestration of all the public property of Belgia was declared. Thus were frustrated all the sanguine hopes of annexing to the republic of France those valuable provinces, the union of which with the French territories, was the object of the above tyrannical decree. Before effecting this re-union, the convention were anxiously desirous of possessing themselves of the property of the inhabitants; and the financier Cambon boasted of being the author of this project.

The commissioners appointed by the convention to put this decree in execution, were the most proper that could have been selected for disappointing the expectations of their employers, both on account of the immorality of their principles, and ferocity of their dispositions. Danton was a man, who though uneducated, had great energy of mind, but his morals were depraved, and his manners disgusting. In Lacroix we saw an adventurer, and a boaster, addicted to licentious indulgencies, and destitute of every principle of honour. Camus was the most implacable and naughty of the Jansenists, among whom he was distinguishable for want of integrity. The character of Trielhard did not materially differ from that of Camus. If Merlin had good intentions, his disposition was splentic and captious; and inflated with notions of republicanism, his public discourses, though animated, were unintelligible. Gosuin's character is that of an outrageous monster, with a mind the most contemptibly mean and sordid.

At the recommendation of the Jacobine club at Paris, thirty-two other persons were nominated by the executive council, to act in conjunction with the above commissioners. The majority of these, were abandoned wretches, instigated by the rich spoils of the Belgic provinces to plunder and blood-shed. By the terror of fire and sword, they not only urged the miserable inhabitants, to solicit an incorporation with

the French republic, but forcibly possessed themselves of the property of the churches, and castles, and sold, at an inadequate price the goods of all persons who had the misfortune to incur their displeasure, representing them under the opprobrious description of aristocrats, and sending indiscriminately people of both sexes and all ages as hostages to fortified and other strong places in France.

The north and west of France began to discover dissatisfaction at this horrid anarchy. The revolvers of La Vendée were not yet in danger : no difficulty had occurred in crushing them utterly, if any foresight had existed in the national convention, or in the executive power. But what is to be expected from a government where, while the wise hesitate, and mad men step in to decide ? Two factions equally atrocious, the Mountain and the Girondine party, divided the convention.

The former, comprising the most furious Jacobins, neither palliated their wicked principles, nor attempted to conceal their crimes ; they spoke of nothing but blood and death. Without capacity to govern, and having neither knowledge, nor a digested plan, they would submit to no dominion whatever. Not even the principal men of the faction could boast of ruling it ; and all their liberties consisted in anarchy.

The opposite party of metaphysicians and intriguing statesmen, had long abused the influence acquired by their talents, and more cultivated education. They had treated the Jacobins with contempt, and the executive council was their instrument. They imagined themselves securely to hold the government : though the convention had been disgusted by their pride and arrogance ; and it was easily known, that this faction were the enemies of royalty, because they seemed to aspire to fill its place.

Hence the independent part of the assembly, who execrated the conduct of the Jacobins, stood in fear of the ambitious spirit of Condorcet, Brissot, Pethion,
Gen-

Genfonné, Guadet, Vergniaux, &c. And thus all parties became united to humble the presumptuous Girondists. The animosity of the contending factions hastened the unhappy king to trial. However, the Girondists too late discovered how fatal this measure was likely to prove to them. Louis, the victim of their ambition and of their cowardice, dragged them down in his fall, and left the field open to the triumph of the Jacobins. Contending interests were set up in the assembly, by those who divided the departments : each espousing the passions of their deputies. Bourdeaux, Marseilles, and Lyons, detested the Mountain, and were the first to establish an opposition ; a civil war has succeeded.

The Pyrenean mountains and the inclemency of weather still secured the frontiers of Spain ; and that kingdom had leisure to collect the forces that were afterwards directed towards Rouffillon, while the convention, entirely occupied by the quarrels of the representatives, and by the precarious state of Paris, provided no means for repelling the enemy.

The metropolis of France, that most wretched and guilty city, thought herself the rival of Rome, because, within a few months, such scenes of massacre and bloodshed had been exhibited within her walls as exceeded the excesses that took place in the capital of Rome for a succession of ages.

For the amusement of her frivolous, and, though timid, yet cruel inhabitants, no less than forty theatres were opened, and generally resorted to ; while a band of villains, no less vain and ridiculous in their pretensions, than barbarous in their actions, supported by two or three thousand dependants, the outcasts of the provinces, and the majority of them not Frenchmen, obliterated the memory of the massacres and horrors of each evening by those of the succeeding morning. The frightful cavern of the Jacobins vomited forth every ill, and spread terror through every house. Men of property trembled, and citizens, who, in
peaceful

peaceful times would have been mild and virtuous, hardened their hearts against pity, and seemed to applaud guilt, lest they should become its victims. All who had the remains of virtue or of shame, had retreated, or been driven from the administration of the department, of the municipality, and of the sections. An infallible sign is supposed always to prognosticate the fall of nations ; then good men retire, leaving the management of public affairs, to those vicious in principle, and turbulent and wicked in practice.

In such a crisis it is only supernatural interposition, that can avert from the people the dreadful effects of universal phrensy and epidemic rage !

This was the situation of France in the year 1793, and such is the gulph a headstrong democracy leads to, when the populace assume the place of the nation, and tyrannise over it by the oligarchy of a few depraved and deluded men, selected from the refuse of the community. During many ages, the senate at Rome controlled popular vehemence ; and directed it, not towards private happiness, but to the aggrandisement of the nation. Rome turned her arms abroad, that she might not destroy the offspring of her own bosom : but France has no such counterpoise as that of the senate of Rome ; and the want of virtue in the preponderating party can bring nothing but disgrace, misfortune, and misery on the country.

CHAP. II.

State of the French Armies.

HAD the political condition of France possessed more solidity, and her measures been more prudently regulated, and had the assembly gained the hearts of the nation to which her arms had opened her

her the way, instead of disgusting them by a tyranny more offensive than that of established despotism, it had been impossible that this new republic should support herself, in opposition to the interests of all Europe, unless she had established a military system capable of resisting a general attack upon her territory both by sea and land.

Confident of their powers being equal to every undertaking, because ignorant of political combinations, on the 19th of November, 1792, the national convention issued a decree, proscribing every despot in the universe, and inviting the inhabitants of all nations to free themselves from their yoke; promising them protection and fraternity, on condition of their adopting the French system. But they ought to have humbled the Empire, Prussia, Spain, and Russia, before they made so proud a declaration. A just assembly, regarding and protecting the rights and privileges of society, (for man in a savage state has no rights, a state of nature confounding all claims,) must have perceived the injustice of such a decree. The maxim of *compelling men to come in*, is not more philosophical in a social, than it is in a theological point of view. The Jacobin preacher is not less unjust, than the preacher of the church of Rome; and it is degrading of liberty to propagate it, like the alcoran, by the sword.

In the violent step of the 19th of November, it will at least be supposed, that the convention, desiring to range all men on the side of liberty, had taken due precautions that the decree should be something more than a vain and dangerous boast, and consequently that they had placed their military establishment on the strongest footing.

General Dumourier, on becoming minister of the war department, (which situation he held but three days, being appointed on the 13th, and quitting it on the 16th of June, 1792) read a bold memorial to the national assembly, proving clearly, that they were
inattentive

inattentive to the army, and that far from placing it in a state to support the war, they were trifling with the public liberty and safety. This memorial was forgotten. The campaign was begun. The general's success which ought to have gained him the confidence of his fellow citizens, if no further, yet as far as respected the military department, served merely to throw suspicion on every advice he could give them. They not only altered his plan of the campaign, but they were desirous of retarding his too rapid progress. The Girondine party frankly told him, they should be extremely sorry to see him force the enemy too promptly to demand peace, since they feared the consequence of the return of the army before the constitution should be completed.

Conceiving general Dumourier to be attached to the Girondine party, the Jacobins charged him with entertaining ambitious views: and the wretched fabricators of the periodical prints, especially Marat, represented him at one time in the character of dictator, at another as duke of Brabant, and at another as leader of the Orleans faction; and under the last fiction, he was branded with the imputation of intending to exalt the eldest son of the detestable Phillip to the throne of France.

Nothing could be more contradictory than these calumnies; for, if ambitious of the office of dictator, it must be absurd to suppose that Dumourier could be the instrument of the house of Orleans; if his aim was to be duke of Brabant, he had then an interest foreign to the party intrigues of his country. But the most absurd accusations were sufficient in France to tarnish innocence. It was, however, seen that calumny was too feeble to stop the progress of a victorious general; and machinations of a more effective nature were employed, and they ended in the destruction of the resources of the army.

Having experienced the difficulties of conducting the war department, Servan feigned sickness; and while

while he declared the insufficiency of his strength for the fatigues of his situation, he procured himself to be appointed general of the army of the Pyrenees. Servan was lieutenant colonel in the preceding month of May. His health, unequal to the duties of the cabinet, was robust enough to support the fatigues of the field. Yet the revolution, it seems, was undertaken to reform the improper distribution and abuse of public stations.

The interior department was under the direction of Roland, a man remarkable among the Girondists for his intriguing spirit, and want of integrity. He had a friend, named Pache; a man of talents and great zeal, who had formerly been secretary to the Marechal de Castries, and preceptor to his son. Roland imagined he could make himself master of the war department, in procuring it for Pache. We shall see how far the result was favourable to the designs of this man.

Being made minister of the war office, Pache chose, or was obliged to appoint, the following persons to different occupations in his department: Meunier, an academician, and a man of understanding, but of as depraved a mind as any in France; another academician, named Vandermonde; a Jacobin, ridiculous for the coarseness and vulgarity of his manners, and dangerous for his intriguing disposition, who had assumed the appellation of Hassensartz, to conceal his real name of Le Lievre, under which he would have been recognized to his dishonour; and Audouin, son-in-law to Pache, and who had been vicar of Eustache.

The conduct of these new ministers occasioned fresh confusion in the department of war, during the most important and most hazardous campaign. The few persons of experience that remained, were discharged, and their situations filled, not merely by Jacobins, but by such of them as had distinguished themselves in the massacres of the first six days of September

ber. The administration established for the supply of arms, cloathing, and provisions, and for regulating the hospitals, were abolished. The old and experienced commissaries and contractors were either dismissed, calumniated, dragged to the bar of justice, or thrown into prison, and rendered infamous without being heard in their own defence. As these imprudent and unjust measures injuriously affected all the armies, although particularly aimed at that of Dumourier, the complaints of the commanders were universal.

Commissioners from the convention were sent to examine into the truth of the complaints ; and their reports were truly alarming. The committee of military affairs, who, from their want of knowledge, had, on former occasions, shewn themselves only capable of embarrassing the measures of the ministry, however wisely concerted, was now made the instrument of justifying the fallacious statements of Pache, in opposition to the reports of the generals and commissioners. Pache was called to the bar of the convention, but no resolution respecting him took place, and the assembly proceeded to the order of the day. Pache had only to withstand the severe and reiterated reproaches of the generals.

A report of the distressed condition of the Belgic army encamped at Liege, was made to the convention by the commissioners, Camus, Gosuain, Danton, and La Croix ; but to this evil no effectual remedy was applied. The army was composed of forty-eight battalions ; the completest of which were from three hundred and fifty, to four hundred men, and many of them were not more than two hundred ; the whole amounting to between fourteen and fifteen thousand foot. The cavalry were about three thousand two hundred. Most of the soldiers were without shoes, and encamped in the mud, their feet being protected by nothing but hay twisted together. The rest of their clothing corresponded with this deplorable appearance. Clothes had been distributed to some ;

some; but those, to the number of fifteen hundred, deserted and returned home. The sick filled the hospitals, where they were in want of every thing. After the conquest of Belgia, to so miserable condition was the victorious army of Jemappe reduced.

A deficiency of provisions obliged this army to stop on the banks of the Meuse; and, if its distress had been known to general Clairfait, he might have engaged it with great advantage, for the carriages of the artillery had been destroyed, and in the preceding month of December, six thousand artillery horses had died at Tongres, and at Liege, for want of forage. The foot had but ten thousand musquets in a condition for service. The cavalry were in want of boots, saddles, cloaks, carbines, pistols, and sabres. The army was without money; and often the staff officers raised contributions among themselves, to make out the soldiers subsistence money for the day.

These wants, however, might have been supplied from Brabant, Liege, and Holland; and general Dumourier had even entered into the necessary contracts, and made reports respecting them; but every plan was rejected, and all his arrangements destroyed. The commissary Ronfin, had orders to condemn, embarrass and retard every measure. His hostility was open; he paid no regard to the opinion of the general: for he was certain of the support of the military committee, of the financier Cambon, and of Pache and his dependants, together with the secret protection of the commissioners of the convention, who appeared to blame these disorders, but suffered them to remain without a check, and in the account they rendered in the month of January, they excused Ronfin, although they acknowledged him to be unqualified for the station he then held.

In Paris various manufactures were established, for the supply of the armies. Cloth was conveyed from Liege to Paris, to make cloathing for the troops. Leather for shoes was bought at Liege, at Dinans,

and all along the banks of the Meuse ; and these articles were sent to the army at nine livres each pair, altho' at Liege shoes cost no more than four livres or four livres ten sous per pair. Cloaks that could be manufactured at Antwerp for nineteen or twenty-one livres each, cost fifty livres each at Paris ; and cloaks were sent from Paris to the army. Corn from the Netherlands was sent to Paris by the way of Nantz, and after being ground in the mills of Mont Martre, near that city, was sent back to the Netherlands.

The most serious disadvantage resulting from these disorders, was their influence on the conduct of the soldiery. We have already taken a review of the character of these troops, and have seen how difficult it was for general Dumourier to avail himself of their courage. It may even be said, that he had accomplished what seemed to be impossible ; and that in beating the Prussians and Austrians, he obtained a victory more tedious and difficult over his licentious soldiers, having introduced discipline and love of order into an army, one fourth part of which was composed of troops of the line, infected by the prejudices of the times, and the other three parts of volunteers, each having an opinion of his own, and each proud of his victories, and susceptible of more mischief than good, by his notions of equality.

At the commencement of the campaign of 1792, the battalions were in want of officers. The superior officers were ill chosen, and were without influence. The soldiers themselves chose their captains, lieutenants, and subaltern officers, and hence these officers were subject to the caprice of men, who acknowledged no superior. A single Jacobin was sufficient to ruin a battalion, by his licentious discourses ; and it was only by culpable condescensions that an officer could preserve his rank, or obtain promotion.

Famine and other extreme afflictions, made the city of Liege the sepulchre of great numbers of Frenchmen ; and indeed, this place proved more fatal to the
army

army than Capua, with its enjoyments, had been to the Carthaginians.

The citizens of Liege carried the revolutionary principles to an excess, proportioned to the extent of their sufferings, when they were betrayed and subdued by the Prussians. They had therefore withdrawn their confidence from the leaders of the revolution, who laboured to secure liberty on the foundation of wise principles.

Fabry and Chestrel, who were very honest men, and wished only for the welfare of their country, had intirely lost their influence. The populace of Outremeuse, perhaps the most dangerous in Europe, after those of London and Paris, had made themselves masters, not of the government, for there was none, but of the public force. Those unhappy men thought only of revenge and punishment. They conducted the French soldiers into the houses of their particular enemies, whom they treated as aristocrats ; that is to say, they pillaged and murdered them.

In this dreadful civil war, each French soldier took an active part either for or against his host, and contributed to destroy the little discipline and good conduct which had hitherto existed in the army, in the midst of misery, want, and complicated distresses. But it was impossible to punish, for it was impossible to discover the guilty. The people of Liege cast the fault upon the French ; and the French recriminated upon the people of Liege.

It was the intention of the general to inflict the punishment of death upon the perpetrators of such crimes ; and this had even been demanded of him by his army in a moment of enthusiasm. But the commissioners, while they seemed to approve of this severity, secretly and effectually opposed it. Since that time, we have seen that the execution of the unfortunate Custine, was the consequence of his having subjected the troops under his command to be punished with death.

The army under general Dumourier were stationed in cantonments from Aix-la-Chapelle to Liege ; and all the officers who could not procure quarters with their battalions, repaired to those cities. Thus the soldiers were almost left without commanders. Want had carried marrauding to its highest pitch. The soldiers robbed in bands from village to village ; and the peasants took their revenge in killing such as, at any time, they found single.

Prevented by these circumstances from pushing on to Cologne, and forcing Clairfait to repass the Rhine, general Dumourier resolved at least to secure the Meuse. He therefore ordered the army of the Ardennes, consisting of 15,000 men, and commanded by general Valence, to join him ; and placed them on his right, in the countries of Stavelo, Malmedy, Spa, Verviers, and Huy. A body of 18,000 men, under the command of general d'Harville, occupied the Meuse from Givet to Namur ; having his out-posts at Ciney, Marche, and Rochefort. The army under general Miranda, consisting of 18,000 men, occupied the left, from Tongres to Ruremonde.

The garrison of the Netherlands was composed of some battalions lately arrived from France. The line thus formed along the Meuse amounted from 65,000 to 70,000 men ; and it would have been sufficient to have seized upon the country between the Meuse and the Rhine, and to have occupied the banks of that last river from Burick to Cologne, if it had been possible, first, to take Maestricht, which General Dumourier was not permitted to attempt, although he had proposed it in the beginning of December, and had it then in his power to effect ; secondly to place a garrison in Juliers, which was also forbidden him, because it was deemed necessary to keep terms with the Elector Palatine, lest he should deliver the passage of Manheim to the Imperial army, by which means they would have cut off the army of Custine from Alsace ; and, lastly, if the army of Belgia had been supplied with provisions,

sions, ammunition, arms, cloathing, and money, it might have marched in the month of December, and have forced the Imperialists to re-pass the Rhine.

Without being in possession either of Guelders, Venloo, or Maestrecht, General Dumourier was convinced of the impracticability of retaining his position on the Meuse; and to this effect he wrote to the Convention, and to the minister of the war department. His sentiments on this subject will be found in his correspondence with Pache, printed in January 1793. Toward the close of the preceding November his quarrel commenced with that Minister, with the Jacobins who supported him, and with the convention, who had not discernment to see the effects of his criminal conduct.

The trial of the unfortunate king commenced in January. It was the remarkable mildness and benevolence of this monarch's character, that brought him to the scaffold. From that instant, the general foresaw the crimes and misfortunes that have since sprung from the chaos in France. He attempted to sound the dispositions of his army respecting the king, but his staff officers, whom he employed in the task effected nothing, and thenceforward the General was proscribed. Not one soldier, not one officer, would reflect on the impending fate of the king: a general apathy, pervaded the whole army; and upon observing their phlegmatic disposition General Dumourier was determined to accelerate his proposed visit to the capital of France.

C H A P. III.

General Dumourier proceeds from Leige to Paris.

WHILE resident in the palace of the Prince Bishop of Leige, General Dumourier was from a variety of causes oppressed with chagrin; and, if it ca-
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be a consolation to that Prelate; he may read, with pleasure, that, after the most splendid victories, this general was more unfortunate than himself. He had been harrassed by the calumnies of the Jacobins, from the moment that he had saved France, by driving a formidable foe out of her territory. The conquest of Belgia had increased the *column of his enemies*, to express himself in the words he used to the national convention, after the battle of Jemappe. He almost reproached himself with having, by the ingratitude of his fellow-citizens, lost the opportunity of quitting the command that was offered him on his return from Champagne. He had caused the war to be declared, in his former situation as minister of foreign affairs; he had afterwards conducted it with glory as a general; he had nothing therefore to reproach himself on these accounts; but he saw the successes of the war mouldering away, and he could not but be penetrated with grief, since the important share he had taken in the public concerns, during nine months, had incorporated his fate with that of his country.

His councils were disregarded, and all his letters and memorials were either rejected, or misinterpreted. Cambon declared, nothing could be more dangerous to a republic than a victorious general. It was laid down as an axiom in the tribune of the national convention, that ingratitude was a necessary virtue in republicans. The Convention withheld the recompences due to the heroes of Champagne and Belgia, because the General had demanded them. By a decree, they authorized the minister of war to annul the nomination of officers made by the generals, and the corps was consequently destitute of officers. Strangers, without qualification for public services, came into France, to gather the fruits of the toils of the army. The General complained of these things to the national convention; and declared, if they would not do him right respecting them, both as to the wants of his army and the other evils, which
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were the cause of its imbecily and disorganization, he should be compelled to resign his command.

The general forcibly urged the indispensable necessity of revoking the unpopular, impolitic, and unjust decree of the 15th of December, which had nearly driven the Belgians into a state of dissention. Notwithstanding the remonstrances of the general, it was resolved in the convention, that the decree should take place on the first of January. Cambon had obtained this decision, being aided by the support of the commissioners Camus, Gosuin, Danton, and La Croix; and the two latter boasted, that they had done so, to avenge themselves for an insult they had received at Ath, where they had been refused a lodging. The general's honour was concerned in preventing the execution of the tyrannical decree, because when he entered the Netherlands, on the third of November he published, with the sanction of the national convention, a proclamation, declaring to the Belgians, that the French entered their country as friends and brethren; that they came to give them entire liberty; and that the people should be left to chuse their own constitution, and mode of government, without interference of the French. The decree not only destroyed the force of this proclamation, but also robbed the unhappy Belgians of all remains of liberty. The commissioners sequestered the public property, and that of the clergy; this nation no longer possessed any public revenue, nor the authorities necessary to preserve even the form of government.

In the plunder of this country, which had not been reduced by the force of arms, but had voluntarily united itself to the republic of France, Cambon hoped to find considerable resource for the prosecution of the war. This criminal and sordid conduct produced no benefit to France; on the contrary, it not only deprived her of 40,000 men, that the Belgians were willing to furnish, and fifty millions of livres, that they would have poured into the French treasury, to contribute

bute to the defence of their liberty ; but was followed by the loss of those fine provinces, and excited a detestation of the national convention and their commissioners, that will never be removed.

One of the clauses of this decree, enjoined the generals to carry the whole into execution, and to place the seals on the public property. General Dumourier rejected this dishonourable employment ; and the commissioners gave the charge to Ronfin, who employed as his instruments, soldiers and clerks of office, all Jacobins, who purloined one half the wealth they were ordered to secure in the name of the republic.

Unable to repress the iniquitous proceedings, the general determined, at least, to mark his disapprobation of them as much as he could, to the Belgians, by being absent, if that were possible, while they should be transacting. On these, and all the other subjects of his vexation, he explained his sentiments so clearly to the commissioners, and general Valence supported his reasonings with such force, that in a conference at Liege, between the commissioners, the generals, and the administrators that were entrusted with providing subsistence for the army ; when it was clearly explained to these commissioners, that so far from supplying him with means of proceeding, they were not able to furnish the provisions necessary for enabling him to maintain the position he then held at Liege.

At length, it was determined that Camus, president of the commission, should return to Paris, attended by general Thovenot, the first to make a suitable report to the national convention, and the second to lay before the military committee an account of the wants of the army, and to obtain the necessary arrangements, and also solid and ample contracts for establishing magazines on the Meuse, and more than all the rest, to obtain a revocation of the decree of the 15th of December, which added the whole Belgic nation to the enemies of France.

The journey, however, was altogether unsuccessful,
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notwithstanding the talents of general Thouvenot, because Camus opinionated, deceitful, and vulgar, not contented with engrossing all the honour of the embassy, assumed the sole right of speaking, supported the decree, and yielded to the will of others respecting the article of the committee of contracts. Thus, instead of removing the evils complained of, he only increased the general's difficulties and embarrassments.

In the interim, general Dumourier retired to the palace of Liege, and employed himself in reflecting upon his unfortunate circumstances, and soliciting permission to repair to Paris. He repeatedly stated in his letters and memorials, that it would be impossible for him to continue in command, if the convention did not abolish the committee of contracts, which was composed of men of the most imprincipled characters, who had rendered abortive all the engagements he had entered into for purchases from the Belgians; and he expostulated on the expediency of displacing the war-minister, through whose misconduct the armies had already been nearly brought to ruin.

Such were the ostensible motive on which the general demanded leave to go to Paris. He had another, however, much more essential; but which he concealed with the utmost care. It was to endeavour to save the unfortunate Louis the XVIth, by representing to the governing party, the danger to which the nation was exposed, from the neighbouring states, and the necessity of forming a solid plan for the campaign, which it would be necessary to commence at a very early period. This consideration, aided by the influence he supposed himself to have over some of the partizans in the convention, might be the means of protracting the trial of the king.

Such was the embarrassed situation of general Dumourier, and such were the objects that engrossed his attention, at the time when the Jacobins were using their utmost endeavours to exhibit a criminal accusation against him; and when they pretended that he
had

had passed his time surrounded by courtezans and actresses. They indeed had sent him a detachment from the opera ; but these returned to Paris after a stay of no more than twenty-four hours. This expedition, and that of a troop of comedians from the theatre of Montanfier, cost the nation more than 100,000 livres, the government pretending to inculcate French revolutionary principles to the Belgians, by exhibiting democratic pieces on their theatres. The general disdained to be the encourager of such follies. All that he saw of these deputies from the opera was at his table, having invited them to dinner. And certainly they conducted themselves with much decency and good sense ; discovering more sagacity than the ministers that sent them.

To obtain his leave of absence, was found a matter of great difficulty. Pache and the Jacobins feared his presence at Paris. Having in vain, pleaded the state of his health, and his need of repose, he was at length, compelled to engage the commissioners to demand the leave of absence directly in their own names, and to declare solemnly his determination to resign in case of refusal.

Notwithstanding the irregularities and vices that infected the army, there remained a sentiment of justice among the soldiers, which secured their attachment to a general, with whom they had always been victorious, and to whom they could no way attribute their present distress. The commissioners therefore declared in their letters, that the army would certainly disband themselves, should the general resign. The leave of absence arrived, and the general prepared instantly to depart ; after La Croix had proposed to make a tour with him to Aix-la-Chapelle, in the hopes of detaining him still longer in that country. But Dumas had secretly determined never more to resume the command ; and was not willing, by visiting the quarters, to make a tacit engagement with the soldiers for his return.

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On his arrival at Brussels, Dumourier found the command of that place had devolved to general Moreton. This man, who died in good time at Douay, had played a very curious part at Paris in the revolution. He was an aristocrat, taking that word in its most odious acceptation. He had been colonel of the regiment of La Fère, and had been broken under the old government, for the vilest acts of military despotism. Resentment threw him into the hands of the republican party; and his influence in the councils of the Palais Royal, had made him one of the chief actors in the revolution. Become secretary of the Jacobins, he plotted to procure a revision of his former sentence; but the sentence remained in its original state. He was afterwards appointed colonel in the army of the north; and as he was well acquainted with all the parts of the discipline of the infantry, and had considerable ability, general Dumourier appointed him chief of the staff to the army of the north.

Upon the departure of Dumourier, to take the command in Champagne, Moreton found himself unable to penetrate into his intentions; and though a man of undoubted courage, his misconduct at the breaking up of the camp at Maulde, was so offensive to the inhabitants of Valenciennes, that he was in danger of being put to a violent death by them.

Upon the return of general Dumourier to the army of the north, which had then become the army of Belgia, he restored Moreton to the rank of major general. But as Thouvenot possessed qualities for the situation, which Moreton wanted, Dumourier made the latter lieutenant-general by seniority (for six months was sufficient to advance men to the highest rank by seniority in this revolutionary army); and gave him the command at Brussels and in Brabant, in order to make general Thouvenot head of the staff. Moreton then threw off all restraint towards general Dumourier; and entirely gained over by the Jacobins, to whom he already owed many obligations, he opposed
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the sentiments and judgment of his general in every possible way. He adopted the decree of the 15th of December ; and became hateful to the people of Brabant.

General Dumourier found him surrounded by the Jacobin populace. A newly raised corps, assuming the name of Sans Culottes, came to harangue the general, and made use of the phrases *thou* and *citizen*. Dumourier was offended with this grossness ; and plainly told them, that being chiefly French soldiers, they ought not to address him in such familiar phrases, because such expressed an equality inconsistent with the discipline of an army ; that they ought to call him *general* or *citizen-general*. but never *citizen* without such like addition. He ordered their statutes to be brought to him, and told them that on his return from Paris, he would decide respecting them : for this mob demanded pay ; and were really paid, though unknown to the general, with the consent of the commissioners, as a recompense for their services, or rather for the atrocious vexations of which they had been the authors.

Previous to this period, general Dumourier had transmitted a proclamation to Liege, the object of which was, to induce the Belgians to hold their primary meetings, and without delay to convene an assembly of their constituents ; for in the decree of the 15th of December it was said, that the sequestration of the public property should cease, when the people of Belgia should have chosen their representatives. The commissioners saw clearly, that the appointment of an assembly would restore the Belgians to their liberty, and would deprive the commissioners of the administration of the public revenue, and especially of the opportunity of plundering of the churches. They therefore delayed the publishing of the general's proclamation ; and afterwards opposed its execution, and prevented the holding of the primary assemblies at Alost, the place Dumourier had appointed, with a view
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to counteract the influence of the populace of Brussels. The general had been warned by the example of Louis the XVIth. who might have avoided the influence of Paris, by assembling the states-general at Tours, Orleans, Blois, or Bruges, instead of at Versailles. General Dumourier now hastened to Paris, seeing no probable means remaining of rescuing the Belgians from the tyranny of the national convention.

C H A P. IV.

General Dumourier arrives at Paris.

ON his arrival at Paris, on the first of January, general Dumourier considered, that during his residence in that capital, and after the expulsion of the Prussians from Champagne, Marat and the other Jacobin journalists, had reproached him for appearing at the theatre, and with seeking popularity, and therefore resolved to avoid all places of public resort, to live as privately as possible, and to see only his particular friends, or such persons as might be useful to him in the objects of his journey.

For five successive days, he confined himself to his apartment, employing that time in drawing up four memorials; the first, on the necessity of recalling the decree of the 15th of December, which had been confirmed, and even aggravated by two decrees passed on the 28th and 31st of the same month; the second, respecting the ill effects of the committee of contracts, and the expediency of replacing on the old footing the the supply of the army with provisions forage, horses, clothing, &c. by the appointment of intelligent contractors; and the third, and fourth on military affairs, and the plans of the ensuing campaign. He concluded each of these memorials by a new declaration of his resolution to resign, if the national convention

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should neglect any of these objects. He accompanied them by a letter to the president, requesting him to engage the convention to form a new committee for the purpose of treating with the generals, both as to the wants of the armies, and military operations, to be in future pursued.

The memorials and letters were, on the 17th of January, transmitted to the president, whose name was Treillhard, who had formerly been an advocate, and who, shortly after this, was joined with Merlin of Douay, another advocate, to the four former commissioners of Belgia. The president, neglecting to communicate the papers to the convention, general Dumourier wrote him another letter, preremptory but concise.

A summary account of this affair was given to the convention on the 17th of the same month. The letter was read, but the memorials were suppressed there, and sent to a committee of twenty-one members, recently established, under the name of the committee of general safety. The most popular members of all the other committees had been selected for this committee. They opened their sittings on the 13th, and the general was invited to attend. The memorials being read, ignorant and frivolous disputes succeeded. All spoke together; and, after sitting three hours, they broke up without the least progress. A further memorial, detailed on certain points, was demanded of the general. As to the plan of the campaign, the members unanimously agreed utterly to decline the consideration of it, alledging that it belonged to the executive council.

In the evening of the 15th, the general attended a second sitting of the committee, with a memorial containing a minute statement of the required information. There were not more than half the members present. They dropped in one after another; and, running slightly through the memorial, which was
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very long and intricate, no more took place on the subject.

In the mean time general Valence arrived from the army, and being admitted to the committee, he read a memorial respecting the recruiting and new modelling of the army. He proposed that the infantry should be divided into brigades by incorporating two batallions of the national guards with each batallion of the line. This project, adopted by the convention in the midst of the ensuing campaign, compleated the ruin of the French army, by rendering it a body of mere volunteers without restraint or discipline. The attention of the committee, whose trifling and inquisitive dispositions was equalled only by their ignorance and indifference to the public welfare, was caught by this novelty, although it ought never to have been discussed but in a time of peace, or at least, not till the conclusion of the campaign ; and the committee entirely threw aside the important objects contained in the papers presented by general Dumourier.

Having quitted the army of Alsace, and taken upon himself the command of that in the county of Nice, general Biron assisted at the third sitting, and read a very pressing memorial, respecting the new commissaries and the committee of contracts. The minister of war being summoned to attend, and not being able to answer to the accusations of the three generals, was very grossly treated by the committee, charmed with finding an opportunity of humbling a minister. They had however a just occasion in the present instance, for the minister had no other defence to produce than the statements, which were taxed with being false. And the whole affair was referred to the military committee.

At a fourth committee, only five members attended, and they did not proceed to business ; but, on separating, they told general Dumourier, that they would send for him when they should have occasion to consult him again. Immediately the general retired

to a small country house at Clichy, from whence he repaired every day to Paris, in the prosecution of his greatest object, that of saving the king. He was never again called to attend the committee of general safety. All the important affairs were suspended at this time, for the pursuit of a measure that involved the ruin of the nation. The convention were occupied by nothing but the trial of the king; which was prosecuted with the greatest bitterness and most indecent barbarity.

On the event of his memorials, general Dumourier believed the salvation or the ruin of his country to depend. Had they been adopted, he would have appeared in the convention, and publicly manifested his zeal in favour of the unfortunate monarch. He flattered himself, that in this undertaking he should have an important influence. He would have been supported by a number of officers and soldiers of his army, who were on leave of absence at Paris, and by adding other means to these, he would have commanded a party sufficiently strong to counteract the Jacobins, and their support, the federates. This resource was lost; and, far from being able to save the king, the general, destitute of power and influence, and considered as a man dangerous to the republic, because he disapproved of the crimes that were committing, feared only to injure Louis XVI. by precipitating the horrible catastrophe, which thenceforward appeared inevitable, and has since been the cause of his uninterrupted and inexhaustible grief.

General La Bourdonnaye, a man of very confined talents, and in all other respects contemptible, in revenge for having lost the command of the army of the north in the preceeding year, in consequence of complaints made against him by general Dumourier, published throughout Paris, that the general had no other object in coming there than to save *the most honest man in the kingdom*. It was an appellation that indeed general Dumourier had very justly given to the king, in a letter

letter written in 1791 ; and which had been printed, as well as the other papers, found in the iron chest delivered up to the convention by Roland.

The Jacobins, and particularly Marat and his faction, industriously circulated the same report. It was said that the general held consultations with Roland and the Girondists every evening. And these last, offended that he was unwilling to consult with any but the Jacobins in private, spread the rumour that he was accustomed to hold secret meetings with Philip Egalité : that man unworthy of bearing the title of duke of Orleans.

Dumourier daily attended the council, returning in the evening to Clichy. But he never dined with any of the ministers, excepting Le Brun and Garat. He shunned the houses of Monge, minister of the marine ; Roland, minister of the home department ; Claviere, minister of the finances ; and above all, that of Pache, minister of the war department.

The office of the war department was become the most disgusting place imaginable ; here four hundred clerks, and a number of women, carried slovenliness in appearance, and coarseness of manners, to an extreme ; public business was neglected, and speculation and rapacity were committed upon all parties. Several of the villains employed in this department, having Hassenfratz and Meusneir at their head, worked day and night to collect false depositions, and to forge papers, to substantiate the accusation that Hassenfratz had made at the Jacobin society against the general, with having embezzled twelve hundred thousand livres in his contracts in Belgia. They excited the hatred of the federates against the general ; and often, in passing by groups of these, he has heard them propose in a loud voice to place his head on the top of a pike. One day in particular, he thought himself happy in escaping through a narrow passage from a gang of those federates in the street of Montmartre, being warned against them by a tradesman who knew him,

he having formerly lived two years in the same street. In the general meetings of the sections and in the coffee-houses, men were paid to declaim against him ; and it was more than once in contemplation to seize upon his person.

The execrable Santerre, commander of the national guards at Paris, professed a great attachment to general Dumourier ; and frequently pressed him to dine with his brother-in-law. His design was to entice him to dine with Marat. The general always declined the invitation ; but, that he might escape assassination, he was under the necessity of using the most condescending excuses for declining to attend.

The general's situation was rendered still more critical, by a circumstance which took place at this time, although he had no concern in it. Colonel Westerman had caned Marat on the Pont-neuf, for having, in his journal, accused the colonel of being the creature of general Dumourier, and the principle instrument of his frauds. Marat thirsted to avenge himself on the general whom he supposed to be the cause of the insult. Dumourier every day received intimations of Marat's designs against him, both from particular friends, and by anonymous letters ; and the general for the first time in his life, adopted the precaution of carrying pistols in his pocket.

While at table with the general, one day Du Bois de Crancé, one of the most cruel and cowardly of the Jacobins, shewed a disposition to offend him, imagining that he would be terrified by his great bulk and the ferocity of his air. General Dumourier laid hold of him, and imposed silence upon him very effectually. Du Bois de Crancé, in revenge, repeated every day in the convention, that Dumourier despised its members, painting it as an assembly consisting of four hundred fools headed by three hundred robbers. Thus a violent storm gathered round the general, who having been long before proscribed, his inveterate enemies
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now only waited for an opportunity to arrest and bring him to trial.

CHAP. V.

Trial of Louis XVI.

THE trial of the king was precipitated with the utmost rancour of animosity, and the most barbarous triumph. The trial is in the hands of all the nations of Europe. The proofs, documents, and pleadings are published, and will remain the dishonour of the French nation to all posterity. Never was crime committed with such cowardice, and such deliberate malice. More than an hundred and fifty members of the pretended tribunal, had printed and published their opinion, even before they had been made acquainted the facts and papers, on which it ought to have been founded. They ought therefore to have abstained from giving their vote, or their votes ought to have been rejected; but the unfortunate Louis XVI. had none of the privileges of an accused man on his trial. It is astonishing that the three hundred and ten members, who had the courage to vote for the preserving the king's life, in spite of the daggers at their throats, had not resolutely insisted, that each of the judges who had given his opinion publicly in writing, should be incapacitated from voting. But those friends of humanity will pardon this reflection in an historians who, far from designing to cast any reproach upon them, wishes to have the power of raising a column to their names, as deserving of remembrance as were the names of the heroes of Marathon.

The most dissolute and corrupt assembly that ever was convened, comprised three hundred and ten men who acted with conscience and courage, in the midst of general depravity and cowardice, and to whom the royal family of France has an eternal obligation.

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Just and humane citizens, receive the homage of a soldier, who acknowledges more fortitude in your conduct, than he has shewn, or than he has seen, in all his battles where he commanded with such success and glory !

This is the disinterested homage of a man, who expects no favours from kings, and who is an unfeigned and ardent friend to liberty. That country which he has served with the pure zeal of patriotism, he found himself compelled to renounce ; foreseeing, that from the false policy of the combined powers, she must again be reduced to the intolerable yoke of an arbitrary government, or remain a republic, under the pernicious and oppressive system of the Jacobins. He has abandoned every hope of seeing France governed by a constitutional king, subject to the controul of, and at the same time the protector of the law. Your virtues will appear the more splendid from being contrasted to the conduct of the Girondines, whose proceedings, as far as they are known, shall be recorded in the page of history, whose province it is to perpetuate the infamy of guilt.

Whether it was ever the intention of the Girondine party to save the king, is a question difficult to be decided. It does not seem that we can discover the truth, but in distinguishing two periods of very different characters, in the existence of this faction, and consequently the designs of its ambitious members, which varied with the change of circumstances.

After having influenced the convention and the ministry, it is undoubtedly true that the Girondists aspired to the establishing of a republic, as the means of perpetuating their power. They had subdued the Feuillans, the moderate party, and the Royalists. They had enlisted most of the daily journals on their side. The Paris Journal, the Chronicle, the Monitor, the Patriot, the Thermometor, the Journals of Gorsas and of Carra, in a word, were all esteemed, and in great circulation, and written, corrected, and edited by the
members

members of this faction. The best orators of the convention, Guadet, Verginiaux, La Source, Brissot, Genfonné, and Condorcet, gave reputation and currency to the opinions of the faction. They had seized upon the direction of the principle committees. Sieyes and Condorcet were at the head of the committee of the constitution. Brissot and Genfonné, governed the diplomatic committee, associated with that of general safety. The committee of finances was entirely at the devotion of Cambon, whom the Girondine party, at that time, believed to be their partizan. And they ruled Paris during all the mayoralty of Pethion.

The Girondine party may be called the Jesuits of the revolution. They acted on the same political principles; they possessed at first the same unlimited power; blinded, afterwards, in a like manner, by pride, they committed the same faults, and underwent the same fate. During their reign, they contemned and insulted the royal family. Pethion, in the same carriage with the king and queen, on their return from Varennes, took every occasion to declare that he no longer designed to support the monarchy. The unfortunate queen related the fact to general Dumourier; and Pethion afterwards acknowledged it to him.

A change of circumstances took place in November 1792. The popularity of KING PETHION, for so he was called in Paris, had sunk under the ascendancy of the Jacobins, and the Marseillois, whom the Jacobins had gained by patriotic orgies. A weak but honest man named Chambon, had succeeded Pethion in the mayoralty. He was despised, and without power. The Jacobins tyrannized over this sections; and the commune of Paris assumed an authority, independent of, and often superior to that of the convention.

Depending on his influence in Marseilles, Barbaroux, a Girondine, who was a deputy from that city, undertook to bring a new body of men from Marseilles; and, mean while, the party employed Roland, then

then minister of the interior department, to invite the departments to send federates to relieve Paris and the convention from the tyranny of the former body of Marseillois. Nothing could be more imprudent than this measure. It could not fail to produce a civil war in Paris, unless the new federates, gained over like the others, by the Jacobins, should acquire sufficient strength to resist the power of their adversaries.

The intrigues of the Girondists were displayed in lively colours by Danton, La Croix, Roberspierre, and Marat. Impartial men in the convention, saw the dangerous ambition of Girondine faction. It was then that the party ought to have adopted a decisive conduct in defending the innocence of the king, and opposing the sentence of death; and then, had they fallen, they would, at least, have fallen with honour. But it is most probable that, on the contrary, their efforts would have been successful, that the departments would have joined them to save the king and the country, and the Jacobins would have been crushed. But the Girondine party possessed not the courage their situation demanded. They contented themselves with proposing an inadequate appeal to the people on the fate of Louis XVI. And this was considered as holding out another signal of civil war.

Though disconcerted and terrified by their antagonists, the Girondists did not save themselves by their pusillanimity in voting with the Jacobins against the unfortunate monarch, who at length, fell a victim to the false policy of his cruel and emplaceable enemies.

While compassion for his misfortunes seemed for a moment to hold the fate of the king in suspense, Pethion had the cruelty to recal to the recollection of his auditors, the occurrences on the 9th and 10th of August, and having basely impressed their minds with this aggravating prejudice, he concluded by voting for death. The veiled opinion of Condorcet, amounted to the same sentence. The conduct of this artful schoolman, abounding in subtlety, and destitute of feeling,

feeling, has been equally atrocious in every stage of the revolution. Brissot, Guadet, Genfonné, and Vergeniaux, were even eager to vote contrary to their sentiments they were known to entertain.

No article of accusation exhibited against the king had sufficient weight to justify the sentence pronounced against him. The catastrophe of the 10th of August, was no crime to be imputed to him. Carra had the audacity to publish in his journal, and declare in the convention, that the event of that day had been prepared by a committee of five persons, among whom were Pethion, Roberspierre, and himself; that the committee met in a small public house in the Faubourg St. Antoine; that the scheme of obliging the king to arm and oppose the people, had failed twice, and had even been on the point of failing on the 10th of August. Hence it is clear, had this paper of Carra, been produced on the trial, it had justified the king, by proving the necessity of his taking up arms in his own defense. But neither justice, sound policy, nor good sense, had any concern in this horrid proceeding.

It seems that providence should have destined this period for the eminent disgrace of France, and for the final decision of the fate of that unhappy country.

All circumstances conspired to injure the cause of the oppressed and innocent king. Even the emigrants, in the zeal of a mistaken attachment, adopted measures that were fatal to him. Bertrand, ex-minister of the marine, a refugee in England, imagined he could save Louis by sending to the convention authentic papers, proving, that the leaders of both parties had negotiated with the king in secret. Danton and La Croix, especially, were so directly implacated in the papers, that their credit had been utterly ruined, if Danton, master of the mountain, (Jacobin party) and La Croix, who influenced the plain, (the independent part of the convention) had not united their efforts to bury the memory of those papers with the ill-fated king. The zeal of Bertrand, instead of saving Louis, hastened

hastened his death. The murder was committed. On the guilty evening, all the theatres were full. Unhappy Frenchmen! When you shall read this chapter, bathed with the tears of him who offers the picture of the greatest of your crimes to your view, you shall tremble for yourselves, and you shall acknowledge the justice of the severe retribution that awaits the horrid enormity of your complicated guilt!

CHAP VI.

Ineffectual attempts of General Dumourier in favour of the King.

OF all the frivolous and unfounded aspersions discharged against general Dumourier by the emigrants, that which has obtained most credit with uninformed and superficial men, is that he did not avail himself of the ascendancy which his victories had given him over his army, to lead it to Paris, and liberate the king. But it is to be considered, first, that his influence with his army was always very precarious, and events afterwards proved that was not to be relied on; secondly, that this army was more than a hundred leagues from Paris, and in want of every necessary for a march, not being able even to quit the country of Liege, without great hazard of losing its artillery for the want of horses; that this step would have abandoned that country to the Austrians, who also would have followed him; and that it would have been a degree of treachery to the honour and interests of the French nation, which would have cost the general and all his principal officers their heads, before they could even have entered France; thirdly, that this army had for some time been in an absolute incapacity of proceeding even to the Rhine, which was only twenty leagues distant, and consequently could not accomplish the longer march to Paris.

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It must, however, be mentioned, that it was not the intention of General Dumourier to lead the whole of his army, but a chosen detachment of troops of the line, to Paris. But the example of Fayette, taught him to regard this measure as a perilous extremity; and some legal form and pretence was wanting to give it colour, and to preserve him the confidence of his soldiers in the execution of it. He had declared, and written, and often repeated, to the leaders of the Girondine party, and especially to Barrere, who has since occasioned such mischief by his versatility, that, if the convention was overawed, they had but to write four lines in the form of a decree, and he would forthwith march 20,000 men to their assistance. Whether it were the effect of timidity, or a confidence in their own secret resources, the members that were still considered as the most respectable in the assembly, were unwilling to comply with this proposition. Indeed their views, such as they have since been discovered to be, would naturally prevent them from placing much confidence in the general, whom they knew to be perfectly attached to the constitution and to the re-establishment of order. There appearing no probability of such a decree as the general had pointed out, and governed by the motives that have been amply detailed in the foregoing chapters, he departed singly for Paris; but he had sent before him on leave of absence, many of the officers commanding corps, and other officers, and soldiers, both of the line and national guards, and among them some Parisians, all of whom had promised him their services in behalf of the king. It is to be observed also that at the time of his departure, although the trial of Louis XVI. was begun, it could not be foreseen, especially by one at the distance of an hundred leagues, that the issue would have been so speedy and fatal. It was well known to the general, that the criminal ferocity of the Jacobins would incite the convention to press forward this hateful and bloody catastrophe, by every

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means within their reach: but he thought that the Girondists, not for honest, but political reasons, and considerations for their personal safety would spin out this affair, and so give him time to take measures for the rescue of the king. It was not till his arrival at Paris that he knew the true state of things, and saw how inadequate his resources were to the magnitude of the undertaking.

A friendly correspondence had always subsisted between General Dumourier and Gensonné, a deputy from the department of Gironde; a misunderstanding had taken place between them the preceding year, at the time when the general quitted the army; but he found no difficulty in excusing the injurious conduct he had noticed in this deputy. He had discovered in Gensonné great capacity and judgment, and a humane disposition; and he willingly renewed his connections with him. General Dumourier opened his mind relative to the king. He expressed his horror at the crime that was about to stain the nation; he made him sensible that such a detestable triumph given to the Jacobins would end in the ruin of all the honest part of the nation, and would render the anarchy that afflicted France incurable; that such of the nations of Europe as had regarded with indifference, and perhaps with pleasure, our interior struggles, our war with Austria and Prussia, and perhaps were not unwilling to see our successes against those two powers, could not but be shocked at the barbarity of murdering Louis XVI.; and would be thenceforward engaged in honour to join the enemies of France, till we should have every power in Europe united against us. These reflections seemed to make great impression on Gensonné; but, to whatever cause it was owing, he undertook nothing and even avoided the general, who had afterward little opportunity of seeing him.

The general had frequent conferences with several other deputies of the same party, as well as with many
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of the independent members of the convention, to whom he represented that, the nation being now republic, Louis was to be treated simply as an individual; that it was indecent, impolitic, and unreasonable to waste time, that ought to be employed in preparations against the dangers of the ensuing campaign, and in reinforcing the armies, in the prosecution of the trial of a single man, whose fate was of little importance to the nation at large; and that it would be wise at least to suspend this useless measure till after the war. The more reasonable of them acknowledged the trial to be an unjust and unwise proceeding, but said, that the members of the *Mountain* had taken their measures, and, should the trial now be abandoned by the convention, the Jacobins would excite an insurrection, fall upon the temple, and massacre the whole of the prisoners. Upon this the general observed, that, he could not think they were sufficiently authorised by their constituents to try the king; that, since they made an affair of consequence of the trial, it appeared to him it would be necessary to their own security to demand instructions in precise terms on the point from the departments, lest one day they should be reproached for the deed by the nation, and become personally responsible for the irregularity and violence of the act. They answered, that the imprudent proposal of appealing to the people made by the Girondine party had deprived them of the resource the general now proposed: since it was feared the convoking of the primary assemblies for such instructions would be the signal of a civil war.

An expedient that seemed to have considerable weight with these deputies, was now suggested by the general; but it failed of effect, because every man seeing a poignard at his breast, chose rather to be a murderer than a victim. The idea was, that a long war had existed between the nation and the king, that the day of the tenth of August had decided the
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fate of both ; that the king had fallen into their hands and could no longer be considered as any thing but a prisoner of war, though without criminality, because both parties had in like manner had recourse to arms ; that a foreign war raged against the nation ; and that they ought to deem themselves fortunate in having a precious hostage in this prisoner, who might serve them in a case of extremity ; and it was added, that should they persist in thinking the king guilty, they ought to form a tribunal authorised to collect facts, examine witnesses, and prepare the way for a final decision, with a deliberation due to the subject ; that this act of justice would satisfy the bitterest enemies of royalty, would give the people time to reflect, and the convention an opportunity to finish the constitution, which was the grand object of their mission ; and when the primary assemblies should be convoked for the acceptance of the constitution, all the proceedings of the tribunal might be laid before them, and they be called upon to decide the fate of the king.

Having expressed these sentiments, both in conversation and in writing, the general had an interview with Pethion with whom till this period he had been on terms of friendship, and represented to him, that it became him personally to interest himself in behalf of Louis XVI. since otherwise, a malignity of mind would be imputed to him, that certainly was not in his character. Pethion appeared to be moved by the general's reasoning ; and declared that personally he *loved* the king, and that he would exert his utmost influence to save him.

Through the medium of one of his friends, the general now applied to Roberspierre, representing, that, it was entirely in his power to avert the impending fate of the king, and that the magnanimity of the action would immortalize his name, and that, in consequence of it the generals of the army would look up to him as the first man in the state, and that the dictatorship would be the reward of his virtue ; but
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that otherwise he would fall into the same contempt and execration as Marat, with whose name that of Roberspierre would thenceforth be constantly associated. This idea the general knew to be particularly odious to Roberspierre.

Knowing that the convention was held in contempt, and the Girondists detested by the Jacobins, the general, by confidential agents, hinted to the latter, that if they wished to become masters of France and Europe, and to rise on the ruins of the national convention, they had only to declare their will that the trial of Louis should be suspended, and that a more important object, the state of war, ought to engage their attention.

A deputy of the convention and a Jacobin named Drouet, the post-master at Menehould, who arrested the king at Varennes, had a brother, an honest and faithful man, who was in the service of the General and strongly attached to his interest. He gave this man instructions to prepare his brother's mind for the impressions he wished it to receive, and afterwards to bring him to Clichy. The general painted to Drouet the crime he and his associates were committing against the king, with such energy, that Drouet, struck with horror, promised to move for the suspension of the trial, both in the convention and in the club of the Jacobins. Had there been one member sufficiently resolute to make the proposition, the king had been saved. No one had the courage Drouet fell sick and was not present when the sentence was past.

The general daily visited various parts of Paris, went into the shops and houses of individuals, and took occasion always to turn the conversation to the king's trial. He observed how strange a circumstance it seemed that the convention should suddenly become a tribunal; that if Louis were still king, the nation ought to decide by whom and with what forms he should be judged; that if he were no longer

king, it was unfit that time so precious to the nation should be lost in enquiring into the guilt of an individual. And to these considerations he added reflections on the mild virtues and misfortunes of Louis XVI. Sometimes he was listened to with eagerness and pity; but frequently he was requested to forbear speaking of so *dangerous* a topic, and sometimes condemned for introducing it.

At times, he exposed himself to serious danger by expressing his surprize, that in a great city like Paris, there should not be five or six thousand men with courage sufficient to rise against two or three thousand villains who, calling themselves Federates, held the city in absolute subjection. A well-informed tradesman, casting down his eyes and blushing with shame, made this answer one day to the general: "*Citizen*, I see what you would have us to do, but we are cowards, and the king will be sacrificed. What do we hope from a city that, having 80,000 armed men, suffered itself to be intimidated on the first days of September, by less than 6000 Marseillois and Bretons?" The general left the man's house, and retired to an unfrequented part of a public walk to indulge in his melancholy reflections.

Such of the soldiers in his army as the general had occasional opportunities of conversing with, appeared to be devoted to the levelling system, and to be infected with phrenzy of the Federates: and some even joined the party of his enemies, filling the different clubs and meetings of the sections with absurd accusations against him.

These attempts to serve the king, which the general renewed every day in various forms and disguises, and with much risk to his own person, produced nothing but the dreadful certainty of the king's ruin. Paris seemed indifferent on the subject. During the twenty days previous to the death of the king, that he studied the temper of that city, he perceived not the smallest commiseration, neither among individuals nor
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in the public, in behalf of the unfortunate Louis. Nor did the approach of this shocking catastrophe induce the Parisians to abstain from any of their accustomed frivolous amusements.

C H A P. VII.

Death of the King of France.

THOUGH naturally of a robust constitution the health of general Dumourier yielded, for a while, to the acute vexations of his mind. On the 18th of January he fell sick, and was confined at his house at Clichy, till the 22d. He now resolved to quit Paris in a few days; and never to enter it more, till he should come to disperse that unworthy assembly, who were base and wicked enough, wantonly, precipitately, and without proof, to condemn to death an innocent king, who had ever loved his people, whose faults were not his own, who had banished the torture from criminal trials, who readily adopted every proposal for the public benefit, and had himself invited the nation to remedy all abuses and to provide for its happiness. Sovereigns are subject in common to many of the causes by which Louis XVI. was reduced to this unhappy condition; they are besieged and betrayed; they are kept in ignorance and see nothing as it really exists; nor have they power to quit the circle in which they are placed, in search of the virtuous man whose pure dignity shuns the corruption and insolence of courts. But it must have been the compleatest disorder that could hurry a whole nation to the murder of their king, after having often blessed and adored; and having compared him to Louis XII. Henry IV. and all the best, and most beloved of their monarchs. The club of Jacobins conducted the French to this pitch of folly and Barbarity.

The

The day on which the king was put to death, being the 21st of January, may be fixed as the epoch of the ruin of the republic, the restoration of monarchy, and there is reason to fear of the triumph of arbitrary and despotic power. The French nation began the career of liberty gloriously. Their first excesses were pardonable, since they resulted from the obstinacy of the abuses it was necessary to destroy. A noble constitution, although in some degree imperfect, seemed to secure the happiness of France. General Dumourier's Journeys into England, Germany, Swisserland, and Italy, at that period, convinced him of the general approbation it obtained. But the king, seduced by his perfidious counsellors, attempted to escape from his people, after having sworn to maintain the constitution. He was discovered and taken. The national Assembly of France acted as became a great nation. They restored the king to his rights; and from that instant the king ceased to be dangerous to the liberties of the people. He was governed faithfully by the principles of the constitution. They were engraven on his heart. If the king's ministers or courtiers still sought to violate the law, the constitution had provided a remedy for the evil. The agents of the executive power were responsible with their lives for misconduct in the government, but an absolute inviolability was attached to the person of the king. The third legislature of France, however, tended visibly to republicanism; they were bent on the overthrow of the constitution. It was necessary to raise new accusations against the king for his destruction; and to this object the Girondine faction proceeded with the most refined perfidy, while the Jacobins openly acted in the same cause with a wild and brutal insolence. Carra, and the journalists of the Jacobins, have placed this subject in the clearest light, in tracing the intrigues which engendered the catastrophe of the 10th of August.

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The transaction of the 21st of June was at once a prelude to that catastrophe, and a disgusting insult to the nation and the constitution, in the unfortunate person of the king. The ferocious Santerre was heard to say on that day. *We have failed now, but we will return again.* The national convention neither punished nor resented the insult. On the contrary, the two factions which, notwithstanding their mutual hatred had many wicked objects in common, were preparing for the execution of a greater plot; and to ensure success had assembled the Marseillois and Bretons from the extremities of the kingdom.

Thus is truly explained the original of the horrors of the decisive and fatal 10th of May. It is true, that the ministers, and generals took measures against the assembly and the Jacobins; supposing, however, that they were culpable, the law was armed against them, but ought to have had no operation on the king, who was both innocent and inviolable, and who was to be considered merely as the occasion, and not as the author of the steps taken in his name. The nation was convinced of this truth; and if Louis had been firm he had not fallen. His assassins basely punished the mildness of his character with death; and the mildness of his character should have pleaded for mercy.

From his religious principles this weak but benevolent prince derived a share of fortitude whereby he was enabled to submit to his martyrdom with exemplary heroism. The particulars of his death are preserved; and are inestimable aids in the study of the human heart. They add new aggravations to the crimes of the Parisians. An innumerable croud attended the execution. Barbarous joy or an unfeeling curiosity, were the only impressions that appeared in the guilty spectators. No one had the courage to shed a tear; and it will scarcely be believed, that the domestics of the good king pressed nearest to the scaffold, and were the most implacable of the multitude.

Arriving

Arriving at Paris on the 22d, General Dumourier repaired to the house of Garat, minister of justice, who seemed to be extremely affected by the death of the king, but more especially by the duty that had been imposed on him, and the other ministers, of reading the sentence to the king. The unfortunate Louis, during the solemn office, remained standing, with a tranquil and majestic countenance, neither offering remonstrance or complaint. He said only, that it was not just to charge him with treason, since his intentions had always been pure, and since he had constantly desired the welfare of his fellow citizens. After requesting a little time to prepare for his death, he dismissed the ministers with an air of dignity and gentleness, the remembrance of which affected Garat very much in speaking of it. General Dumourier, Cabanis, the friend and physician of Mirabeau, and the minister, were mutually affected. They read the will of this unfortunate prince. It had been written with his own hand. In some places there were erasures, but the writing was clear, and without any marks of being written with agitation. It contained four pages written on letter-paper. The first was consecrated to religion, and the homage was just; since, in that principle, he found courage, support, and consolation. The three other pages exhibited an example of magnanimity, reason and philosophy. This will, since published to the world, is one of the noblest writings that the mind ever produced under suffering circumstances. The monsters of the national convention have said, that this writing justified the king's sentence; because, having no object in common with the rest of the world, when on the point of becoming the victim of the ingratitude of his subjects, he had employed in two or three places the language of royalty, and disdained to flatter the prejudices of his assassins.

During the existence of a monarchy of fourteen hundred years, the French have assassinated many of their

their kings. But the deed was always the crime of an individual; the rage of the nation against the perpetrator was extreme; and the villain was punished with the most horrible tortures. It was reserved to an enlightened and philosophical age to produce a like crime, committed in the name of the whole French nation, approved by the majority, and regarded as an act of heroism.

It is inconsistent with reason to suppose that a republic erected upon the ruins of every principle of justice and humanity, can either prosper or subsist for any length of time. The monsters have killed Louis XVI. but they have restored royalty. This inconsiderate and changeable nation, always running to the extremes of passion, will herself massacre her iniquitous judges and her furious Jacobins, and run to adore new kings. The efforts for a reasonable liberty that have been made during three years by true patriots will be lost; and France will present the picture of a monarchy crowded with disgraces and crimes, dismembered and ruined, in which a rigid despotism must long combat a destructive anarchy, before the reign of laws can be restored: and then it shall not be the laws of the people. The whole of this generation, even those that are but newly born, shall endure the punishment of the atrocious crimes of four years: such crimes as posterity will scarcely believe it possible to have existed.

C H A P. VIII.

Conferences of Dumourier and Cambon.

HAVING pursued an uninterrupted narrative of the proceedings which led to the deplorable event which he could neither foresee nor obstruct, it will be necessary to speak of the other occupations of General Dumourier during this unhappy month of
January.

January. An essential object of his journey to Paris was to obtain the suppression of the decree of the 15th of December, or at least a tacit agreement from the convention, that it should not be put in execution in Brabant. He demonstrated to the convention, that the people of Brabant were wholly alienated from the French; that an open rebellion was to be feared, if the decree should be executed; that on the appearance of the Austrians in force, the French would have an additional enemy in the Belgians, who might easily attack their weakened garrisons, cut off their provisions, and render their retreat impossible. The convention were too presumptuous, and too much taken up with the king's trial to attend to these remonstrances.

The department of finance was under the most absolute controul of one individual member of the convention. This was Cambon, a man of a most irregular mind; ignorant and destitute of sound principles, yet scheming and unrelenting in his projects. D'Espagnac had been arrested on the 22d of November, along with Malus, for fulfilling an engagement that they had made with Servan respecting carriages for the army, and which was very important to the nation. He was still a prisoner at Paris; but at liberty to go about with a guard. He possessed a mind abounding in resources. He had gained the confidence of Cambon on all the subjects of finance, and offered to procure the General a conference with this dictator of the national treasury; the General consented, and they went to breakfast with Cambon. This man boasted of having obtained and supported the decree of the 15th of December. His reasons for the project, he said, were, that the treasury was empty; that France had six hundred thousand troops on foot, and paid two hundred millions of livres per month for the expences of the war. It was observed by the General, that six hundred thousand men ought not to cost two hundred millions per month, and that the

the armies of France did not amount to more than three hundred thousand effective men. Cambon answered, that the national guards of all the frontier cities received the same pay as the army, as well as part of the national guards of Paris ; he declared he saw no other resource, than the execution of the decree for carrying on the war ; that specie already cost the nation fifty per cent, and that soon it would not be procured even at cent per cent ; that he had but one remedy against this evil, which was to seize upon all the specie in Belgia, and the silver in the churches and banks. He acknowledged this to be unjust, but he thought it unavoidable ; he said that when the Belgians should be ruined and reduced to the same distress as the French, they would necessarily unite their fate with that of France, as the people of Liege had done, who threw themselves into our arms, being poor and involved in debt. He added, that then France would admit the Belgians as members of the republic, and with the same policy they might hope to proceed conquering people after people ; that the decree of the 15th of December was well calculated for this purpose, because it tended to disorganize the neighbouring states, that being the most fortunate thing that could be done for France.

It was objected by the general, that this project was both cruel and unjust, as well as impracticable ; it was observed, that we were now in the middle of the month of January, with our armies weakened, while no one thought of the means of recruiting them, nor of the plan of the ensuing campaign, although on the eve of being opened ; that the people of Belgia were entirely averse to the disorganizing principles of the revolution ; that we had neither time before us to remove what he (Cambon) called their prejudices, nor to crush them ; that in the beginning of the approaching March, the enemy would attack the French posts upon the Meuse, which were too distant from each other, and not sufficiently strong ; that, masters of the

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passage

passage of Maestricht, they would penetrate the centre of the French line ; that the Belgians finding a power to protect them, would take up arms every where at once, and would put to the sword the garrisons in the interior parts of Belgia, composed of feeble battalions of new levies ; that, occupying the posts behind the French, they would not only cut off the provisions of the army, but its retreat ; that in this situation the army could not regain France, but would be entirely ruined, and thus all would be lost to the republic.

It was represented by general Dumourier, that these odious robberies would not produce as much to France as would a just conduct toward the Belgians ; that it would be more prudent to borrow part of the treasures of the clergy, and so to interest them in our success, than to seize upon the whole by violence ; that, as to specie, there would be no necessity for sending any from France into Belgia, where it was in abundance ; that the true means of putting it in circulation, and at length to replace it by assignats, was to engage the rich merchants of Antwerp, Brussels, and Ghent, in the furnishing of provisions, clothing, and all the necessaries for the war ; that, in this way, the supply of every thing would be secured, and the expences reduced to one half ; that the contractors would receive assignats in payment, and would be compelled by their own interest to give them currency. The general observed, that the convention, by annulling the decree of the 15th of December, would effectually free the Belgians, whom they had reduced to a slavery more severe than their former servitude ; that in this case the Belgians would form a free constitution, raise troops, and join our arms ; that this fraternity of arms and mutual services, would induce them, more effectually than any other means, to demand at least a permanent alliance with the republic, if not an entire union.

Cambon

Cambon seemed inclined to yield, especially when he promised that, should these just, moderate and wise measures be adopted, he would not only forbear longer to demand any thing for his army, which the resources of Belgia could provide for in abundance, but that he would procure from the French treasury several millions by way of loan. He well knew that the Belgians, to withdraw themselves from their present ruinous slavery, would fulfil the promises he had made in their behalf.

Cambon went to the convention, after this conference, and in the heat of the debate, said in the tribune, that if the decree of the 15th of December was not executed, it would be because Dumourier had opposed it by the prerogative of his Veto. Notwithstanding this treachery, in which, to render general Dumourier odious, Cambon assimilated him with the king, whose trial was then pursuing with bitterness, the general consented to another interview with him, and even invited him to dinner, together with a deputy named Ducos.

The last conference, which continued more than six hours, was not carried on with much temper. General Dumourier having said, that if Cambon was resolved upon oppressing the Belgians, he might seek another general, since Dumourier never would consent to become an Attila to a people who had received the French as friends and brethren. Cambon took an opportunity to tell the convention that nothing could be more indecent than to hear a general threatening to resign, in consequence of every decree that was past contrary to his opinion; that the republic must not rest upon one man, and they ought either to impose silence upon, or punish the general. In this fruitless manner terminated the general's conferences with Cambon, whom he expressly warned against the events that have since transpired.

Cambon had good reason for saying he was devoid of resources for the war. In January there was no

more in the national treasury than an hundred and ninety-two millions of livres in assignats, and from fifteen to twenty millions of livres in specie. These sums were not sufficient for the armies till April ; and the whole estimated value of the lands of the clergy was already consumed by the assignats on the security of that fund.

This knowledge Dumourier obtained in the committee of general safety, where it being resolved to augment the army to three hundred and seventy thousand men, he stated that the decree for that purpose would be useless, as was the case with others of the same kind the preceding year, if the minister at war did not at the same time present a statement of the sums necessary for each particular article belonging to the augmentation, such as clothing, arms, horses, &c. and if the convention did not place these sums in the disposal of the minister of war. Cambon acknowledged the truth of the general's observation, stating the poverty of the treasury, and saying, he knew not on what fund to issue assignats, since the only resource remaining was the national forests and the estates of the emigrants. The violent part of the committee cried out, that they had nothing to do but to sell those estates forthwith. Disputes succeeding, the general desired leave to explain his sentiments.

He requested the committee to consider that the lands of the clergy had sold exceedingly ill ; that a part still remained unsold, the general apprehension being such that there were no buyers ; that, if under these circumstances, they should order the sale of the estates of the emigrants, valued at more than twelve hundred millions of livres, this great addition to the lands on sale would still further diminish the value of the whole, and tend to the ruin of the nation ; that the credit of the assignats recently issued would be still diminished by this fatal operation ; since the public, judging by the price of the lands, would doubt the sufficiency of the funds on which the assignats were grounded ;

grounded ; for, supposing they should hazard issuing the twelve millions on the estates of the emigrants, as some members had proposed, either they would not find purchasers, or the produce of the sale would not amount to the third of the enormous sum ; that then the state would not only lose the other two thirds but be menaced with inevitable bankruptcy.

With respect to the forests he observed, that there was already a great scarcity of wood in France, and if the forests were sold, the whole of them would be cut down ; so that, not to notice the consumption of wood in a variety of ways, France would not have a sufficient quantity of coal for common firing ; and that, besides of this inconvenience, which France would feel for more than a century, this resource would not produce, at the utmost, more two or three hundred millions, although it stood valued at eight hundred millions of livres.

The force of these observations was acknowledged, and it was agreed to leave these two objects untouched. Thus, general Dumourier saved the estates of the emigrants for that time : but, neither this service, nor many others general Dumourier has rendered them, could ever obtain him justice or candour on their part.

It was resolved by the committee to propose to the convention the issuing of six hundred millions of livres in assignats, on the gross fund of all the national lands, without appropriating any specific part as a security.

It is a dangerous practice in finance to issue paper on vague and undefined funds ; and it was an abuse of confidence in this respect which ruined the system projected by Law, in 1720. This mode of resource however, extended afterwards to three hundred millions of livres. This is a smooth descent leading to bankruptcy ; but bankruptcy is the last resource of Cambon. He has himself said that it is inevitable. As to the convention, they are not employed in considerations so profound. They have no object but to exist

from day to day, without the trouble of inquiring what will be the result. To the management of such people is the most opulent kingdom in the universe entrusted !

CHAP. IX.

Interview between the general and some of the Jacobins.

GENERAL Dumourier became a member of the Jacobin society at an early period of its institution ; but, at that time, neither Marat, Camille, Desmoulins, Bazire, Merlin, Chabot, nor Bourdon, were known in the society, nor the rest of that list of contemptible characters afterward chosen, to the surprise of all just men, to form the most atrocious assembly in the universe. He never attended their meetings very assiduously ; although the adventure of the "red cap," which he was obliged to put on when he attended the meeting on his being made minister, might begot an opinion that he was a zealous partizan of the faction.

The fact was as follows : The general informed the king, that he conceived it would be serviceable to his personal interest, and especially to the public concerns, for the new ministers, named by him on the recommendation of the people, who were members of the Jacobin club, to present themselves to the society, lest they should now be suspected of joining the aristocracy ; and he proposed to attend the fitting of that evening himself. The king perceived the importance of the measure, and approved of Dumourier's design. Some days previous to that, the factions had adopted the "red cap" for the emblem of liberty. Dumourier, and the Girondine party, who had hitherto professed to be the friends of order, and indeed, cannot be reproached with having flattered the Jacobins at any period, convinced, Pethion, then mayor of Paris, and beloved by the Jacobins, then all-powerful, that this badge assumed by the people, might be productive of

of the greatest disorders, if not of the horrors attending the contest of the white and red rose in England, and that of the times of the hoods in king John's reign at Paris. — Pethion, at that period, possessed an absolute ascendancy over Robespierre and the Jacobins; and promised that he would write to them on the subject, and that the red cap should be suppressed.

Pethion had appointed to write on the same day that Dumourier had fixed upon for attending the society of Jacobins. The letter was indeed written, but had not arrived when Dumourier entered the hall of the assembly. All the members had red caps on their heads, and a cap was offered to Dumourier as he was mounting the tribune. He was compelled to put it on, or imprudently to subject himself to very great risks. Dumourier said little in the tribune. Having assured them that, when war should be declared, he would quit his pen to serve them with his sword, he left the hall. He was scarcely gone, when Pethion's letter was announced and read, and produced the desired effect, in banishing the caps from the assembly; so that half an hour would have saved the minister this disgrace. The public, misled by false royalists, that is to say, by the anti-constitutional party, have misjudged this fact, which was but a mere accident.

The Jacobins had become the most inveterate enemies to Dumourier at the time of his retiring from the administration. In despite of Marat's accusations, the general's success in Campagne, had restored him a little to their favour; and he appeared at the club, for a quarter of an hour, in October 1792. But he never held any further correspondence with the society, nor with any one of its members.

The meetings of the Jacobins were attended with the strictest punctuality by Hassenfratz, Andouin, and other clerks of the war office. They multiplied accusations against the general; and often demanded that he should be compelled to appear at the bar to answer their charges. But in the midst of these intrigues,

trigues, they were desirous of attaching the general to their party. The majority usually opposed his enemies; and, when Hassenfratz produced his grand accusation respecting the embezzlement of two hundred thousand livres, together with the papers to substantiate the charge, the society silenced him, and proceeded to the order of the day.

A number of emissaries were employed by the Jacobins to prevail upon Dumourier to attend their meetings; to which end Anacharsis Clootz used various stratagems: but the general always excused himself, on the ground that he could not appear at the society till he had offered his homage to the convention. Doctor Seyffer made attempts of the same nature; as well as Proli, an adventurer of Brussels, who was desirous of procuring at least an interview between the general and one Desfieux, a celebrated Jacobin, and one of the most active itinerants of the sect, who, arriving at Bourdeaux, found means of disgracing the members of the Girondine party, and of exciting the populace against the honest part of that great city.

A member of the convention named Jean-Bon St. André, an enthusiastic Jacobin, though bearing the character of an honest man, having conceived a great esteem for Dumourier, although he had no personal acquaintance with him, was extremely anxious to bring about an interview, and requested that he might be present. The General was not satisfied that the adventurer Proli, whom he despised, should be the medium of this negotiation; however, for many important reasons, he, at length, consented to the interview.

Being indisposed at the time of the proposed meeting, the general would not, by a forfeiture of his word, seem to be wanting in respect to Desfieux and St. André, to both of whom he was a stranger; and he made another appointment to meet them at the house of Bonne-Carrère, the intimate friend of these two persons.

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The meeting was held at the house of Bonne-Carrère. Desfieux appeared to the general to be a man of mean capacity, and of a violent disposition. Jean-Bon St. André seemed better informed, and more moderate. No arrangement could be made respecting the mode of the general's presenting himself to the Jacobin society; nor on the conduct the society would observe towards him, governed as it was by Marat. Dumourier, therefore, declined entering into any engagement to present himself to the society; nor did he make any declaration of a contrary intention.

The general judged it prudent to touch but slightly on the subject of the king's trial, lest he should injure the cause by seeming to be interested in it; he saw that Desfieux and Jean-Bon St. André, were governed by savage rage against the king, which vented itself in the vilest and most unjust terms; and he perceived clearly, that he had nothing to hope on that point from these men.

Both St. André and Desfieux were strenuous advocates in favour of Pache and his adherents; and the Pache who called himself the organ of the Jacobins, requested Dumourier to withdraw his accusations against the minister of war, whom the Jacobins, he said, were determined to preserve in his place; and invited the general to join their faction in disgracing Le Brun, Garat, Claviere, and above all, Roland; which ministers they considered as the agents of the Girondine faction.

The General communicated to Bonne-Carrère the determination he had made of wholly declining these negotiations. But he felt the danger to which he should expose himself in taking this step; and especially in pursuing the plan he had laid down, and announced to the convention, his design of resigning the command. He well knew, that thenceforth he must either join the Jacobins, and become the accomplice of their crimes, or be deprived of the command, his only shield

shield against his enemies, he should be pursued on the unjust accusations of Hassenfratz, and delivered over to the execrable Revolutionary Tribunal, that has since, on the slightest pretences, been guilty of the murder of Custine.

At length the general made up his mind as to the course of his future conduct, which he afterwards regulated according to political circumstances, as will appear in the sequel. No prospect remaining of protecting the king, the general's thoughts were engrossed by means for saving his unfortunate queen and the dauphin, and of establishing a limited monarchy, and thereby putting an end to the dreadful disorders that were precipitating France to disgrace and ruin.

CHAP. X.

Of the Executive Council.

THE twenty-six days that General Dumourier passed at Paris were chiefly employed in transacting business with the six ministers exercising the executive power. And here it will be necessary to observe that, in a writing he published after that period, by an error in the press, twenty-six hours were put for twenty-six days. In consequence of which error, a criticism appeared in one of the English papers, where the general was seriously reproached with asserting he had performed, in twenty-six hours, the business of twenty-six days.

Roland was hated by the other five members of the executive council, who concealed all they could from him—They were divided into two parties. One was composed of Le Brun, minister of foreign affairs, whom Dumourier had made first clerk, and who was very fit for that situation, being industrious and well informed; but he had neither sufficient dignity nor energy of mind to act for himself, and was rendered deceitful by his timidity of character, even toward
his

his benefactor, although he still regarded him as necessary to his support. He had dismissed from his office Maret and Noel, two men neither deficient in talents nor honesty; had appointed no person to superintend the business of the office, and to distribute the work to the different superior clerks; and he had taken for his principal secretary a man of the name of Isabeau, whose reputation was none of the fairest. Occupied, like ministers of former times, by intrigues for the preservation of his place, he was more influenced by the Jacobins than became a man, to whom Brissot, Condorcet, and the other heads of the Girondine party dictated the policy of his foreign negotiations.

Garat, a minister of justice, and a man of abilities and integrity; was of the faction of Le Brun; excepting that, by an adulation unworthy of himself, he had endeavoured to apologize for the well known murders of the first days of September, this man did not merit reproof. Grouvelle, although only secretary of the council, may be considered as having all the influence of a minister, since he assumed much authority, and gave his opinion, and decided on every thing. He was a man of letters, overbearing, and open in his avowal of bold and extravagant notions of liberty.

On the other side was Pache, minister of war, a man of sense, and possibly an honest man, but ignorant and blindly devoted to the Jacobin party. He had a wife and daughter, equally ugly and ill tempered, who frequented the clubs and even the haunts of the Marsellois, to demand the king's death. The war-office was become a club, breathing nothing but blood and carnage. The clerks always wore the red cap at their desks, and used the phrases thou and thee to every one, even to the minister, who himself affected a slovenly dress, and courted the Parisian populace, by assuming their manners.

The same disgusting scene presented itself in the office of the Marine department, from which all the
clerks

clerks of character and experience were driven, to make way for ignorant and furious Jacobins, who notwithstanding the filthiness of their appearance, had acquired immense fortunes.

The war-office and that of the marine department, united in presenting an address to the national convention, signed also, as it was said, by the two ministers, demanding that the king should be put to death. Monge, the minister of the marine, was an academician, had been an excellent lecturer in hydrography, and seemed a man of simple manners, but was a little ungracious in his behaviour. He was entirely devoted to Pache; and, in concert with him, supported the Jacobin faction in the council.

Claviere, minister of the finances, although he was connected with and supported by the Girondists, and was the relation of Brissot, frequently joined the other faction, from a love of contradiction, and because it was the most active and powerful. Like the rest, he thought of nothing but of preserving his place, which Cambon, and the committee of finance were endeavoured to suppress.

Such was the executive council of France, in the most critical period of her existence. An obvious and sad reflection naturally presents itself; the French revolution, under the pretence of equalising all men, has debased all men. Most of the Jacobins, belonged to the lowest class of the people; and, unable to find among themselves persons equal to the first stations, they lowered the nature of those stations to their own level. Hence there is neither dignity, nor character, in the government; nor respectability, nor a sense of duty, in the people; and the populace, unlike the Athenian democracy, are drunken and savage slaves, usurping the place of the Spartans. The ancient government was destroyed to remedy the abuse of distributing places among the nobles, without regard to their moral capacities. Yet, instead of the Revolution replacing them by men of talents, it has filled their seats with artful and imprudent plebeians.

France cannot escape her entire ruin, but in freeing herself from the subaltern tyrants that invade every department. Unhappily, she no longer has the means in her own hands, since these tyrants are masters of the money, arms, power, and authority of the nation. But the ignorance and barbarous rage of this horde is destructive of itself; and foreign arms will restore the ancient despotism, instead of forming that just equilibrium between the talents of men and the employments of that state that constitutes the perfection of government. This state of things, however, cannot remain long; because the love of liberty is too deeply rooted in France to be ever again wholly destroyed; and the restoration of despotism will beget another revolution, the moment that foreign troops shall be withdrawn from the country, and shall leave the nobles of France, scattered over that vast kingdom, to the vengeance of the people, called down on their heads by the abuse of their short-lived triumph.

The council did not interfere in the fate of the king. Le Brun and Garat, seemed to apprehend the consequences of the trial; but they feared to employ the means, or to indulge in the idea, of putting a stop to it, or of suspending it; and confined themselves to a declaration, that it was unfortunate for France that such a trial had commenced. Roland was the most terrified of all the ministers at this trial; because, in reflecting on the imprudence, and on the injustice of his former complaints against the king, no doubt he felt that he was the principal cause of the king's danger. He relented and was silent. It belonged to the malignant mind of Claviere, to rejoice at the trial; and besides, he had always discovered a personal hatred against Louis XVI. As to Pache and Monge, they canvassed openly for the king's death. And Grouvelle declared, that it was necessary to the honour of the republic, that he should die.

The open and bitter quarrels that existed between the minister of war and the generals, on the com-
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plaints made by the latter respecting the armies, and the providing of necessaries for the troops, could never bring the council to take any step in its collective capacity relative to those subjects. Every one of the ministers reserved an exclusive authority in his own department; and Pache laid before the council, as well as before the committee of war, statements which were altogether false, and which were uniformly opposed by new complaints from the generals, and by the reports of the commissioners of the convention with the armies. The council heard all the reports and complaints, but they still upheld the committee of contracts, which was secretly influenced by Claviere, the friend of Bidermann, who was at the head of the committee; and the affairs of the armies were conducted as before. No provision was made either for the cloathing, subsistence, or accoutrements of the troops, nor for the hospitals, nor for the ammunition that was wanted in the frontier places, nor for the works necessary to put them in a state of defence. At that time, the Jacobins had resolved to place one of their faction at the head of the municipality, and had promised to make Pache mayor of Paris; he, therefore, gave himself little uneasiness respecting the future embarrassments of the war department; which Hassenfratz and Meusniere were to quit along with him.

The more we reflect on the conduct of the Jacobins, the more are we lost in conjecture respecting the spirit by which they were guided. It is certain, that they have been continually industrious to disorganize France, and to render useless the immense resources she possessed for the defence of her liberty; they have ruined the fleets and armies; they have imprisoned, or driven out of the kingdom, the ablest officers; they have lavished the treasures of the nation in wild and ineffectual expences; they have destroyed the commercial and political connections of France with other nations; and have set every nation at defiance;

fiance; and it cannot be doubted, that the society has been influenced by English, Italians, Flemings, and Germans, pretending to be furious Jacobins, and who were known to be the spies of foreign governments. In this class may be ranked Clootz, Marat, Chabot, Pio, the Jew Ephraim, De Buscher, and many others.

The decree of the 15th of December, far from being disapproved of by the council, was supported by every one of the members. Le Brun had been secretary to the people of Liege, during their revolution, to which he had given his support, by a periodical work, entitled, "The Journal of Europe." This paper was not ill written; and it was in consequence of seeing it that Dumourier had placed him in the department of foreign affairs. Le Brun was of opinion, as well as most of the other revolutionists of France, that a revolution could not be successful without being attended by a complete disorganization; so that he could not fail to approve of a decree, calculated to disorganize a people, who had the misfortune to call upon us for aid. The principles of Dumourier, which inclined him to respect the liberty, property, and opinions of others, could not be very acceptable to Le Brun. But Le Brun was silent on the subject to Dumourier, although he, in concert with Marat, Chepy, and his other emissaries, had established a destructive engine in Belgium, under the name of the revolutionary committee. The general complained to the minister of the language and conduct of Chepy, desiring he might be recalled, as being dangerous to the affairs of France in Belgium. Le Brun, however, not only countenanced Chepy, but gave him new instructions that greatly extended his power.

In the same manner, while the general was soliciting the revocation of the decree of the 15th of December, the council appointed, on the recommendation of the Jacobins, thirty-two commissioners of the executive

power, to whose situation was annexed the salary or 10,000 livres, beside the expences of their journey, and the profits of their plunder. These commissioners were furnished with ridiculous instructions, in which the council feigned to confine their authority within narrow bounds; but the commissioners paid no regard to their instructions, having themselves given an arbitrary latitude to their power. These miscreants inflicted the greatest wrongs on the Belgians, and caused among that people an utter abhorrence of the French name.

The plan of the campaign remained yet to be settled. Cambon had asserted that France maintained 600,000 troops. It was now the 15th of January, and the council neither knew how many troops France really had on foot, nor how many enemies she would have to contend with, in the campaign. The general stated to the council that, although all Europe should declare against France, she having no civil war, (for the revolt in La Vendée had not yet broken out) might defend her frontiers with three hundred and seventy thousand men (the sixth part of them being cavalry), exclusive of the garrisons and troops of the fleet, by standing on the defensive on the south, and on the banks of the Rhine, and confining their offensive operations to the frontiers, extending from the Moselle to Dunkirk. The general proposed to distribute the troops in the following manner: 80,000 men to compose the army of Belgium; 40,000 men that of the Ardennes; a corps of 20,000 to be posted on the Moselle, to keep open the communication between the armies of the Ardennes and that of the Rhine; 50,000 to compose the army of the Rhine; a reserve of 20,000 men to be placed at Chalons or Soissons; a corps of 15,000 at Lyons, to watch Swisserland and Piedmont; 40,000 for the army of Savoy and the countries of Nice and Provence; 25,000 for the army of the Pyrennees; 40,000 for the coast of the West, from Bayonne to Brest; and 40,000 for the coasts along the channel,
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from Brest to Dunkirk. All these armies might mutually assist each other; and, as the whole of France was armed, even should the enemy penetrate into any part, it was not to be doubted they would be repulsed or overwhelmed.

General Dumourier also proposed that Custine's army, which had already evacuated Francfort, should fall back upon Landau, leaving a garrison in Mayence sufficient to compel the king of Prussia to lose three or four months before that place, which would afford time to put the fortified towns of Alsace, Lorraine, and the Ardennes, into a proper state of defence, and to make the enemy on that side lose the rest of the campaign.

The general further proposed that the greatest efforts should be made to push the campaign on with vigour on the side of Belgium, because that being a flat country, without fortified places, and even without any of those naturally strong situations of country which stand in the place of fortresses, the fate of the war in these provinces must be decided by battles. On this scheme, if the French should be victorious, the greater part of the French army might pass the Rhine; and if unsuccessful, might retire behind the fortresses of Flanders and Artois; however, the whole campaign might pass without the French lines being broken in upon in this quarter.

Instead of this plan, which Dumourier laid before the committee of general safety, as well as the executive council, La Clos, who had just been appointed to the command in India, proposed that they should instantly send him out with 15 vessels and 15,000 men, which measure necessarily involved a war with England and Holland, although it had then been very easy and was very necessary to the safety of France to have avoided that war.

The object of this expedition of La Clos was to make himself master of the Cape of Good Hope and

the Island of Ceylon; and, afterward, to join Tippoo Saib and to attack Bengal.

Kellermann, on paying his respects to the national convention, on his departure to take the command of the army of Dauphiné, which amounted to nearly twenty thousand men (exclusive of the army of the country of Nice, under General Biron, from ten to twelve thousand men) received orders from the president to go and conquer Rome; and the general gravely answered, that he took his leave to go to Rome. This army had also been weakened by drawing between seven and eight thousand men from it, for the fleet that lay at Toulon, destined to conquer Sardinia. This expedition was undertaken in the most stormy part of the year, in a narrow sea, abounding with rocks and islands; and part of the fleet was lost and the expedition failed.

The army of the Pyrenees consisted only of an extensive establishment of staff officers, without troops. Yet the convention had resolved upon conquering Spain, and had destined 40,000 men, that were not raised, and general Servan, for the purpose. There were no troops on the coast of the west and north; excepting some weak garrisons at Belleisle, and at two or three other places on that coast. There was no army of reserve. Fifty thousand men were wanting to complete the army of Belgium and that of the Ardennes; the army of Alsace did not amount to 20,000 men, exclusive of 22,000 shut up in Mayence; and the army of the Moselle did not amount to 12,000 men.

In order therefore to put the plan of general Dumourier in execution, there were wanting more than 150,000 men; together with the provisions, arms and clothing for this large body of troops. Above all, France was in want of cavalry. The armies of Belgium and of the Ardennes required a body of 20,000 cavalry; and the two armies had not 6,000; and they were in want of 15,000 artillery horses.

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The general's plan was adopted; the 370,000 men were decreed to be raised; and a few alterations made in the distribution of the troops; but this was all that ever was done toward the execution of the plan. However, the general obtained an order a few days before his departure for 15,000 men of the new-raised batallions, to march from the third line in Picardy, Flanders and Artois, where they were altogether useless, into maritime Flanders.

Independent of the executive council, from which (as Le Brun and Garat suspected) a great many projects were concealed, especially those respecting foreign politics, there were two private committees held at the house of general Dumourier, which seemed to dispose of the fate of the empire; and which in fact produced nothing. They were composed of the two ministers Le Brun and Garat, and those members of the Girondine party, Condorcet, Pethion, Gensonné and Brissot. It is probable that the only object of the party, in establishing these committees, was that their existence should be known to Paris, in order to beget an opinion that the general was entirely devoted to them; and thereby to strengthen the party, by the acquisition of his friends. Le Brun even seemed unwilling that the negotiations then carrying on with England and Holland should be at all enquired into by the committees; and requested the general to forbear touching on the subject; and it was never introduced.

Brissot boasted of his plans for the conquest of Spain and Italy; but the general easily detected the folly of his calculations;

The situation of the republic with Swisserland was an interesting subject. The malignity of Claviere, had been lately gratified, in compelling general Montesquieu to become an exile to escape the fangs of his persecutor the vile Du Bois de Crancé; and, in disorganizing Geneva, his native country. Brissot and his adherents maintained, that it was necessary to compel the Swiss cantons to abandon their neutrality;

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or, in case of refusal, to attack them; and it is probable that in this they were actuated by the agents of the combined powers, to whom it was very important that Switzerland should join the confederacy. The general proved by arguments, drawn from the relative situations of France, Switzerland, and the combined powers, to which these metaphysicians were strangers, that it was prudent to conciliate the good dispositions of the Helvetic body towards France; yet, at the same time, to maintain an army of 15,000 men to cover Lyons, and to be ready on any emergency on that side.

Dumourier was the more desirous of preserving this neutrality, because it was during his administration; that the event of disarming the regiment of Ernest happened at Aix. At that period, he made every compensation he could to that brave regiment, for the injustice of his countrymen; he presented the red ribband to the two principal officers, and provided for the safety of their retreat with their men to the frontiers.

General Dumourier always exerted every means in his power to preserve peace with Switzerland; a measure that was so just, and so necessary to the welfare of the two nations. But he must own, that his efforts have less contributed to that difficult task, than the prudent and firm conduct of colonel De Weis, a member of the sovereign council of Berne, and a writer distinguished by works which display extensive knowledge, energy of mind, and goodness of heart. This officer, without possessing any ostensible diplomatic character, was respected by the ministry, was listened to in the committees, and had even acquired an influence in the convention. Tranquil when surrounded by danger, and incorrupted in the midst of crimes, he had the courage to say to one of the leaders of the faction, "I know that you can cause me to be arrested or massacred; but proofs of your villany, that would bring you to the scaffold in eight days, are
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within my reach : I demand that a peaceable conduct on the part of France, toward my country, be the price of my silence."

On another trying occasion, when a superior officer had bluntly interrupted him, in the midst of a sentence, to demand if, daring to speak the language he held, he had 100,000 men at his beck in the Fauxbourgs of Paris, "No," he answered haughtily, "I am single; but I have an hundred thousand republican sentiments in my heart, of which you are destitute." He was applauded by his audience; and continued his discourse.

His work entitled, "A rapid survey of the relative interests of the Helvetic body, and the French Republic," which was published in a crisis of great danger to both countries, exposed and defeated the hostile projects of a faction towards Swisserland, on the eve of execution; and it is very probable that, without the foresight and courage of colonel de Weiss, war had been declared against the Helvetic body before the end of February. Various secret preparations were already making for an attack on Swisserland, in pursuit of an ill digested plan of Robert, Claviere, and other Swiss emigrants. The attack was to be made on three points at once. A column, composed of part of the army of the Upper Rihne, and augmented by new levies, was to take Basle by surprise, or assault, and keep the Austrians in check. Another column, drawn from the army of the Alps, was to blockade Geneva, where the French had numerous partizans, and to penetrate by Versoix into the Pays de Vaud. The third division, composed of chosen troops, was to march suddenly by the pass of Porentru, already occupied by the French, against Berne, whose treasury, granaries, and arsenal, excited the cupidity of the projectors of this plan. Berne had been already secretly reconnoitred; and, although it be nearly surrounded by a rapid and deep river, it was expected that the place would be carried, by pouring in bombs
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and red-hot balls from the neighbouring heights, before the Swiss militia could assemble with force to oppose the attack. The projectors of the plan also expected a powerful diversion to be made in their behalf, by the discontented party, (whose numbers were greatly exaggerated) of the Lower Valais, Neuf-Châtel, Pays de Vaud, Soleure, Lucerne, and Fribourg. This last city was destined to be an object of signal vengeance, on account of some offence she had committed respecting the assignats. The popular governments were to be informed that these hostilities would not affect them, and that France would continue to preserve peace with them. As to the other cantons, the commissioners and seditious preachers were to overthrow their constitutions, stir up the poor against the rich, massacre, imprison, or banish the magistrates and principal citizens, seize upon specie, provisions, horses, and arms, compel men of property to emigrate, that their estates might be confiscated, outrage religion, and in the name of liberty and the public good to ruin this free and happy people, and reduce them to slavery. The expedition was to have been prompt; but the explosion was prevented, and Claviere and Brissot, overawed by Weiss, laid aside a project in which Switzerland, from the character of the times, had every thing to hazard.

The conquest of Rome and of Spain were deferred till armies could be raised to march against those countries. As to all other affairs, the sittings of these two committees were as fruitless as were the deliberations of the committee of general safety, and those of the executive council. Dumourier could not, by any means, obtain of them the accomplishment of any object, calculated to serve the nation.

C H A P. XI.

The retreat of Roland from the administration.

AT the time of the king's death, Roland, who had long strove to maintain his situation in the ministry, against the will of the Jacobins, as well as against the real inclinations of his own party, sent a letter to his colleagues, announcing his resignation. The ministers never appeared more chearful than on the day they received this letter, and the council appeared more like a school relieved from the restraints of a troublesome pedant, than a grave meeting of statesman. Roland's resignation made part of a compromise between the Jacobin and Gironde parties, in which it was agreed, that both Roland and Pache should quit the ministry. But the consequences were very different to those two ministers, the latter of them acquiring a situation of more real importance than any in the ministry; while the former remained more than ever exposed to the insults and persecutions of the Jacobins.

This sacrifice made of Roland by his party, is another instance of the cowardice of that faction, who ought never to have abandoned a man, of whose services they had availed themselves, without any respect to his peace or safety. In truth, the whole conduct of Roland, in his public character, was a mistaken policy, which exposed himself and his party, to continual danger. Roland did not possess much strength of mind, but had acquired extensive information on the different branches of trade and manufactures; and, if it had been expedient to divide the duties of the administration of the home department, which was too extensive and too complicated for a mind of such little energy, it is probable, he would have made an excellent minister of commercial concerns. He was upright in his designs, and was possessed of a mild and philanthropic disposition;

sition; but the desire of appearing a rigid moralist induced him to assume a severity of character unnatural to him. He hoped to resemble Cato the Censor, and had adopted his turn of conversation, at once cold and repulsive, but without the genius and boldness of that celebrated man. In his dress he was nice and singular, following the fashions of former times; but this was at least less displeasing than the slovenly affectation of the Jacobins. His deportment was grave, and not unbecoming the dignity of his station. He was indefatigable in the application of his talents. But he loved too much to gratify the will of the people, and was too ready to believe that the higher orders were oppressive and unjust; and this disposition, that becomes dangerous when it is too generally indulged, conducted him habitually into precipitate and imprudent measures. He was candid in his examination of the subjects belonging to the other departments of the government, such as those relating to the armies, the marine, and foreign negotiations; and supported, with great sincerity, all propositions that came before the council of a just and reasonable nature. Perceiving the equivocal conduct of the other ministers, mistrusting their talents, and perhaps their good faith, he would no longer admit of any responsibility of the council in a collective capacity; and his pertinacity in refusing to answer for any measures but those that were the consequence of his direct orders begat a greater hatred of him than ever among his colleagues.

The temper and qualities of Roland would have fitted him well enough for the ministry, had the republic been settled on its foundations, and if the times had been more free from the violence of party rage, for he was a rigid republican. This disposition was the cause of his ill conduct to Louis the XVI. and of that imprudent step of delivering into the hands of the convention the fatal chest containing the monarch's passive correspondence, in which those base men found pretexts for the martyrdom of that unfortunate prince.

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Perhaps it was prejudicial to the interests of Roland that he was governed by his wife, who was a woman of fine talents, and whom he acknowledged to be the critic, that gave a polish to his numerous works; but certainly it was among his misfortunes to be surrounded by ignorant and designing journalists, who composed, under his directions, those verbose harrangues that covered the walls and public buildings of Paris: for the Jacobins had the address to turn this engine of faction against him and his party.

Among the women who have risen to celebrity during the French revolution, no one has acted a more conspicuous or noble part than Madame Roland. She was between thirty and forty years of age, had a lively and healthy countenance, and a most interesting figure; she dressed with great taste; conversed with ability, although perhaps with too much wit and refinement; she was innocently gay, and had placed herself at the head of a party consisting of metaphysicians, scholars, members of the convention, and ministers. Every day these partizans of Madame Roland paid their respects to her, and on the Friday of every week they dined at her house, where the conduct and politics of statesman took their character from Madame Roland's opinions. None of the wives of the other ministers were admitted to these meetings.

It would be unjust not to notice the spirit with which Madame Roland conducted herself under an insult of the Jacobins, at a time when her husband's name had already fallen into great discredit. Interrogated at the bar of the convention respecting an injurious accusation of an unprincipled man named Viard, she said, *I am the Wife of citizen Roland; I bear the name of a virtuous man to whom I am proud to be allied.* It certainly required all the malignity of the Jacobins to persecute such a woman.

Although Madame Roland possessed much good sense, she permitted it to be seen that she governed her husband, and thereby did a dis-service to his reputation, for which she could not compensate by the value of her

counsellors. It was Madame Roland that selected Pache and Lanthenas to aid her husband in his administration; and the former of them so entirely gained the confidence of Roland, that he was appointed minister of war through Roland's interest. Pache was no sooner the colleague of Roland, then he became his enemy, and fought by every means to ruin him, and for that purpose he did not hesitate to become the partizan of the most intemperate men among the Jacobins. The contest between these two ministers was open, and their hostile attacks were without measure or decency. They both descended from their situations, but with Pache it was only to rise to higher power. Roland was to be subjected to new and more bitter misfortunes.

Other women have also distinguished themselves during the revolution, but without the dignity that has been preserved by Madame Roland; excepting, indeed, it be Madame Necker, who, in many respects, may be considered as the rival of Madame Roland's fame, and whose age and experience, if it rendered her less agreeable to the thoughtless, gave her the advantage as the counsellor of her husband. Mademoiselle La Brousse, Madame de Stael, Condorcet, Pastoret, Coigny and Théroigne, were either artful females, like those who haunted the courts of former times, or differed in nothing from the vulgar and furious women of the Fauxbourgs of Paris.

One unfortunate woman, Elizabeth Corday, has consigned her name to history, by an act, which happily for humanity will find few imitators, although it delivered the earth from a monster.

The executive council seemed to have undergone no change by the retreat of Roland from the ministry. During a considerable period before his resignation, he had been entirely occupied in brooding over his vexations, the attacks of his enemies, and the means of his defence. Every satire of the Jacobins, that was directed against him, begat in his apprehension the obligation of justifying himself to the convention; and the
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members of the convention, who, perhaps, were more irritated by the austerity of Roland's virtue, than by the petulance of his spirit, saw nothing in these homilies but an insupportable pride. His own party, no longer deriving reputation from his name, had, in truth, renounced him; and had very ignorantly resolved to sacrifice him. Roland flattered himself that his resignation would not be accepted, and he remained in the house appropriated to the minister of the home department, till he was no longer permitted to doubt of his fate. During the latter part of his administration, he seldom slept in this house; as the Jacobins, to terrify him, frequently sent bands of the federates to make excursions during the night round the house. In this manner were the representatives of the executive power treated in France. Le Brun and Claviere have been since accused and imprisoned; and Garat was accused and arrested, after having resigned. So ferocious has been the character of this revolution that, of the men who have had an eminent part in it, such only have been out of the reach of a violent death as have fled and are in exile.

C H A P. XII.

Negotiations with Holland and England.

FRANCE, at that period, had no other declared enemies than Austria, Prussia, and Sardinia. She had displayed a superiority over those powers during the preceding campaign which would have been entirely decisive; if, according to the plan of general Dumourier, Custine, instead of passing the Rhine to levy an inconsiderable contribution on Franckfort, and for which France paid so dearly, had made himself master of Coblentz, where there was no garrison; and if the wants of the army had been supplied, so that the army of Belgium might have taken up its

winter quarters along the banks of the Rhine, from Cleves to Cologne; that of the Ardennes, from Cologne to Andernach; that of the Moselle, from Andernach to Mayence, including Coblenz; and that of Alsace, from Mayence to Landau, including Spires. This position would have compelled the county of Luxembourg to have surrendered, by cutting off its supplies of provisions. The armies would have had behind them a country on which, whether it were neuter or an enemy, they might long have subsisted; and, by opening the campaign early in the spring, might have passed the Rhine without difficulty, and have penetrated into the center of Germany, where the French would have been received with open arms, if they had possessed the prudence to have forbore from exciting terror in the inhabitants by unjust decrees and by the sending off rapacious commissioners to commit violence, insults and robberies.

This great plan was neglected; yet France might have sustained herself with reputation and effect against her enemies, who were in truth already overcome, if her conduct had not drawn new enemies upon her.

A means existed at that period, for preserving Spain in her neutrality; and by employing it the nation would have spared herself the guilt of a great crime. The king of Spain engaged with the convention to remain neuter, on condition that the life of the unfortunate Louis XVI. should be spared. This step does honour to the Spanish monarch; and it is difficult to imagine why the French princes did not follow so bright an example. The implacable, ignorant convention rejected the terms of the Spanish monarch with disdain, and thereby committed a new crime against the nation, by creating her a new enemy, without consulting her on the necessity or prudence of their conduct.

The courts of London and the Hague, had for some time betrayed a hatred of the French revolution; and the death of Louis XVI. could not but increase

crease that hatred. But, in England, no part of the nation was willing to enter into a war against France, excepting the king, who considered his differences with the French as a personal quarrel. And, in Holland, every party dreaded to be drawn into a war. It was therefore possible for France to have preserved peace with those two countries; and, till that period, she had wisely cultivated the good will of Holland, from whence she drew specie and provisions; and it was easy to have continued that system.

In the latter end of the month of November, general Dumourier proposed to the executive council the taking of Maestricht, without which he could neither defend the Meuse nor the country of Liege. He thought it reasonable, after many examples in former wars, to take and hold this place, engaging by a duly authorized manifesto, to restore it at the end of the war. At that period his army was victorious and full of ardour. He had, after the taking of the citadel of Antwerp, assembled the whole of his heavy artillery at Tongres and Liege, in order, not to expose the horses belonging to the artillery to die for want of forage, as the Jacobins have stupidly asserted, but to make himself master of Maestricht. That place was not as yet pallisadoed, nor provided with a garrison, nor with any thing necessary to sustain a siege. Venlo was in the same condition. Causes of complaint were not wanting to give a colour to the enterprize; and to throw the imputation of being the aggressors upon the Dutch, if they should resent his conduct, for they had already frequently violated the neutrality, and had recently prohibited, on pain of death, all exportations of provisions to France, while provisions in immense quantities were drawn from Holland, to establish magazines, on the Lower Rhine, for the Imperialists and Prussians. The executive council rejected the general's propositions, and expressly commanded him to preserve the strictest neutrality toward Holland; which injunction the general was punctual in observing.

ing. They then sent him an order to undertake the siege of Luxembourg during the winter; but, the general shewing the absurdity of the plan, it was not put in execution.

As the executive council had thus neglected the opportunity of seizing upon Maastricht, which may be regarded as the key of the Netherlands on the side of the Meuse, the general was of opinion, that it would no longer be prudent to commit any hostility on the part of France against Holland, being convinced that a war with England must be the consequence of such hostility; and his advice was thenceforward to preserve a neutrality with both England and Holland, with the utmost solicitude.

The friendship of Holland was indispensably necessary to enable France to hold Belgium, for if the Dutch delivered the passages of Maastricht and Venlo to the Austrians, the Meuse would be no longer tenable, and the French would be compelled to abandon the countries of Liege, Gueldres, Limbourg, Brabant, and Namur, and retreat behind the Scheldt; contracting their lines within the country lying between the citadel of Antwerp and Valenciennes. And in the case of the English and Dutch assembling an army in Dutch Flanders, the French would be further forced to abandon the Scheldt, and retire behind the river Lys, and under the fortified places of French Flanders and Artois.

At this time there were at Paris many Dutch refugees, victims of the Dutch revolution, and of the faithless and feeble conduct of the minister Brienne. Many among them were respectable and opulent men, who assured the French ministry that their party in Holland was much more considerable than that of the Stadtholder, which indeed was true. These representations were disregarded till the month of January, when Le Brun, after giving them an hearing, referred them to general Dumourier for his opinion respecting their resources, and especially respecting a plan of invading

vading Zealand, which the Dutch patriots represented as easy to be undertaken and certain of success. After a deliberate examination the general judged the plan to be impracticable, but wrote to the minister that he would postpone giving a definitive answer till he should be at Antwerp, and should be able more particularly to examine the several parts of the project; and it was resolved that the Dutch refugees should proceed to Antwerp with their revolutionary committee; and orders were given to the Dutch legion, consisting nearly of 10,000 men, to garrison Antwerp, and to be ready to form the advanced guard of the French army, in case of a war with Holland.

An agent of Le Brun was appointed to attend the Dutch revolutionary committee; but no positive engagement with them was entered into, and all that related to them was rendered dependent on the issue of a negotiation which was then on the point of commencing.

At the time that Dumourier had been minister for foreign affairs he had sent to the Hague, as minister plenipotentiary, Emanuel de Maulde, a colonel in the French army, who had conducted himself with great prudence and ability, had procured arms and horses for France, and had so well reconciled his attention to the interests of the refugees with the respect due to the government of the country, as to acquire the confidence and esteem of the two factions that divided Holland. This conduct which was conformable to his instructions, was too moderate to be agreeable to the temper of the present times; and De Maulde had moreover the misfortune to be noble. Le Brun in particular conceived an aversion to him. The military committee disapproved of his sending fusées to Dunkirk. His measures were opposed on every quarter, and his intentions calumniated. He was recalled; and in his room was appointed Noel, whom the general had made one of the principal clerks of the department of foreign affairs. Noel, although an
extremely

extremely honest man, arriving with prejudices against De Maulde and plans much less moderate than those on which De Maulde had acted, was very ill received; and, attributing his reception to De Maulde, became his enemy and accuser.

De Maulde, on his arrival at Paris, called upon the general; and told him that, if France desired to preserve a neutrality with Holland and England, nothing was more easy; that although the ministers of the two courts would neither acknowledge the national convention, nor treat with Le Brun, yet the grand pensioner of Holland, Van Spiegel, and the English ambassador, lord Auckland, had charged him to declare that they would treat willingly with general Dumourier.

At the same time, Bénéit, who had been agent of the French ministry at London, and had just arrived from that place, informed Le Brun on the part of Talleyrand, late bishop of Autun, De Talon, and other French emigrants, who had political connections with the British ministry, that Pitt and the council of St. James's had nothing more at heart than to treat for the preservation of the neutrality, provided that general Dumourier should be charged with the negotiation, and should proceed to England for the purpose of settling its terms, which he might easily accomplish before the opening of the campaign.

This overture of the English ministry was, at first, communicated to no other person of the executive council than Garat and Le Brun. Garat, who was possessed of a sound judgement, zealously embraced the offer, and proposed to send the general as ambassador extraordinary to England, without however superseding Chauvelin, with instructions to demand a decisive answer respecting war or peace. The king's trial was not yet concluded, but the cruel catastrophe was sufficiently foreseen; this circumstance suggested new considerations to Garat, who feared that the English court might be treacherous enough to detain
Dumourier

Dumourier in England, and thereby deprive France of her best general. Dumourier was compelled to dissemble that he also saw the probability of that event, and that it was the only thing he desired, in order that he might escape from the hands of the miscreants who governed his country. He appeared to subscribe to the prudence of Garat's precaution. It was, however, determined that the affair should be laid before the council, and a proposition be made by Garat to send general Dumourier as ambassador extraordinary to London, in consequence of the overtures made by the ministers of England and Holland; to give the general instructions to conduct the negociation with suitable dignity and with promptitude, and whatever might be the issue, to return instantly to put himself at the head of the armies. It was resolved to demand from the English ministry every possible security for the person of general Dumourier, and for the full liberty of returning at his pleasure.

When the proposition was laid before the council, Claviere, Pache and Monge opposed it in the most decided manner, undoubtedly incited by jealousy and love of opposition, for they well knew the distress of their respective departments, and their incapability of supporting a war that would become so general.

Dumourier was extremely afflicted with the fate of a measure which seemed to have promised his deliverance, as well as an important occasion of serving his country; but he was not discouraged. He was of the opinion of Garat and le Brun that the design should not be discussed any more in the council, but prosecuted secretly till it should be in a state to ensure success. It was agreed that de Maulde should depart instantly for the Hague, under the pretence of his private concerns; that Noel should be recalled and placed elsewhere; that the general should charge de Maulde with a letter for Lord Auckland, informing him that the general would be at Antwerp on the 1st of February, to visit his troops in their winter quarters, and that having
learnt

learnt from de Maulde, his friend, that Lord Auckland had spoken of him with esteem and confidence, it would be a circumstance of great pleasure to him if an opportunity should offer of meeting that nobleman on the frontiers, and that perhaps this interview might be beneficial to the interests of the two nations, and the cause of humanity. It was also determined that, should Lord Auckland receive this invitation with the good-will that was to be expected, the general should give him a meeting, and might even, if it was found necessary, pass into England.

It was further decided, that Marat, who had already been several times in England, should be sent to London, to learn from Mr. Pitt if he really desired to treat personally with general Dumourier. Chauvelin, minister plenipotentiary of France to the court of London, did not at all accord with Talleyrând, who had been sent with him as an adviser in his negociation, and had not at all succeeded in the object of his embassy, which he was ambitious of conducting without the participation of his colleague. Many indeed were the obstacles Chauvelin had to encounter; he had against him the prejudices of the English nation; the king of England, the most-* in Europe, and the most enraged against the French revolution; the French emigrants; the persons who had been given him as advisers and assistants; the national convention of France; and his own inexperience. It was thought necessary, if Dumourier's journey should take place, to sacrifice Chauvelin, or rather to give him some other embassy; for Dumourier, who had been the intimate friend of his father, and had therefore given him the appointment to England, insisted that he should be sent to Venice or Florence, that he might continue his diplomatic career with success.

It appears to be but just to say a word here of the disposition that Dumourier has always displayed in his public character. Whether it were the effect of good nature, or of a sense of justice, he has been anxious not

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* Despotique.

to prejudice the interests of any other person in the public employment; and has obliged and served great numbers; of course it is not greatly surprising that he has met with much ingratitude.

Chauvelin, as it has been said, was to be recalled, and Marat was to be appointed to his situation, on the general's departure from London; so that Marat was extremely interested in the success of the negociation, and had strong motives for smoothing the difficulties that might be in the general's way, and thereby to render his stay at the court of London as short as possible.

C H A P. XIII.

Departure of De Maulde, of Marat, and of general Dumourier from Paris.

IN pursuance of these plans, Emanuel de Maulde proceeded to the Hague, although the death of the king, which happened while they were in agitation, seemed to be an event entirely destructive of them; for the certainty that Holland was eager to preserve peace induced Garat and Le Brun to believe that all resentment excited by that horrible catastrophe would yield to the great object of preserving peace, and they were not deceived.

Marat's departure was unwisely postponed, (taking place only on the same day that general Dumourier left Paris,) under pretence of first founding Mr. Pitt, respecting the general's journey to England, by the means of one of his friends, who had already been employed in the same capacity on a former occasion by Marat. But the general had reason to believe that Le Brun, offended that the court of St. James would neither treat with him as minister of foreign affairs, nor with the convention, was not sorry to undermine this negociation, by giving scope to the rash ignorance of

Brissot,

Brissot, and the folly of the diplomatic committee, who seeming to think that France had not enemies enough to contend with, studied to increase the number, by insulting every nation.

Marat's mission was altogether unsuccessful. Chauvelin had never been acknowledged in England as minister of the republic, the court of St. James having considered his mission at an end on the abolition of royalty in France, and having permitted his stay in London merely as an indulgence granted to an individual. And when the news of the cruel death of Louis XVI. arrived in England, Chauvelin was ordered to quit London in four and twenty hours, and the kingdom in eight days. It was under these circumstances that Marat arrived in England, and received an order from the council instantly to quit the kingdom.

But this ill reception of Marat by the court of St. James, did not put a stop to the negociation in Holland. General Dumourier departed from Paris, on the 26th of January, with a mind filled with apprehensions; he had not been able to prevent the commission of an unprovoked, fruitless, disgraceful, and fatal crime; he had not succeeded in procuring a revocation of the decree of the 15th December, nor in obtaining an exception in behalf of Belgium, and thereby to preserve the French army in case of retreat; nor in establishing an effective administration for the supply of arms, subsistence, &c. for the army; nor in his attempts to procure the necessary repairs of the fortified places, reinforcements of the armies, horses for the cavalry, nor any of that multitude of objects the supply of which was necessary to the opening of the campaign; nor (which in every case was the greatest of his afflictions) to save an innocent king whose goodness was personally known to him. He was about to resume the command of a disorganised army, abandoning itself to robberies, and every species of excess, ill armed, in want of cloathing, and dispersed in the impoverished villages along the Meuse, and the Roer. New troops
were

were daily arriving from Germany to strengthen general Clairfait, who had made a stand, between the Herffe and the Roer.

The prince of Cobourg, was to take the command of this army. In case of Dumourier waiting till the prince should attack him, he could not resist that general in front, and at the same time, the prince of Hohenloe, who would attack him on his right flank by Namur, the citadel of which was repairing by the French; and if the English and Dutch should have time to assemble an army on his left flank, on the side of Antwerp and Dutch Flanders, even the retreat of Dumourier would not be secured, having to march through fifty leagues of flat country, with a disorderly army, pursued by three armies more considerable than his own, and continually assailed by the peasants and the inhabitants of the cities, whom the excesses of the convention, had driven to desperation. Dumourier, had no hope of diminishing his perplexities, but by the negotiation of de Maulde. His confidence in that was considerable, since Holland had the utmost dread of a rupture with France, being quite unprepared for it, and having the greatest interest in the preservation of the neutrality.

We are about to give an account of the further circumstances of this negotiation, which was broken off in the beginning of February, by the unwise and haughty impetuosity of the national convention. The abrupt declaration of war, made by that assembly against England and Holland, gave France an air of perfidy, respecting that negociation, with which the English have reprobated them with some appearance of reason; but the same charge may be retorted on the English, and it is propable, that Pitt had no other design than to amuse general Dumourier, to gain time to make the necessary preparatives for war; and the treaty entered into by the court of St. James's with the court of Turin, at that very period, confirms the opinion. So much truth is there in the observation,
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that

that history is but a picture of the errors and crimes of governments.

C H A P. XIV.

Fruitless Negotiations. Declaration of war.

IMMEDIATELY on the arrival of de Maulde at the Hague, which was in the latter end of January, he presented general Dumourier's letter to lord Auckland, who testified the greatest pleasure to de Maulde on reading it, and told him the interests of England and Holland being inseparable in this affair, he should communicate the proposal to Van Spiegle; which was no sooner done, than the latter embraced the project of a conference on the frontiers between the ambassador of England, the grand pensioner, and general Dumourier.

Lord Auckland dispatched three packet boats, immediately succeeding each other to his court, and de Maulde sent his secretary to Antwerp, where the general had arrived on the 2d of February, after having visited the posts from Dunkirk to Antwerp.

Throughout Picardy, Artois, and maritime Flanders, Dumourier found the people overwhelmed with terror and grief, at the tragical death of Louis the XVI. The very name of Jacobin, he perceived, excited equal fear and horror. In all cities, however, there were numerous emissaries of the Jacobins, who stirred up the populace against the moderate and wise part of the citizens, and collected accusations, little regarding whether true or false, against the different administrators of the departments.

At St. Omers and Dunkirk, there was not the least appearance of preparations being made for the war, and there were scarcely any troops to be seen; for the minister of war had weakened maritime Flanders, to furnish the augmentation of 10,000 foot and, 1500 cavalry,

valry, for the army in Austrian Flanders, in consequence of the general's having demanded that reinforcement. The minister of war even drew new battallions afterwards from this country, which was part of the actual seat of the war, to form a body of 12,000 men near Cherbourg, from whence the general had observed a diversion might be made into England, in case war with that power could not be avoided.

Nieuport and Ostend, were in the same condition as St. Omers and Dunkirk, not having a single battery mounted, to prevent any vessels of war entering those ports. There were not even cannon for the purpose ; nor could any be obtained, without taking them from Dunkirk, which had not sufficient for its own fortifications.

Dumourier, struck with the disorder that prevailed the whole country, and seeing that his embarrassments every moment increased, was extremely satisfied with the first successes of de Maulds negociation. He instantly dispatched a courier to Le Brun, with the original answer of lord Auckland, which stated that the British minister and the grand pensionary of Holland, had agreed to proceed together to the frontiers to confer with the general ; that lord Auckland had sent several dispatches to his court, to obtain its sanction, and instructions relative to the conference ; that he should soon receive an answer, and that his intentions were not to gain time, nor to retard the general's preparations for the campaign.

The dispatches of de Maulde, which accompanied those of lord Auckland, gave an account of the circumstances of his interview with the British minister, and the grand pensionary of Holland. Those ministers, as de Maulde was prepared to find, expressed their utter abhorrence of the atrocious barbarity recently committed at Paris ; but as de Maulde gave them positive assurances that the general partook of their sentiments on that subject, and was filled with the profoundest indignation against the authors of the crimes,

crimes, that horrible affair did not retard the negotiation ; and it was settled, without any difficulty, that as soon as lord Auckland should have received the instructions of his court, the conference should take place at the Moor Dyke, on board a yacht belonging to the prince of Orange, which would be prepared to receive the general. De Maulde concluded, by declaring his persuasion, that the conference would be attended with the greatest success.

The general entertained the same hopes, and had prescribed to himself the plan he thought it is duty to follow. He resolved not to betray the interests of his unhappy country ; on the contrary, it was his intention to diminish the number of her enemies, in settling the neutrality of England and Holland on a sure basis ; but, after he should have rendered this last of his services to France, he resolved to free himself from the imputation of partaking in the crimes of his countrymen, and no longer to fight for absurd tyrants, whom he was anxious to punish, instead of aiding in the support of their heinous tyranny. He did not design therefore to return to Antwerp, but to retire to the Hague, and from thence to publish a memorial in justification of his conduct.

He unfolded a part of these designs in a letter to de Maulde, which was communicated to the two ministers. They requested leave to take a copy of it, but de Maulde declined granting that permission, being unauthorised by his friend ; but at the same time he delivered lord Auckland a letter from the general, informing that minister he should receive with great pleasure news of the sanction of the British court to these measures.

At the moment when the negociation was in this promising state, while the general consoled himself with the hope of being freed from the insupportable yoke of combating for tyrants, under the certainty of becoming one day the victim of their ingratitude and cruelty, whatever might be his success ; while he thus flattered himself, on the 7th of February he learnt by
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the public papers that the national convention had declared war against Holland and England, on a report made by Brissot in the name of the diplomatic committee. This news reduced him to despair, for it was altogether unexpected. He had quitted Paris on the 26th of January; had arrived at Antwerp, only on the 2d of February; Le Brun then had not waited to receive his first dispatches, nor intelligence respecting de Maulde's negociation. It seems that Le Brun had precipitated the report of the affront offered to the republic in the person of Chauvelin, by order of the king of England, to excite the anger of the thoughtless convention, and thereby raise an insurmountable obstacle to the measures he had concerted with the general.

As to Brissot, he had, as was usual with him, availed himself of this opportunity of insulting both kings and people, in which he was zealously seconded by Barrere and the Jacobins. Thus the two factions united in taking a most disastrous step, and without consideration.

The war was declared, but Le Brun sent no intelligence to general Dumourier, on whom the burthen fell with the greatest weight, and little inquiry was made in the council, whether he was at all in a condition to support himself against these new enemies.

On the day that general Dumourier heard of the declaration of war against England and Holland, De Maulde, arrived at Antwerp from the Hague, with a second letter from Lord Auckland, congratulating him on having received authority from his court to enter on the conference, which was fixed to commence on the 10th, at the Moor Dyke. The general instantly dispatched a courier, informing lord Auckland of the declaration of war; and observing, that although he must admit the declaration of war to have been a little abrupt, he must observe, it had been occasioned by the conduct of the English ministry; first, in detaining two French vessels laden with corn, notwithstanding

standing the remonstrances of the French ministry to the contrary; secondly, in contemptuously ordering the French ambassador to quit the kingdom, while a negociation was pending between the two nations; and thirdly, in causing lord Auckland to publish on the 2d of February an address to the States General, which was equivalent to a declaration of war.

The general had also causes of complaint against the grand pensionary Van Speigle. He had in vain demanded of him the liberation of colonel Micoud, a French officer, who, after gaining a considerable lawsuit against a merchant in Holland, had been thrown into prison through the credit of the merchant, on a vague accusation of having spoken too freely of the government. He had driven a troop of French comedians from Amsterdam without even granting them time to collect the sums due to them; he had permitted Noel, the French minister at the Hague, and Thainville, his secretary, to be insulted by the emigrants, and had afterwards abruptly ordered them to quit the country; he had allowed the emigrants to appear in military uniforms at the Hague; and finally had suffered the greatest enmity to be expressed against France with impunity.

It is certain that the conduct of the courts of St. James's and the Hague was inexcuseable, since in the midst of a negociation entered into (in consequence of overtures from themselves) with general Dumourier, whom they had demanded to conduct the negociation, they had provoked the anger of the national convention, whom they knew to be haughty and impatient, and incapable of a temperate conduct. It is but just therefore, to reproach them as well as the French, with the evils resulting from this war, which is to be considered as only in its beginning, and which will be the source of other equally destructive wars.

It may be said, that providence has united all the people of Europe to inflict a punishment on the enormous crimes committed by the French nation; and perhaps

perhaps to punish their own errors by the calamities they will have to endure in this long, afflicting and bloody contest. The atheists of the national convention, and these are the most ignorant and wicked of the members, because it is not through the influence of philosophy that they have become atheists, but through the influence of their crimes, have considered what the general has said to them respecting providence in his letter of the 12th of March, as an unmeaning rhapsody; to such men he has to answer, that providence leaves us free to make a virtuous or vicious choice, but that from this first choice necessarily results the character of our actions, good or bad; that which is just is alone true; that which is unjust is the effect of error in the mind; that this is above all true with respect to governments; and that justice conducts nations to happiness, and injustice to misery; that when a nation is universally infected with a licentious spirit, as is the case with France, all her motives and actions tend to her ruin; hence the same phrenzy which induced France to commit the fruitless crime of murdering Louis XVI. and treating his family as a herd of slaves, dictated the decree of the 15th of December, which is equally devoid of justice and policy, which has lost the nation the good-will of every people who were attached to her, has infused divisions into her councils, familiarised her with accusations, robberies, and massacres, has begotten her filthiness and grossness of manners; her wantonness in creating of enemies, and indifference to the means of resisting them; and in fine her anarchy and total want of order, which have already inflicted upon her the first punishments of that long series that awaits her. For from the moment that France became a republic, she degenerated into the most unfortunate country that the annals of the world have produced.

We will conclude this book with a melancholy reflection on the condition to which France has reduced herself by her errors; she had been presented with a
constitu-

constitution formed in a short and difficult period by her first legislators, which was not indeed perfect but highly valuable, and which every people of Europe admired and envied. The two factions that existed in France in combating each other, nevertheless were of one mind to destroy this constitution. The court hoped to recover its former power and numerous gratifications, and the Jacobins entirely to bear down royalty, which they hated, but which was so necessary to the happiness of Frenchmen; and while the constitution was a theme of praise with all reasonable men in other parts of Europe, the French blamed, spurned and rejected it. But the merits of the constitution were unknown to the people of France, for they never permitted themselves to judge of it but through the medium of their furious passions.



END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.

M E M O I R S
O F
GENERAL DUMOURIER:

VOLUME II.

C H A P. I.

Plan of the Campaign.

THIS volume contains the detail of a campaign; the shortest, the most variegated, and perhaps the most important that ever took place. It was suggested and executed with an equal degree of celerity; the scheme of the enterprise being projected and carried into execution, between the 7th and the 22d of February 1793, and the campaign ending on the 5th of April. It presented to the consideration of military men the capture of a number of cities, even when their environs were in a state of inundation, a hard-fought battle, many skirmishes, and a retreat, which at once astonished and commanded the applause of the generals of the adverse armies. In this short space of time, two kinds of military operations were pursuing at the same time; namely, the

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offensive

offensive and the defensive : and at length this memorable campaign, in part, decided the fate of France, and perhaps, by its influence, that of all Europe.

While this occurrence engaged the attention of the philosopher, it tended to confirm the opinion, that the fate of empires often depend upon circumstances of apparently small consideration, and that the conduct of an individual alone may be productive of the salvation or ruin of a whole kingdom. By taking command of the army of La Fayette, in the preceding year, general Dumourier saved France in the plains of Champagne, and rendered his brave companions in the war illustrious in the Belgic territories; for the danger of the enterprize in which he was engaged drew men distinguished for martial ardour about him; and such was the importance of his situation, that the nation was not only obliged to attend to and adopt his councils, but also to support him, and second his exertions.

But this year there was a change of circumstances. The nation, or rather those to whom the powers of government had devolved, considering matters in a false point of view, intoxicated with their successes, and blinded by their crimes, no longer attended to the councils of the general, who was still desirous of defending them against the power of their enemies, and the intemperance of their own wild imaginations: but, instead of being supported, he was betrayed, and his country made unhappy, in despite of all his endeavours to terminate the war in her favour. Having formed a second disposition, he had the mortification to be disappointed of victory by the conduct of his own troops: in the midst of a retreat, as skillfully managed as it was sanguinary, he conceived a third measure for saving his army, and preventing the entire ruin of the Netherlands; but through the outrageous pride and obstinacy of the national convention, and the want of fortitude in his army, this project, which had the safety and welfare of France for



for its object, was unfortunately defeated. He was now obliged to relinquish his design, and seek an asylum amongst his enemies; and even these were incapable of treating him but with esteem and respect.

From this time the French seemed to have no traces of their former character remaining; martial bravery was succeeded by savage ferocity; no regular system was observed in the conduct of the war, nor were any talents displayed in its execution; the rancour of animosity provoked reciprocal slaughter in the contending armies: but this was yielding to the impulse of intemperate rage, and not the result of martial ardor in the prosecution of a war which, perhaps, would have been already concluded, if a single nation had opposed France, and if the combination of martial powers who attacked her at the same time, had not been disconcerted in their operations by the particular interests by which they were respectively influenced.

General Dumourier received the disagreeable intelligence that England and Holland were preparing to unite their arms with the other enemies of France. Had the councils of France been guided by prudence, it would have been proposed to abandon the Netherlands, which could not be defended, and withdraw the armies from the northern frontiers, still, however, preserving a footing on the banks of the Scheldt, and keeping possession of the fortress of Namur; but so reasonable a proposition would have been construed into a proof either of cowardice or treason, for which the general would have lost his head.

But a proposal of this kind could only have been made to the vindictive tyrants, who the general was waiting for an opportunity to oppose, with a view to the welfare of France. Had he returned into the interior part of the country, followed by the enemy, that movement, by carrying the appearance of a flight, would have forfeited all consideration with the con-

vention, which was only to be preserved by great and splendid successes; and besides, this retreat would have been converted by the Jacobins at Paris into the means of strengthening their party with the addition of sixty or seventy thousand men. In short, he could not extricate himself from the desperate situation in which he was placed, but by the most daring and hazardous attempts. His military reputation and the celerity of his operations were alone to compensate for all the deficiencies in his army. Men, clothing, horses, provisions, and money were to be obtained in Holland; and therefore he projected the exploit of making an immediate conquest of that country. Here follows his plan of operations.

The refugee Hollanders had formed a small revolutionary committee at Antwerp, where the Batavian legion was stationed. These people were more conspicuous for their zeal in the cause they had espoused, than for the strength of their understanding or the acuteness of penetration; and though they expended considerable sums of money in maintaining a correspondence with the different provinces of their republic, the information which they communicated to the general was of little importance, and particularly defective in whatever related to military affairs. The substance of all the intelligence that could be drawn from these people, was, that their country was very formidable, especially at Amsterdam, Haarlem, Dordrecht, or Dort, and in Zealand. He resumed the proposition that had been made at Paris for an irruption into Zealand; he canvassed this plan in conjunction with the members of the committee, and affected to adopt it, the better to disguise a more important undertaking. This scheme he divulged only to M. Koch and M. de Nis, whom he deemed worthy of all his confidence, and whose zeal, probity, magnanimity, and civism would rank them among the deliverers of their country.

The attempt upon Zealand, as proposed by the Batavian Committee, was to be made according to the following plan. They had learned that the Stadtholder had formed a design of fortifying the island of Walkeren, with a view of retiring thither, together with the States General, and all the members of the government, in case the French should make an incursion into Holland. The committee proposed that some thousands of men should, by successive small detachments, proceed from Antwerp to Zuid-Beveland, and be removed from island to island, till they reached that of Walkeren, where they might be employed in the reduction of Middleburgh and Flushing. Having passed the canals of the Scheldt, they were to proceed by the way of Sandvliet, and pass over the marshy lands of the island of Zuid-Beveland; then they were to cross an arm of the sea between Zuid-Beveland and Walkeren, and on their arrival in the latter island, their great object would have been obtained, supposing the inhabitants had not immediately disarmed the garrisons of these two places, consisting only of about twelve or fifteen hundred men, and those very indifferently equipped. However, the island was in a situation capable of receiving succours to more than double the force of the assailants; and had considerable reinforcements been thrown in, the enterprise would not only have been defeated, but the French detachment must inevitably have been ruined, and left without resources; as its retreat would have been impracticable, there being several English frigates then stationed at Flushing, and the Dutch having, near the island of Bantz, in the Scheldt, about a league below Lillo, a squadron which might have cut off all communication between the French detachment and Flanders.

Such rapidity and precision were requisite in this expedition, that the general could not repose a sufficient reliance on his own troops, or in the Batavian revolutionists; he had not a general officer with whom

he could entrust so hazardous an enterprize; and he could not relinquish the general command of his army, for the purpose of personally directing the operations of the detachment; for had he resorted to the last expedient, he was confident, from the disposition of mind the Hollanders were then in, his ruin would have been a necessary and unavoidable consequence. So unskillful an opening of the campaign, with a small number of inexperienced troops, must have completed the ruin of his army, which, as will in the sequel be seen, had already greatly suffered by his absence, and which, a short time after, were thrown into consternation, vanquished, and disbanded on the Roër and the Meuse.

If, by the greatest chance imaginable, and against all probability, this expedition had succeeded, although brilliant, it would have contributed nothing to the advantage of the general, who might have lost five or six thousand men, by their being separated from him by an arm of the sea, and there being between them many strong places in Dutch Flanders; so that his remaining troops might not be of sufficient force to enable him to undertake any other enterprize.

In the mean time, that he might conceal the real object he had in view, he affected to adopt the above plan of attack, and made some dispositions calculated to induce the belief that he actually meant to carry it into effect. At this time there was at Antwerp a small squadron under the command of captain Moulton, an American officer, in the service of France, who had assisted at the capture of the citadel of Antwerp: this force consisted of the Ariel, of 24 guns, a brig of 14, two gun-boats armed with twenty-four pounders, and a fourth vessel which had foundered, and was at that time unfit for service. He ordered these ships to anchor below fort Lillo, and a furnace to be made in each of the gunboats, for making balls red-hot; at the same time directing provisions and ammunition to be conveyed into the two forts of Lillo and Liefkenshoeck, and the citadel of Antwerp. He caused
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all the Dutch vessels, which, after the declaration of war, had been stopped in the rivers communicating with the Scheldt, to assemble at Antwerp, as if intending to convert them into fire-ships. The general also pretended to have a design of setting fire to the Dutch squadron, stationed below Bats, and also of making a vigorous assault upon the fortress of that town, which was defended by forty pieces of cannon. The squadron sailed to Remekens, and for several days it was supposed the general's views were directed towards Zealand, the invasion of which country was expected to take place at the opening of the campaign. But, in the interim, the attention of general Dumourier was engrossed by another object, the attainment of which, because it never had been aimed at, might appear impracticable; this was to advance with a body of troops posted at Mordyck, and masking Breda and Gertruydenberg on the right, and Bergen-op-zoom, Steenberg, Klundert, and Williamstadt on the left, to effect a passage over an arm of the sea to Dort, where being once disembarked, he would have found himself at once in the very heart of Holland, when no obstacles could have opposed his marching by the way of Rotterdam, Delf, the Hague, Leyden, and Haarlem, quite to Amsterdam. He might then have made himself master of various defensive places in Holland, while general Miranda, with a part of the grand army, might have covered and bombarded Maestricht and Venlo, and after being informed of the landing of general Dumourier at Dort, he might have left the siege of Maestricht to be continued by general Valence, and have marched at the head of twenty thousand men to Nimègue, whither general Dumourier, taking the way of Utrecht, would have proceeded to give him the meeting. Had this project been executed with celerity, it could scarcely have met with any considerable obstacle to impede or retard its success; for the Stadtholder had neither an army on foot, nor any defensive plan prepared; and besides,

besides, of all undertakings, this was one the least to be expected; for had it been pursued, it would have been making, if the expression may be admitted, "an army" *pass through the eye of a needle*.

Had Dumourier made himself master of Holland, it was his intention to send all the national volunteers back to the Netherlands; to secure his own safety and that of the most confidential of the commanders, by stationing around them a circle of troops of the line; to demand of the States General orders for the surrender of all towns and other places; to introduce no changes in the government, but such as were indispensibly necessary; to dissolve the revolutionary committee of Holland, to whom he had signified, that if possessed of the confidence of their fellow-citizens, they should be appointed to offices in the administration of the provinces to which they belonged; to secure the Batavian republic from the commissaries of the convention and the Jacobins; immediately to equip a fleet, and station ships of war at Rotterdam, in Zealand, and in the Texel, for the protection of the homeward-bound India trade, and to employ other vessels in reinforcing the garrisons; to announce to the English a perfect neutrality; to station in the country of Zutphen, and in Guelderland, an army of observation of thirty thousand men; to provide money and arms for thirty thousand men to be raised at Antwerp, in Flanders, and in Campine, on whose attachment and fidelity reliance might be placed; to curb the excesses of the French army at Liege, to annul the decree of the 15th of December throughout Belgia, to offer the people the privilege of assembling at Alost, Antwerp, or Ghent, for the purpose of establishing such a form of government as might be agreeable to them, upon a solid foundation; to take into pay a certain number of Belgic battalions, each containing eight hundred men, whereby a force of forty thousand men might be raised in aid of the cavalry; to demand a suspension of hostilities from the Imperialists, who, in case of refusal,

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by an army of an hundred and fifty thousand men, might be compelled to pass the Rhine; but in case of this being acceded to, sufficient time would be allowed for completing the remaining part of the plan, which was, to erect the seventeen provinces into a republic, if that measure should be acceptable to the people, or to establish an offensive and defensive alliance between the Batavian and Belgic republics, in case of the proposed reunion not being adopted; that these states should jointly raise an army of eighty thousand men, and keep that force on foot till the end of the war; to propose an alliance with France, conditionally, that she should restore the constitution of 1789, as the only means of suppressing the rage of anarchy prevailing throughout the kingdom; and if this should be rejected, to march to Paris with all the French troops of the line, and forty thousand Belgians and Batavians, for the purpose of dissolving the convention, and annihilating the abominable society of Jacobins.

Chimerical as it may appear to some readers, such was the project concerted by the general, and known only to four people, who, after all the calculations that art could suggest, were firmly persuaded it could not fail of success, abating the intervention of unfortunate and unforeseen occurrences to disconcert and defeat the plan of operations the general had framed. The success of this measure would have put an end to the war, and have effectually prevented the ruin of France.

CHAP. II.

Orders issued to the grand army. Councils of war. Orders for the levy of Belgic battalions. General Valence arrives at Antwerp. A loan. A manifesto.

THOUGH the plan was formed, the means for carrying it into effect were yet to be provided. At Antwerp there were only two incomplete battalions

lions of national guards, each consisting of about three hundred and fifty men, the most deficient in point of discipline, and the most dangerous, as well to the general as to peaceable citizens, of any troops that ever existed. These ferocious janissaries were allowed forty sols a day free, from deduction, and had the privilege of appointing their own officers. Upon reviewing these men, the general very seriously admonished them, that if they continued to give countenance to any disorderly proceedings, on which account complaints had been made against them, or were guilty of mutiny or disobedience of orders, they should be sent back to France. These men had formerly belonged to the corps of French guards. There were besides, a hundred and fifty men of the twentieth regiment of cavalry, and three battalions of the national guards, together with a Batavian legion of about two thousand men; there being among the latter two hundred cavalry. Twelve battalions of newly raised national troops, most of them without powder and ball, and even unprovided with shoes, were stationed in the towns and villages of West Flanders, not expecting to be called to act in the campaign till the month of May.

The general had neither a single piece of artillery, nor one howitzer; he had no magazines, nor a commissary or clerk of any description; but notwithstanding these disadvantages, no time was to be lost. The precipitation with which the French declared war, at the beginning of February, gave the signal to the Hollanders to prepare for their defence; but this rapidity not being foreseen by the general, an immediate attack upon the Dutch territories became impracticable. Had it been attempted as suddenly as it had been resolved upon, it must certainly have proved unsuccessful.

During the winter, general Miranda had remained at the head of the army in the north. This general, who is a native of Pérou, is a man of genius, better acquainted

acquainted with the theory of war, than any other officer of the army, though not accustomed to actual service. His intimacy and friendship with Pethion, had induced him the preceding year to enter into the army, in quality of field-marshal; soon after which he joined general Dumourier, at the camp of Grand-pré, in Champagne, attached himself to him, and rendered considerable services during the different attacks of the Prussians, and particularly in the retreat on the 15th of September, at St. Menehould. The haughty, austere, and inflexible temper of this general, rendered him universally disliked; he was by no means qualified for the command of French soldiers, who ought always to experience from their officers good humour and confidence.

In November, 1792, general Dumourier conferred upon Miranda the command of the Northern army, together with the prospect of attaining the title of commander in chief, upon the first vacancy. In the campaign of 1792, Valance gained great reputation for the brilliant manner in which he commanded general Kellerman's advanced guards, and several detached corps; and at the solicitation of general Dumourier, he was appointed commander in chief: but the preference thus given to an officer of longer standing than himself, Miranda could not forgive. Unfortunately for France, the vehemence of this general's temper did not display itself till the battle of Nerwinde. He appeared to be zealously attached to his commander in chief, who had transmitted orders to him from Paris, to prepare his artillery for speedily opening the campaign by the siege of Maestricht, provided an arrangement of affairs should not take place between England and Holland.

At this time Dumourier's army was under the conduct of general Noüe, a man of courage and integrity, whom fifty years services had rendered respectable, but had impaired the strength of his constitution; he

he was assisted by major-general Thovenot, an officer of extraordinary merit.

During the absence of general Valence, his army was commanded by general Veneur, a man of great bravery, but deficient in natural abilities, and of confined knowledge in military affairs.

General Dumourier ordered general Miranda to advance with a part of his army before Maestricht, without leaving the Lower Meuse in a defenceless state, and by the 25th, to draw reinforcements of three thousand men from the two other armies, at the same time giving directions for these orders to be communicated to the other generals, that they might appoint such quarters for their troops as would admit of their being quickly collected, if the Imperialists, who were in great strength upon the Erftle, and the Prussians equally so at Wesel, should attempt, as from circumstances seemed to be probably, to form a junction for the relief of Maestricht. General Dumourier judged it not proper precisely to ascertain the spot where this army of observation was to assemble, and in this respect he confesses himself to have been represented as guilty of a great error.

In subsequent advices he explained to him the particulars of the proposed attack; he instructed him not to attempt a regular siege at that unfavourable time of the year, but to assault the place with bombs and red-hot balls, as the Duke of Saxe-Teschén had done before Lisle, and after receiving intelligence of general Dumourier having passed Mordyck, to leave the continuance of the siege to general Valence, who was speedily expected from Paris, and march with the utmost expedition to Nimenguen, and in passing the frontiers of the duchy of Cleves, to intercept the Prussians, if they should have arrived in Holland before him. It was represented to be necessary that Venlo should be attacked by general Champmorin, an excellent engineer, while the siege of Maestricht was carrying

carrying on, for the purpose of commanding the Lower Meuse as far as Genep. General Champmorin was restrained from employing more than twenty-five, or at most, thirty thousand men in the performance of this service, lest the force in the Netherlands and the Upper Meuse should be too much impaired. In consequence of Maestricht having been entirely blocked up from the 12th to the 14th, he was recommended to exert the utmost activity in his preparations; and lieutenant-general Boucher, an engineer of deserved celebrity, was appointed to assist in carrying on the siege.

Advices nearly of the same tendency he dispatched to the generals Noüe and Thovenot, enjoining them to announce the same to the army, which was preparing to depart from their winter quarters on the banks of the Lower Meuse.

The general wrote to lieutenant Moreton, commandant at Brussels, that he should shortly arrive in that city. He gave directions to general Hardans to recall his troops from their winter quarters at Namur by the 20th of February, as he should review them on the 22d of that month. In thus amusing such of his officers as it was not his intention should co-operate with him, he equally deceived the enemy, and made them incapable of forming an idea as to where he meant to open the campaign.

Some days after the departure of general Dumourier from Paris, Pache resigned the office of minister of the war department, in consequence of his appointment to be mayor of that city, and he was succeeded by general Bournonville, whom Dumourier had made a lieutenant-general, and a short time after promoted to a command in chief. He had complimented Dumourier by giving him the appellations of "his Ajax and his son;" and voluntarily offered to leave no means untried for performing whatever the general might recommend, or that he conceived could in any respect prove serviceable to him. The

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general only informed him, that he was preparing to attack Holland, but gave no detail of his plan, lest he should be betrayed by the indiscretion or the ill-will of the commissaries of war.

A few days before his resignation, Pache had given orders for the demolition of the few remaining fortifications at Mons and Tournay. This impolitic order roused the indignation of the inhabitants of the two cities; and therefore the execution of it was suspended by Dumourier, who not only urgently solicited the new minister to relinquish this measure, but advised him to cause the fortifications of the two places to be immediately repaired, and the castle of Huy to be fortified with equal expedition. He further recommended a ditch to be dug round Malines, where water might be easily admitted, to form a good defence; that batteries might be constructed at Ostend, Nieuport, and Dunkirk, to connect the frontiers in such a manner that they could not be easily penetrated, in the very probable event of the evacuation of the Netherlands; advising him at the same time completely to re-establish the lines between Dunkirk and Bruges; to trace out an intrenched camp upon Mount Cassel; to fortify as campaign posts Orchies, between Lille, Douay, and Condé; Bavay, fronting Quesnoy, between Condé and Maubeuge; and Beaumont, between Maubeuge and Philipville.

Such were the councils given by a man who stands accused of having betrayed his country, which he faithfully served till the last moment, and would again serve with the same zeal, if it should ever have a king and constitution. Had the measures recommended by him been adopted, the progress of the combined armies to our frontiers would have been delayed, and greater difficulties would have opposed their penetrating into France.

He applied to the minister for reinforcements, desiring that general Arçon might be sent to him, together with a number of engineers, as the plan of the war

war comprehended divers sieges. Bournonville complied, as far as his power extended, and Arçon timely arrived. This field-officer, who is one of the best engineers, and one of the honestest men in France, was accused of aristocracy by the famous Prince of Hesse, one of the most contemptible of the Jacobins, and in consequence of this he was displaced. General Dumourier, who had long known his merit, procured him to be restored to his station, and his country has great obligations to his subsequent services.

General de Flers held the command at Bruges; he was a man of great courage, but obstinate, and of slender abilities. After receiving a gun-shot wound at the camp of Maulde, this officer was sent to Bruges, and appointed to command in West Flanders, where upon his requisition, the minister Pache furnished him with a reinforcement of six thousand men. On his arrival at Bruges, de Flers transmitted a scheme for the surprise of the city of Echuse to the general, who seemed to approve it, and sent him to Bournonville with directions to request he might be supplied with five or six thousand men, and a small train of artillery, for the purpose of threatening Dutch Flanders. This was readily complied with.

It was not the intention of the general to charge de Flers with the attack of places in Dutch Flanders, which he could not take, but to have this small body of troops at his disposal, to supply the places of those at Antwerp and Breda, whom he was preparing to lead into Holland. This body of men was also intended to divert the attention of the Hollanders, and conceal from them the true point of attack; and general de Flers was deceived, and therefore made various preparations for his expected expedition.

The general had not with him at this time a single staff-officer, having left them all at Liege, together with his aides-de-camp, and was only attended by his faithful Baptiste. He had thought it proper to leave his aides-de-camp and attendants at the camp

of the grand army, that it might be believed he meant to return; and he only sent for some horses from Antwerp, under the pretext that he should make use of them in visiting the cantonments of the Meuse. The general sent to the army for four aides-de-camp to assist in his operations, and as the principal of these, he fixed upon colonel Thovenot, younger brother of the general of that name. This officer, who has always been the friend of his general, is a well-bred man, possessing great bravery, with a mind fertile in resources. He rendered the greatest services to the general, during the campaign in Holland, as well as after they had both quitted the army.

It was necessary that general Thovenot should remain with the grand army, being the only officer conversant in the detail of the duties of an adjutant, and the best qualified to conciliate misunderstandings among the commanders. It was known that he possessed, and acknowledged that he merited the whole confidence of Dumourier; and if this did not increase the esteem in which he was held, it secured him respect; and it was confessed that this advice, according with the designs of the generals, ought to be followed.

The commissary Petit-Jean was the only man belonging to the army empowered to superintend and regulate the details of the siege of Maastricht, the cantonments between the Meuse and the Roer, the winter quarters in Belgia, and the establishment of the several kinds of magazines. The general was unwilling to impose upon him these complicated duties, before the arrival of the commissary Malies, who was still detained at Paris, though it had been promised he should be sent to the army. He therefore determined to send to Antwerp for general Thovenot and Petit-Jean, and conjointly with them, in the space of two days, formed an arrangement for collecting, arming, and equipping the troops, and, in short,

The attempt upon Zealand, as proposed by the Batavian Committee, was to be made according to the following plan. They had learned that the Stadtholder had formed a design of fortifying the island of Walkeren, with a view of retiring thither, together with the States General, and all the members of the government, in case the French should make an incursion into Holland. The committee proposed that some thousands of men should, by successive small detachments, proceed from Antwerp to Zuid-Beveland, and be removed from island to island, till they reached that of Walkeren, where they might be employed in the reduction of Middleburgh and Flushing. Having passed the canals of the Scheldt, they were to proceed by the way of Sandvliet, and pass over the marshy lands of the island of Zuid-Beveland; then they were to cross an arm of the sea between Zuid-Beveland and Walkeren, and on their arrival in the latter island, their great object would have been obtained, supposing the inhabitants had not immediately disarmed the garrisons of these two places, consisting only of about twelve or fifteen hundred men, and those very indifferently equipped. However, the island was in a situation capable of receiving succours to more than double the force of the assailants; and had considerable reinforcements been thrown in, the enterprise would not only have been defeated, but the French detachment must inevitably have been ruined, and left without resources; as its retreat would have been impracticable, there being several English frigates then stationed at Flushing, and the Dutch having, near the island of Batz, in the Scheldt, about a league below Lillo, a squadron which might have cut off all communication between the French detachment and Flanders.

Such rapidity and precision were requisite in this expedition, that the general could not repose a sufficient reliance on his own troops, or in the Batavian revolutionists; he had not a general officer with whom

he could entrust so hazardous an enterprize; and he could not relinquish the general command of his army, for the purpose of personally directing the operations of the detachment; for had he resorted to the last expedient, he was confident, from the disposition of mind the Hollanders were then in, his ruin would have been a necessary and unavoidable consequence. So unskillful an opening of the campaign, with a small number of inexperienced troops, must have completed the ruin of his army, which, as will in the sequel be seen, had already greatly suffered by his absence, and which, a short time after, were thrown into consternation, vanquished, and disbanded on the Roër and the Meuse.

If, by the greatest chance imaginable, and against all probability, this expedition had succeeded, although brilliant, it would have contributed nothing to the advantage of the general, who might have lost five or six thousand men, by their being separated from him by an arm of the sea, and there being between them many strong places in Dutch Flanders; so that his remaining troops might not be of sufficient force to enable him to undertake any other enterprize.

In the mean time, that he might conceal the real object he had in view, he affected to adopt the above plan of attack, and made some dispositions calculated to induce the belief that he actually meant to carry it into effect. At this time there was at Antwerp a small squadron under the command of captain Moulton, an American officer, in the service of France, who had assisted at the capture of the citadel of Antwerp: this force consisted of the *Ariel*, of 24 guns, a brig of 14, two gun-boats armed with twenty-four pounders, and a fourth vessel which had foundered, and was at that time unfit for service. He ordered these ships to anchor below fort Lillo, and a furnace to be made in each of the gunboats, for making balls red-hot; at the same time directing provisions and ammunition to be conveyed into the two forts of Lillo and Liefkenshoeck, and the citadel of Antwerp. He caused
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Had Dumourier made himself master of Holland, it was his intention to send all the national volunteers back to the Netherlands ; to secure his own safety and that of the most confidential of the commanders, by stationing around them a circle of troops of the line ; to demand of the States General orders for the surrender of all towns and other places ; to introduce no changes in the government, but such as were indispensibly necessary ; to dissolve the revolutionary committee of Holland, to whom he had signified, that if possessed of the confidence of their fellow-citizens, they should be appointed to offices in the administration of the provinces to which they belonged ; to secure the Batavian republic from the commissaries of the convention and the Jacobins ; immediately to equip a fleet, and station ships of war at Rotterdam, in Zealand, and in the Texel, for the protection of the homeward-bound India trade, and to employ other vessels in reinforcing the garrisons ; to announce to the English a perfect neutrality ; to station in the country of Zutphen, and in Guelderland, an army of observation of thirty thousand men ; to provide money and arms for thirty thousand men to be raised at Antwerp, in Flanders, and in Campine, on whose attachment and fidelity reliance might be placed ; to curb the excesses of the French army at Liege, to annul the decree of the 15th of December throughout Belgia, to offer the people the privilege of assembling at Alost, Antwerp, or Ghent, for the purpose of establishing such a form of government as might be agreeable to them, upon a solid foundation ; to take into pay a certain number of Belgic battalions, each containing eight hundred men, whereby a force of forty thousand men might be raised in aid of the cavalry ; to demand a suspension of hostilities from the Imperialists, who, in case of refusal,
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from Antwerp till the 22d of the month, when he set out with the artillery, and the latter columns of the troops, to join the army in Holland.

This army was composed of twenty-one battalions, only two of which were troops of the line: it comprised the ninety-fifth regiment, formerly called that of Conti, which had not yet been in battle, and the national guards. When complete, these twenty-one battalions would have consisted of from twelve to fourteen thousand men, but those under arms did not amount to ten thousand. Three battalions of the volunteers had already made a campaign in Flanders, but the rest were quite new recruits, and mostly youths of from thirteen to sixteen years of age. Only eight of the battalions were provided with field-pieces. The cavalry consisted of a hundred men of the twentieth regiment, fifty dragoons of the sixth, the eighth regiment of hussars, being near three hundred men, badly armed and mounted, and newly raised; a hundred Belgic hussars, of whom there was no cause of complaint; eighty Batavian dragoons, and three hundred recruits, of a late levy, and quite undisciplined, under the command of colonel Westermann. This account includes about a thousand cavalry.

The light troops were three battalions of about fifteen hundred Batavians, who served with great credit; about a thousand Belgian recruits, collected at Bruges and Ghent, of whom two hundred were dragoons of infantry; and near twelve hundred infantry of the northern legion, very much disposed to plunder, and indifferent soldiers. Of this armament, which, in a complete state, would have included eighteen thousand men, only thirteen thousand seven hundred were in a condition to take the field. The artillery consisted of four twelve pounders, eight eight pounders, four ten inch mortars, twenty small mortars for grenades, and four howitzers.

The general formed this little army into four divisions. An advanced-guard, composed of two battalions

lions of national guards, two Batavian battalions, the Belgic corps, a party of the legion of the north, the fifty dragoons of the sixth regiment, and the eighty Batavian dragoons, with three hundred horse of the northern legion, were commanded by General Berneron.

The division posted to the right, commanded by general d'Arçon, with colonel Westermann under him, comprehended nine battalions of national guards, and two battalions of horse grenadiers, which, with one half of the republican hussars, were considered but as one battalion.

The left division, under colonel Clerc, of the regiment of Bouillon, which the general had ordered to be detached from the grand army, was also composed of nine battalions, one of which was a troop of a hundred and fifty of the republican hussar regulars. It has been observed, that this regiment being in want of horses and arms, had remained behind; that on their joining the army at Breda, they were in very bad order; and that the general had found himself under the necessity of breaking the colonel, named Dumont, a weak man, a drunkard, and dishonest. This man, who was a violent Jacobin, had formerly been a taylor at Lille. The general appointed lieutenant-colonel Morgan, one of his aides-de-camp, to the command of this regiment. The rear-guard, under colonel Tilly, one of his aides-de-camp, was composed of one battalion of national guards, one Batavian battalion, two hundred Belgians, two hundred men of the twentieth regiment of cavalry, and one hundred Belgic hussars. Each of these corps the general furnished with a small division of artillery.

With this force general Dumourier undertook the conquest of Holland; being persuaded that a powerful party, who impatiently expected his arrival, would declare in his favour, immediately upon his entering the country. He had neither time, from the rapidity of his motions, nor means, from the want of officers

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at the head of the troops, to collect his forces, nor to introduce the necessary discipline among them. But nevertheless, he was filled with ardor and confidence. This expedition was a coup-de-main perfectly congenial with the natural genius of the nation. The general apprised his troops of the rigour of the climate; of the number of strong places to be taken, surrounded by inundations; and of the canals and arms of the sea that were to be crossed; but while he pointed out these obstacles, he informed them, that being once arrived in Holland, they would find abundance of friends, and be amply supplied with provisions, arms, cloathing and money.

The French soldiers have much vivacity; and when the difficulties they have to encounter are anticipated to them, their general has nothing to think of but victory. If, on the contrary, danger is concealed from them, they are confounded and astonished at its appearance; and being once discouraged, they are seized with mistrust, and it becomes almost impossible to rally them.

On the 16th, the general dispatched general Berneron with the advanced-guard, informing him, that he should be furnished with scaling-ladders, and supported by a detachment from the army. The instructions delivered to him in writing purported, that he should without delay detach a corps of eight hundred infantry, and one hundred cavalry, under the Dutch general Daendels, to Mordyck, and seize and keep possession of all the vessels there, as well as those that might be found at Swaluve and Roowaert; to station his advanced post on the small river of Merck, from Oudenbosch and Sevenbergen to Breda; and to form a bridge over the Merck, for effecting a communication with lieutenant-colonel Daendels, and affording a means of protecting him against the sallies from the neighbouring garrisons.

In Bergen-op-zoom, Gertruydenberg, and Breda, there were three regiments of dragoons, stronger than
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any of the general's cavalry, and a sufficient number of infantry for sustaining them. It is certain, that had these been united, and joined by the cavalry of Bois-le-Duc and Heusden, they might have forced the advanced-guard to retreat, and have frustrated the expedition. But general Dumourier knew that no Dutch officer, charged with the defence of the country, had it in his power to strengthen the town, by forming a junction of the cavalry; and he was also confident, that no general plan of defence was prepared, the officers in the place having only to attend to the duties of their own respective and particular stations; and therefore it was not to be supposed, that they would leave the town, and oppose any part of its garrison to an army which they all supposed to be very formidable, and which, from the extent of its line, seemed to threaten the assault of several cities at one and the same time. The officers did not expect so sudden an attack, and, circumstanced as they were, they had sufficient employment in putting the place into a state of defence.

Arriving on the 22d at his first post, the general was astonished and afflicted to find that his orders had not been obeyed. No part of the van-guard having passed the Merck, time was allowed for Hollanders to remove their vessels to the opposite shore of Dort, under the protection of three cruizers, stationed in the channel. This misfortune rendered the passage over the river more difficult; and perhaps it would have been impracticable, could not other vessels have been procured for supplying the place of those upon which a dependence had been reposed.

The general pushed forward to the front of the forces under generals Berneron and Daendels. He ordered general d'Arçon, with the right division, to block up Breda, and colonel Clerc, with the left division, in close cantonments, to block up Bergen-op-zoom and Steenberg. The governors of these two places abandoned all their out-posts; and colonel Clerc

Clerc having taken possession of the fortress of Blaw-Sluis, in front of Steenberg, summoned the commandant to surrender. The garrison of Bergen-op-zoom hazarded two or three small sallies, which were attended with no other consequence than the desertion of some soldiers, who joined the Batavians.

The general brought up his rear between the two divisions of the army at Sevenbergen, having in his front the van-guard of Princeland, a district comprehending Klundert and Williamstadt, which places he ordered to be laid siege to, giving directions to lieutenant-colonel Daendels to hasten to Nordschantz, to cut off the communication between the former mentioned places. At Nordschantz the above officer found three small single-decked boats, which he detained, in order to make use of them when opportunity should serve, in that part of the enterprise, which he was particularly charged to execute. Having advanced M. Koch and M. Nys to the rank of colonels, the former, a bold and eloquent man, was directed to join Daendels; and the other, who was remarkable for sagacity and courage, the general resolved should remain with him.

The general did not attempt to disguise the difficulties attending the passage of Mordyck, of which the first attempt was thus conducted. After instructions had been given to general Berneron, Daendels and Koch were on the 17th to repair to Mordyck, with nine hundred men, supported by the whole of the van-guard stationed on the Merck, and secure all the vessels on that shore. On the 21st, or the 22d, at latest, as many men as possible were to embark in the vessels, and, after a passage of near two leagues, land on the island of Dort, and then force an entrance into that city, where it was expected they would procure arms, and be joined by about two hundred and fifty of the troops in the garrison; and being aided by the inhabitants, who it was hoped would declare in their favour, they were to bring from Dort to Mordyck up-

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wards

wards of a hundred single-decked vessels, which they would find completely rigged, mounting three or four of the strongest with guns, which were to go in pursuit of the three cruisers, and endeavour to take them; they being badly armed, and very weakly manned. The troops were then to repair to Sevenbergen, Oudenbosch, Mordyck, and Swaluve, protected by the rear from annoyance by sorties from the garrison. Two or three thousand men having effected their passage, the bridge being formed, and an army at the same time at Dort, no further obstacle was to be apprehended.

The day on which the general quitted Antwerp, he was visited at a village through which he had to pass by the baron de Staël, formerly the Swedish ambassador at the court of France, who was on his way to Paris, and they supped together. The baron said, that in all parts of Germany and Holland, through which he had lately passed, the greatest success was wished to the general, who was expected at Utrecht, where a hotel was already prepared for his reception; and he confirmed what had been communicated to the general, respecting the great consternation prevailing among the stadtholderian party. Without endeavouring to penetrate into the secret of his journey, the general advised him to wait for the success of his expedition, before explaining himself to the French ministry, lest he should engage his court in a compromise, which must be afterwards retracted, and particularly to say nothing more at Paris, than he would be willing to have printed, and known to all the world. The baron gave assurances that he had no other object in view than his own private affairs. Previous to his departure from Antwerp, the general had given advice of a similar tendency to a personage of high importance in Poland, who also came to visit him. His maxim was, as little as possible to involve foreign powers in negotiations with a ministry enslaved to an assembly

assembly of seven hundred people, possessing neither experience, justice, nor discretion.

The first plan of the general was totally deranged by the neglect of the orders delivered to the commanders of the van-guard.

However, instead of despairing of success, he formed new dispositions. In the canals between Oudenbosch and Sevenbergen, he had seized twenty-three vessels of from twenty to seventy tons burthen; and directed a commissary at war, named Bourcier, an active and intelligent man, to arrange these for the reception of twelve hundred troops, four of them to be provided with cannon, and form the van of this fleet. The general ordered all the carpenters and sailors at the small neighbouring ports to be hired, and assigned them wages to be paid out of the fund raised by the Dutch committee upon the effects properly belonging to the stadtholder and his known adherents.

Since its arrival in Holland no other expence had been incurred on account of the army than merely its pay; the country afforded provision and forage, and the inhabitants not only offered, but actually advanced sums of money for facilitating the success of the expedition. Never did an army experience a more cordial reception, though no troops ever less merited such friendly treatment; for the life-guards and the light troops abandoned themselves to all kinds of excesses. But it must be observed, that the troops of the line, and the national guards, on all occasions, conducted themselves with honour and humanity.

As the equipment of the fleet required time, the general introduced another change in his dispositions. In addition to his first plan, he found it necessary to mask the strong places, and to slide (to use that expression) between them, preparatory to a speedy embarkation at Mordyck. Thus an opportunity would be afforded him of insulting these places; and from the known weakness and inexperience of the commanders of the garrisons, he hoped to be able to carry

one of them at least, which would be a great relief to his forces, and supply him with artillery and ammunition, with which he was very indifferently provided.

It was not the general's intention to pursue a siege in form; because, to have insured success, he must have compressed the whole of his small army into a contracted compass of ground, so that its weakness would have been manifestly betrayed to the enemy. Besides, having no longer the country at command, the garrisons would have had time to recover from their consternation, and might take the field to cut off his communication with Antwerp, harass his artificers, and destroy the little fleet on which his last hopes were reposed. Without disarranging the original disposition of his posts, and while the blockade of Bergen-op-zoom and Steenberg was continued by colonel Clerc, he ordered general d'Arçon to assault the town of Breda, while Klundert was attacked by the van of the army.

Breda is a place celebrated for its strength; at the time of the attack, it was in a state of inundation, closely surrounded by chevaux de frise, and defended by four hundred pieces of artillery. The garrison was composed of two thousand infantry, and a regiment of dragoons: the governor, count de Byland, was a man of courage, but unaccustomed to the practical part of war. There being no magazines in the place, the garrison were obliged to procure their meat and bread from the butcher and baker. Most of the Dutch towns were laid under water, and provided with out-works, but these were chiefly unfortified. The inhabitants, though subjects to the prince of Orange, were strongly attached to the opposite faction.

General d'Arçon, without opening the trenches, mounted two batteries, with four mortars and four howitzers, very near the town, on the side of the village of Hage. These the enemy answered, by maintaining a brisk fire for three hours. At this time,
general

general d'Arçon, having only sixty remaining bombs, was preparing to raise the siege, when colonel Philip de Vaux, aid-de-camp to general Dumourier, came to repeat the summons for a surrender of the place; and this officer having represented, that general Dumourier was preparing to bring up his whole force, and that there was no hope of succour from any quarter whatever, count Byland, the governor, was induced to capitulate. The garrison were allowed the honours of war, and whatever else they demanded. Upon the French troops entering the place, it was found that our shells had only damaged a small number of the houses. Here we took two hundred and fifty pieces of cannon, near three thousand pounds of powder, and five thousand musquets, of which articles we were in great want. This siege was attended with the loss of only twenty men on both sides. The French soldiers carried their confidence so far as to dance the *carmagnole* upon the glacis, which was the only place not laid under water. Thirty of Byland's dragoons made a sally upon the dancers, and having attacked them with their sabres, re-entered the town with six prisoners, though with the loss of some men and horses. The besieging army was composed of five thousand men, about twelve hundred of whom were detached to take possession of several forts upon the sluices on the side of Heusden.

Klundert was taken two days afterwards. This is a small, but very compact and regular fort, in the middle of a district overflowed with water. It was defended with great vigour, but not with equal military skill, by lieutenant colonel Westphalien, a brave officer, whose garrison amounted only to a hundred and fifty men. Berneron had mounted a four-gun battery behind the Dyke, at about a hundred and fifty toises * from the town, and such was the effect of the shot, that most of the houses in the little city of

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Klundert

* Nine hundred feet English measure.

Klundert were so battered as to admit light through the walls. Having, though without effect, answered the violent fire from the battery for several successive days, and finding himself deprived of all shelter and protection, the governor took up the resolution of spiking up his guns, and endeavouring to save himself and his garrison by flying to Williamstadt. His retreat was intercepted by a Batavian detachment under lieutenant-colonel Hartman, whom the governor shot through the head, but he himself experienced the same fate. The dead body of the governor being conveyed to Klundert, the keys of the fortress were found in his pocket. The garrison were made prisoners of war, and in the place were found fifty-three pieces of ordnance, several mortars, a great quantity of bombs and balls, and near eight thousand pounds of powder.

The general ordered Berneron to proceed without delay to the siege of Williamstadt, taking with him ten of the pieces of artillery of Klundert; and it was with the ammunition obtained at this place, that Berneron was enabled to undertake the bombardment of the former city.

The general also directed d'Arçon to proceed to the siege of Gertruydenberg, a small place and badly defended on the side of Ramsdonk, having only a single ditch behind the river, which commands the town; but on the left shore of the Donge it is deeply inundated, and protected by two ranges of strong out-works, which could not have been forced in three weeks, had they been skilfully and vigorously defended. Hirtzel's regiment of eight or nine hundred men, and the fine regiment of dragoons, forming the body-guard of the Stadtholder, were garrisoned in this place; the governor of which was a major-general of long standing, in the eightieth year of his age, and named Bedault. General d'Arçon brought before the town some pieces of cannon and mortars taken at Breda. All the out-works were either reduced or abandoned the first day.

D'Arçon mounted the batteries with three or four pieces of artillery, and after some mutual discharges, a capitulation was agreed on, according to which the honours of war were granted to the besieged. In the mean time, general Dumourier arrived, and went to dine with the aged general Bedault, who acknowledged that he had surrendered in consequence of being disappointed of some vessels which had been promised to be sent from Dort or Gorcum, for the purpose of laying the place under water. Some shells fell in the city, and one of them upon the governor's house.

While the governor and the general were at dinner, intelligence was brought of the capitulation being violated by a lieutenant-colonel of the national guards, who being intoxicated, attempted to force his way into the town in defiance of the centinel, and actually discharged a pistol at the lieutenant-colonel d'Hirtzel. General Dumourier ordered this drunken man to be brought before him, and depriving him of his commission, bestowed it, to the astonishment of all the officers of the garrison, who interceded in behalf of the delinquent, upon the soldier who had received the offence.

The general had much conversation with the different officers, and remembers that while walking with general d'Hirtzel, he made use of these words—*"Hodie mihi, cras tibi."* This worthy Swiss seems to have spoken in the spirit of prophecy.

By the reduction of this town we gained one hundred and fifty pieces of artillery, two thousand pounds of powder, a great number of bombs and shells, and two thousand five hundred new musquets, and, what was more essential than all the rest, a good port, and upwards of thirty transports of various burthen, of which kind of vessels we had before taken five at the siege of Breda.

This was in the early part of March. During these sieges, the general remained at Mordyck, judging it prudent to be present in the centre of his operations,
from

from whence he had the opportunity of superintending the bombardments both on his right and left, and also of his maritime force. Commissary Bourfier, with almost incredible labour, found means to arm twenty-three vessels laden with provisions for twelve hundred men; these he sent down the canal of Sevenberg to Roowaert.

When the general had established his quarters in the latter village, with a hundred chasseurs and fifty dragoons, he was cannonaded the whole day from three guardships. Having drawn up his chasseurs upon the banks of the Dyke, the commander, and another officer of a sloop, which had proved very offensive, were shot, upon which the vessel sheered off. A few days afterwards, the general caused to be brought from Breda twelve twenty-four pounders, together with powder and ball, with which he mounted several batteries, one posted at Roowaert for protecting the fleet under sailing orders, and the rest at Mordyck for favouring the embarkation. He was confident that his shot would pass beyond the middle of the river, and that, therefore, the enemy's vessels would not attempt to approach the side occupied by the French.

The troops were in high spirits, and very impatient to pass the river. This forwardness induced the general, in pleasantry, to observe to them that they resembled beavers; and from this circumstance the place acquired the name of "Beaver camp." There was no scarcity of provisions, which were in general of a good quality; and brandy was distributed amongst the troops every morning. In truth, the general afforded them an example of constancy, he being neither more commodiously lodged, or otherwise better accommodated, than themselves.

During this expedition, the general concerted a plan of operations to be carried on in those parts of the country that were flooded. The vessels before mentioned were manned by mariners from Gascony, Brittany,

Brittany, Normandy and Dunkirk; so that he was able to procure between four and five hundred seamen, by allowing them each twenty sols a day additional wages. The small fleet of Roowaert formed the van, the manœuvres being directed by an English lieutenant and a Dutch seaman, assisted by coasting pilots. Various delays had given the Dutch time to make considerable augmentations to their maritime force in the Bisbos, which is the small sea of Mor-dyck, where they had collected twelve armed ships, one of which carried twenty guns. These vessels were very advantageously posted for corresponding together, and giving succour to each other: the general was of opinion, that unless he could pass the fleet with the ebb tide, he could bring no more than half the enemy's ships into action.

The Dutch had also formed some batteries at Huy, and along the shore of the island of Dordt; and intelligence was received that twelve hundred English guards had marched thither, immediately after their landing at Helvoetfluice: but the general could not firmly rely on this information, knowing that the defensive preparations of the prince of Orange were carrying on at Gorcum, where the Stadtholderian army for opposing the general's march were to rendezvous. This army was not very considerable, and when joined by the English troops, and a number of emigrants, did not amount to four thousand men.

In the mean time, to disconcert the designs of the enemy, the blockade of Bergen-op-zoom and Steenberg was continued. General de Flers having arrived from Paris with a reinforcement, he was directed to bring six thousand men to occupy the station where colonel le Clerc had been lately posted at Rosendaël, and about Bergen-op-zoom; and these orders were speedily executed. The general ordered the left division to Oudenbosch and Sevenbergen; and also the national guards, with some cavalry, to march to the right and halt in the neighbourhood of Heusden.

Heusden. A lieutenant-colonel of the national guards in summoning the latter place to surrender, treated the governor with ridicule, in addressing him by the title of *Citoyen Commandant* instead of *Monsieur*.

The siege of Williamstadt was still continued, but without success. General Berneron having begun the attack at too great a distance from the place, he expended a great quantity of ammunition without obtaining any advantage. This place was only assailable from one narrow opening, and the Dutch poured in reinforcements by sea. Hither the general sent Dubois de Crancé, an engineer of great merit, and of a character very different from that of his unworthy brother, who is a member of the national convention, and he was accompanied by captain Marefcot. These two deserving officers deemed it necessary to erect batteries nearer the town, and having delineated a plan for constructing one, at the distance of two hundred toises, it was partly carried into execution, when they were abandoned by the troops, and put to death by the enemy, who made a sally upon the town: but still Berneron was not disheartened, nor did he raise the siege till after the general's departure.

At Gertruydenberg the general found a considerable navy, part of which, together with his other vessels, he determined to employ as transports. At Roowaert he had a sufficient number of vessels for his van. Master of Breda, Klundert, and Gertruydenberg, he was in no danger of his forces being annoyed in the rear, where the detachment under general de Flers was still employed in the blockade of Bergen-op-zoom and Steenberg. Having drawn up his rear, he stationed it at Swaluve, where he had several transports. He resolved to make use of the vessels at Gertruydenberg as transports for his right division.

The passage from Gertruydenberg to the island of Dort, is a little longer than that to Mordyck. To the right, and also in front of the port, the Bif-
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bos is full of shallows, and contains a number of small islands detached from the continent of Gorcum, most of them covered with trees and underwood. Serpentine canals lead to the landing places of these islands, which the Dutch ships could not approach, from a want of water. However, in different stations, there were three vessels, each mounted with four guns, and carrying thirty men. Beyond these islands, many of which are deluged with water at high tide, one was observed more elevated than the rest, having a farm upon it, and a decoy for ducks, belonging to an inhabitant of Gertruydenberg. This little island, which the larger armed Dutch ships could not approach within seven or eight hundred toises, is separated from the isle of Dort by a canal of about six hundred toises in breadth. On the shore, opposite the isle of Dort, there was a battery mounting six cannon, in a low and marshy situation; and under this battery a vessel was stationed, being a frigate armed with fourteen guns.

The general determined to transport six twenty-four pounders, and two battalions to this island, and to form a battery there for driving off the frigate, which, after being taken, was to be sent after the smallest vessels of Gertruydenberg, and to pass by that place with the right division. An engagement being likely to take place in the attempt of one of the four-gun ship's approach to this island, several sloops filled with picked soldiers, were appointed to favour the landing; and for the like purpose two guns were placed upon the decks of two of the vessels which were to form the van of the fleet; of the two latter, one being under command of an English naval officer named White, and the other under lieutenant-colonel Rue, aid-de-camp to the general, who had been accustomed to the naval service. Every necessary precaution being made, the passage was to be attempted on the night between the 9th and 10th; but fate had events in store for frustrating the general's

neral's projects, which followed each other in rapid succession, and in the end determined the issue of the war.

In the midst of his successes, general Dumourier had suffered the greatest inquietude since the first day of March. General Miranda had opened the siege of Maestricht, on the 20th of February, and although he had set the city on fire in several quarters, it was resolutely defended, in consequence of the arrival of a numerous body of emigrants, under the conduct of M. Autichamp, a brave and skilful lieutenant-general in the army of Condé; and the safety of the place is attributed to this relief.

General Champmorin took the fort of Stevenswert, upon the Meuse, and likewise that of St. Michel, forming on the left of the river of that name the head of the bridge of Venlo; but the latter town he could not gain possession of, being repulsed by the Prussians posted there.

General Velance, although skilled in military affairs, had not yet gained sufficient authority over the troops, fully to compensate for the absence of Dumourier. This officer still remained in winter quarters at Liege.

General Stengel was posted about Aix-la-Chapelle. This was an excellent officer of the light troops, and perfectly qualified to command an advance-guard. General Dampierre had the command in Aix-la-Chapelle, where he indulged himself in idle amusements, and in the pursuit of plunder. This man was rash and ambitious, but without talents, daring even to temerity, but often dispirited through ignorance; he was besides refractory to all his superiors, and engaged in machinations with the Jacobins at Paris, in the circulation of calumnies fabricated with a view to obtain the command in chief.

The prince of Cobourg being arrived at Cologne, and, knowing the disorders and want of union among the generals, and also the bad disposition of the French,
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he assembled his army and marched to Aldenhoven, which he took possession of without opposition; all the troops falling back from that place upon Liege, in the utmost confusion, without even attempting to come to an engagement. General Veneur, who commanded at the assault of Maestricht, on the side of Wyck, had time and the good fortune to draw off his artillery, and repass the Meuse. The Imperialists entered Maestricht without obstruction or difficulty. Miranda might still have continued the cannonade from the left of the Meuse, and have drawn up his army in a respectable position between Tongres and Maestricht, and have thereby been enabled successfully to oppose the progress of the prince of Cobourg; and general Dumourier gave orders to that effect, when he first heard of the disaster. This was also the advice of general Valence, who a few days afterwards saved a column of twenty-seven battalions, who were retreating to Liege, by making a vigorous charge with his cavalry in the plain of Tonges.

Lieutenant-general La Noüe displayed the greatest bravery in the retreat of Aix-la-Chapelle. Miranda quite lost his temper; he took upon himself to order the banks of the Meuse to be evacuated. Pursuing their successes, the Imperialists passed that river, and entered Liege, where they seized the magazines, which were then establishing by the French, and particularly those for the reception of the army clothing. So great was the consternation in this army, that, excepting the heavy artillery, which was conveyed to Louvain, and from thence to Tournay, nothing was saved, not even the baggage of the soldiers. These two generals re-united their forces at the camp of Louvain.

Champporin, no longer able to maintain his post on the left shore of the Meuse, retreated from Stevensvert and fort St. Michel, wherein he neglected to leave garrisons, to Dieft, as did general La Marliér to Ruremonde. This retreat left the Prussians masters of the Lower Meuse. They might have passed

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through Campine to Antwerp, or by Bois-le-duc to the rear of the army acting in Holland. Prince Frederick of Brunswick neglected to take advantage of a favourable opportunity, of which, however, Dumourier availed himself, for covering this detachment.

The troops were greatly discouraged, and withdrawing their obedience from their officers, Miranda was in danger of losing his life; however general Valance, aided by Thovenot, restored some degree of order, but still the number of deserters was prodigious. More than six thousand men fled into France.

At this time, the army loudly demanded general Dumourier to take the command. The commissioners of the convention sent to him courier after courier, directing him to return: he constantly answered, that he was able to keep his station at Louvain, and that all losses would be repaired, if they would allow him time to pursue his expedition. This was true. The generals Valance and Thovenot concerted their own measures between themselves. As to Miranda, so much confidence had he hitherto shewn, and so much was he dispirited by the late events, as to justify the dispatches of general Valance, which always predicted misfortune and disappointment; while on the contrary, the letters of Miranda as constantly announced, that no danger was to be apprehended from the Imperial army. He would have been right, if the French had opposed an equal force to them, which they ought, and were enabled to have done. In this case it is to be presumed, that the prince of Cobourg would not have risked coming to an engagement, which the French had no reason to avoid.

The commissioners of the convention hastened to Paris, and there gave so alarming an account of the contentions prevailing among the soldiers, that it was decided that general Dumourier alone was qualified to rescue the army from the imminent danger wherein it was involved, and to avert the ruin with which it

was threatened. The most peremptory orders were given for him to abandon the expedition in Holland, and immediately to put himself at the head of the grand army. These orders were received at eight o'clock at night, and at nine the next morning he set out in compliance with the directions of the convention.

He left the army under the command of general De Flers, who he knew to be incapable of discharging the trust, but he had no other officer to put in his place. General d'Arçon, in consequence of being afflicted with the rheumatism, could neither take the command, nor continue the campaign; he even refused to assume the rank of lieutenant-general, which Dumourier had procured for him, in compensation for his conquest of Breda; and on account of his ill state of health, he was under the necessity of retiring to Antwerp. Lieutenant-general Marassé, governor of Antwerp, an ancient officer of great experience, honour, and bravery, could not take an active command, on account of his advanced period of life. Immediately upon his arrival at the grand army, it was the intention of Dumourier, that Miranda should supersede De Flers in command.

Colonel Thovenot, who remained behind, might properly be called the very soul of the army; he had copies of the instructions delivered to general De Flers, who was advised to take no measures without consulting Colonel Thovenot. It was directed, without delay, to attempt the passage of Gertruydenberg; and in case of success, that general De Flers should take up his quarters at Dort, and dispatch a courier to Dumourier for fresh orders.

But the departure of Dumourier dispirited the whole corps. Those who had displayed the greatest share of intrepidity and impatience, now deemed the enterprize to be impracticable; and indeed they had grounds for their apprehension; for in a few days the Dutch navy was re-inforced, and the Prussians ad-

vanced by the way of Bois-le-duc. Agreeable to his instructions, in case of the failure of the attempt to effect the passage, De Flers threw himself into Breda, with six batallions and two hundred cavalry. Colonel Tilly was at Gertruydenberg with three batallions and fifty horse. The rest of the army retired to Antwerp, being favoured by colonels Vaux and Thovenot, who evacuated the batteries of Mordyck without loss, whereby they saved the army, which was quite discouraged and in the greatest disorder.

Thus ended the expedition in Holland, projected and carried into effect in six days; and which, in all probability, would have succeeded, had it not been for the failure of the attempt of Aix-la-Chapelle. In this affair France lost not a single soldier. Two strong places still remained in our possession which might interrupt the progress of the enemy, in case of a second expedition being undertaken. All the hopes of Dumourier being destroyed, it became necessary for him to form new plans of operations.

C H A P. VI.

The general arrives at Antwerp, and afterwards at Brussels. Addresses himself to the people. Writes to the convention. Chepy of Estienne taken into custody. He arrives at Louvain.

SINCE his departure from Paris, the expedition to Holland, and the dispositions of the grand army, had engaged the whole attention of the general. He lamented even as much as Belgians themselves the intolerable tyranny exercised towards them by the national convention, and particularly by the commissioners of the executive council. The insolence of these satellites of avarice and oppression was equal to their

their wickedness. Most of these people claimed the parade of, and never went abroad unattended by, a military force. Finding themselves not yet powerful enough farther to extend their extortions, they multiplied their numbers by giving commissions to other dissolute and unprincipled people. Upon his arrival at Bruges, a ball was given, at which the general attended, and one of the dancers here accosted him, saying he was a commissioner, and that he was going to Ostend and Nieuport to erect batteries, and put those places into a defensive state. The general advised him to confine himself to the moderate exercise of the functions of his civil capacity, and not to interfere in the military department.

Another person, named, as the general believes, Lieutaud, who lived near general Marlière, wrote a long letter to Dumourier, directing him to relinquish every other pursuit, and march to the succour of Ruremonde.

In consequence of the declaration of war on the first of February, an inhabitant of Liege, who was a commissioner from the convention, and named Cochelet, putting himself at the head of a party of men, proceeded into the Dutch territories, and arriving before Maestricht, seized the colours bearing the arms of the States General, in the name of the French republic. This ridiculous parade gave the governor of Maestricht time to call in his out-posts and foraging parties from the vicinities of the city; for the assault of which, preparations were making by general Miaczynsky. This Cochelet wrote an insolent letter to General Miranda, directing him to take Maestricht before the 20th of February; threatening to denounce him as a traitor, if this order was not complied with; and he sent a copy of this letter to the convention, who bestowed applauses upon the Roman firmness of the writer: at length Cochelet was recalled for having abused the authority given him by the convention.

Arriving at Antwerp on the second of February, the general found that city in great disorder, on account of the number of petty tyrants, whose names are now forgotten, then resident there ; whom, however, he occasioned to be displaced ; all the cities of Belgia were governed by one, or by a number of these arbitrary *proconsuls*. They began by confiscating the plate belonging to the churches, and the revenues of the nobility and clergy, whose effects they applied to their own use, or sold at very inadequate prices. To ingratiate the favour of the populace, they displaced the magistrates elected by the people, erected clubs, and exercised the most oppressive and tyrannical power, wherein they were supported by the soldiery, who yielded to them an implicit obedience.

All Belgia found this anarchical tyranny wholly insupportable, and Dumourier represented the complaints of the people to the convention, and afterwards to the commissioners Camus, Trielhard, Merlin, and Gosuin, whom he met with at Ghent ; but they declined administering any remedy. He predicted to them, that upon the appearance of the Prince de Cobourg, they might expect a general insurrection ; that the soldiers, by whom the garrison was weakly manned, would be put to the sword ; and that they would find this a more disastrous war than that which was to be prosecuted against the Imperialists.

The defeat at Aix-le-Chapelle, the flight of our troops to Louvain, and their desertions, together with the disorder and consternation prevailing among them, seemed to precipitate the popular commotion foretold by the general.

A circumstance occurred still farther to aggravate this danger. The commissioners formed a plan for the several provinces to communicate to each other their respective means for bringing about the re-union of France : they promiscuously, and without any form or regularity, caused meetings of the people to be held in the churches : the French commissioner, supported

ported by the military and the members of the French and Belgic clubs, read the act of accession; the meaning of which few of the auditors understood, not even excepting those who harangued upon the subject. This act of accession was signed by the people who were thus convened, most of them trembling while they put down their names. This piece was printed and sent to the convention; who thereupon created an additional department. In several of the provinces these *fraternising* measures were carried on by violence and force, particularly at Brussels and Mons; where the people were assaulted by the different factions, with musquets, sabres, and other weapons.

Partial disturbances also broke out among the populace at Vavres, Hall, Braines, and Soignies; but of these, the most serious and alarming happened at Grammont, where ten thousand peasants having assembled, and being provided with some pieces of artillery, they imprisoned the magistrates, and defeated and put to flight some detachments from the garrison of Ghent. The number of the insurgents daily increased; and the French army being scarcely sufficient to oppose the Austrians, no part of it could be spared for suppressing this cruel intestine war which now raged throughout Belgia. The general, who abhorred the injustice of the convention, would not be made the instrument of exercising tyranny over the Belgians: his conduct was at this time governed by two motives; that of affording relief to this unhappy country, and of saving his army. He had the good fortune to succeed in his endeavours; in proof of which, he appeals to the testimony of those good people from whom he has received the most honourable marks of esteem and acknowledgement, while travelling in the Netherlands, since his disgrace.

Arriving on the eleventh at Antwerp, he found that city under great alarm and consternation. An executive commissioner, named Chaussart, who had modestly

deftly arrogated to himself the furname of *Publicola*, had lately taken away the commiffions of all the magiftrates, and iffued orders for apprehending fixty-seven of the nobility. General Maraffè had hitherto evaded carrying into effect this order given to him by *Publicola*; but the bifhop and great numbers of other perfons were obliged to fave themfelves by flight, or by remaining in concealment. The general fent a written order to Chauffart, and the other commiffioners who were in league with him, to depart immediately from Antwerp, and repair to Bruffels, faying that, if they refufed to comply, general Maraffè would order them to be conducted there by force. Chauffart, with great haughtinefs and infolence, came to complain of this order, faying, it appeared to be dictated by a *viſier*. The general pleaſantly replied to him, "Away, M. Chauffart, I am no more a *viſier*, than you are a *Publicola*;" upon which he immediately departed. The general then reſtored the good order of this important city, and re-eſtabliſhed the magiftrates in their offices. He prohibited the club from interfering in public affairs, giving orders to general Maraffè to block up the doors of the place where the club was held, and to commit ſuch of the members to priſon as ſhould oppoſe this meaſure. This order was printed in the two languages, and fixed up in the moſt public places.

He then proceeded to Bruffels. A few days after his arrival, in conſequence of the complaints of all claſſes of the inhabitants of that city, he ſuperceded general Moreton, who had been guilty of exceſſes of every ſpecies, and appointed lieutenant-general Duval to ſucceed him. This was a very meritorious officer, whoſe ill health alone prevented his joining the army, where he had ſerved the preceding year with great honour to himſelf and advantage to his country. He was a man of great virtue; an enlightened citizen, and happily choſen to induce the people to forget the tyrannical government

government of Moreton ; who, by order of the minister, went to command at Douay, where he died, but not till he had been the author of much mischief.

Duval gave the general an account of the disorderly state of the army at Louvain, from whence he had lately arrived. This corps had lost great part of their artillery, and almost all their tents and baggage in its retreat ; there were not tents enough for one half of the men ; and the want of discipline and confidence generally prevailed among them. They had also lost great part of their batallion guns.

The general officers commanding the artillery, having neither received nor applied for any orders, during the confusion occasioned by the retreat, they held a council of war among themselves ; the decision of which was, that the whole park of artillery should be removed into the French territories. The twenty-four and the sixteen pounders, the mortars and pontoons were already upon the road to Tournay ; fortunately the twelve and eight pounders, and the howitzers were already at Anderlecht ; so that the troops had only some batallion guns. The general ordered the twenty-four and sixteen pounders to remain at Tournay, and that the whole park at Anderlecht should be sent to the army at Louvain.

Brussels was at this time crowded with soldiers belonging to different regiments, who were on their way to France. The general obliged them to return to the camp ; and dispatched orders to Tournay and Mons, and all the places in the department in the North, for stopping all military men who should attempt to pass, and compelling them to join their respective corps. General Stengel having retired to Namur, with one or two squadrons of hussars, Dumourier ordered him to rejoin the army. General Neuilly, who had held his winter-quarters in the country of Stavels with half of the advance-guard of the army of the Ardennes, having also retreated to Namur, the general ordered him to take the position
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of Judoigne, for the purpose of securing a communication between the main army and the corps commanded by lieutenant-general Harville, to whom he had repeated the order for calling in the out-posts, it being designed to oppose the prince of Hohenloe and general Beaulieu in their expected attempt of forcing the passage of the Meuse, and turning the right of the army, for the purpose of falling upon Brussels and Mons. Though the garrison at Brussels was very weak, the general was obliged to reinforce himself with some of its best battalions.

A reinforcement of ten thousand men, hastily raised in the northern department, marched from France. These recruits were very unequal, being chiefly old and very young men, armed with pikes, hangers, firelocks and pistols. They had been promised twenty sols a day, and were to be stationed at different parts at Belgia, but, as they themselves pretended, were not enlisted for the purpose of going into battle. This troop was raised at the suggestion of the commissaries Gossuin and Merlin; but, as they appeared only calculated to encrease the want of discipline and good order, the general hastened them back to France.

At this time, the general's attention was much engaged in devising means for re-animating the spirits of the Belgians, and rescuing them from the tyranny to which they were subjugated. He was aware, that whatever measures he should pursue towards this end, would exasperate the convention and the Jacobins against him; but the grievances of the people were so great, their injuries so cruel, and the danger of vengeance so pressing, that he judged it prudent to follow the dictates of his own discretion.

A few days before his arrival, Chepy had endeavoured to prevail upon general Duval to order the heads of several people to be cut off; he also threatened Brussels with fire and sword, and caused several opulent persons to be arrested, and sent prisoners to the citadels

dels in the northern department. The general put this man under arrest, and sent him in the escorte of a guard to Paris.

The legion of Sans Culottes, raised by general Moreton, a collection of the vilest of the rabble, struck terror into this city, where they were continually employed in the basest acts of cruelty and extortion. They were under the command of a man named Estienne, a native of France, but a very unworthy subject of that country, who assumed to himself the title of general. Dumourier sent Estienne to prison, and published an ordinance, prohibiting all persons from taking up the appellation of Sans-Culottes.

The general convened the magistrates of the city, and in presence of the whole people, requested they would not attribute to the French nation the crimes of some individuals, promising to punish the guilty, and assuring them, that one motive for his coming there was, to restore to their families those peaceable citizens who had been forced away, under pretext of being kept as hostages. The friends and relations of those who had been so cruelly dragged from their homes, shed tears of gratitude, and caused the particulars of this interesting scene to be printed. He published an ordinance for the people to lay their complaints before the magistrates, and authorising the latter to enforce legal means for obtaining redress from those commissioners, whether Frenchmen or otherwise, who had been guilty of an abuse of power: another ordinance was issued, forbidding the clubs to intermeddle in public affairs; as was also a third, commanding the sacred vessels to be restored to all churches; and to enforce a due execution of this, the magistrates and military commanders were directed to assist. All these ordinances were printed in the two languages, and dispersed throughout Belgia. The effect of these measures was speedily apparent. The inhabitants of Grammont wrote to the general, informing

informing him, that they had laid down their arms. Peace was restored between the French and the Belgians, and the latter respectable nation cast into oblivion all the injuries they had received from our soldiers, now considering them only in the characters of their friends and brothers. In short, the garrisons in general conducted themselves with propriety, and particularly those of the great cities; and had it not been for the odious decree of the fifteenth of December, and the appointment of commissioners, the French would have lived heretofore in perfect amity with the inhabitants.

On the twelfth of March, he wrote a letter to the convention, which appearing to contain very alarming and afflicting truths, the president and the committee, to whom it was referred, deemed it not prudent to have it read in the tribune. However, a copy of this letter became public, and was printed at Antwerp. In this letter the general explained all the measures he had been obliged to pursue for the protection of Belgia, and for saving his army, referring for the detailed accounts to the papers he had transmitted to the ministry.

He called a meeting of the inspecting commissary Petit Jean, and the principal persons in the offices of the different departments, and having informed them that he was preparing to make a grand movement, they unanimously promised to yield him every assistance in their power, and without delay to supply him with a fortnight's provisions. The general caused a camp-hospital to be prepared, and intimated that he should come to an engagement in a very short time.

The treasurer of the army being gone to Lisle with two millions of livres, the general dispatched orders to the governor of that city for his immediate return with the money, under the protection of a strong guard. He harangued the garrison of Brussels with so much success, that all the different corps requested

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astonished that a man pretending to such strictness of religious principles, should have given countenance to the seizure of the sacred vessels, and other articles appertaining to public worship. "Go to St. Guld, (said the general) and behold the host scattered upon the pavement of the church, the altars broken down, and the paintings mutilated; and if you cannot justify these profanations, consider what other means of restitution you can adopt, than that of restoring the church-plate, and inflicting exemplary punishment upon the emissaries who acted so wickedly in pursuance of your orders. If the convention can applaud such crimes; if they do not rouse their indignation; and if they do not punish the perpetrators of them, the consequence will be unfortunate, both to them, and my unhappy country. Be assured, that if a crime seemed necessary for the preservation of my life, I would not be guilty of one. But in this case, the atrocious crimes that are permitted and encouraged, operate to the injury of France, to whom I shall render service in detecting and suppressing them."

Camus confessed there would be great difficulty in restoring the church-plate, since it had been broken for the purpose of putting it into chests. "Well, (said the general) that being the case, it may be easily re-manufactured, upon paying the charge of workmanship." Camus and Treilhard constantly maintained, that the general was deficient in respect and obedience towards the convention. Merlin and Gosuin, who were more reasonable men, admitting the general to be right, a violent dispute arose among these commissioners.

During this conference, Camus, the most irascible among mankind, said, half smiling, but with a mixture of fury in his countenance, "General, the people call you Cæsar; if I was sure they were right, I would become Brutus, and stab you." The general replied, "My dear Camus, I am not Cæsar, nor

nor are you Brutus; and the menace of perishing by your hand, is sufficient to secure immortality to my name." After a conference of three or four hours, the commissioners sat out the same night for Brussels. Camus was true to his word: he made a report to the convention with all the bitterness of a faithless and wicked man; and from that time he became the sworn enemy of the general, whose whole attention was now engrossed by the means of relieving himself from the embarrassments into which he had been drawn by the misconduct of his officers, and of regulating a disorganized army, which now had not even the same degree of spirit and animation they possessed in the preceding campaign.

C H A P. V.

The state of the army. Its position. The general's orders to the different divisions. He determines to engage the enemy.

UPON the appearance of general Dumourier, the spirits and courage of the whole army seemed to be reanimated: confidence and joy sparkled in the eyes of the soldiers, who caressed him, calling him their father, expressing shame and repentance for their former conduct, and loudly demanding that he would lead them on to face the enemy. He reminded them of their former disorderly behaviour, and particularly of their want of confidence in their commanders, who had so often led them in the career of victory. He told them, that their impetuosity, their neglect of discipline, and their precipitate manner of retreat, had disappointed him of effecting the conquest of Holland, on which probably the fate of the whole campaign depended. They appeared to be conscious of deserving this blame, and heartily disposed to repair their misconduct, if the general would continue

in command, and again lead them on to the conquest of the country, which had been so lately lost through their disobedience.

This disposition enabled the general very speedily to re-organize his army, which had been reinforced by succours from the corps under major-general Thovenot, who, added to his other military qualifications, had a particular facility in establishing the necessary order and regularity in a great army, and in forming the disposition for encampments. It is with particular satisfaction, that the general pays this just tribute to this excellent officer, his particular friend, who may become one of the first generals in France, if popular prejudice does not impede his entering once more into the service of his country, and of obtaining the rank of commander in chief.

Independent of the Belgic garrisons, the column engaged in the expedition in Holland, was composed of about twenty thousand men, of whom two thousand were cavalry. After the junction of general De Flers, independent of a division of five thousand men, including eight hundred cavalry, under general Marlière, and a division of Namur, commanded by lieutenant-general Harville, composed of twelve thousand infantry, and fifteen hundred horse; the grand army had a force of from thirty-eight to forty thousand infantry, and four thousand five hundred horse; which the major-general organized in the following manner.

The infantry, consisting of sixty-two battalions, was divided into four columns; the right division of eighteen battalions was under general Valence; the centre, being of the same force, was under the duc de Chartres, now called *Egalité*; and general Miranda had the command of the left wing. Each of these divisions formed a body of seven thousand men. The reserve-guard, consisting of eight battalions of grenadiers, was commanded by general Chancel, who received his orders from the duc de Chartres. Miranda delivered his orders to general Maiczinsky, who

who commanded the left flank, forming a column of two thousand infantry, and one thousand cavalry, and also to general Champmorin, who had the command of a division of six thousand infantry, including one thousand horse. General Valence had the command of the right flank of the corps under general Dampierre, of equal force with that of Miaczinsky, together with general Neully's division of four thousand infantry, and one thousand horse. The advance-guard consisted of six thousand men, of whom fifteen hundred were horse, commanded by general La-Marche. This was an old and very useful officer, who had formerly served as colonel of Hussars. He was assisted by two young, very meritorious officers, whose knowledge of the country made them very useful as guides. Colonel Montjoye, adjutant-general, and lieutenant-colonel Barrois, had the command of the artillery.

At this time, the army had only five lieutenant-generals, and twelve field-m Marshals, and of the latter, six were at the head of detached parties, so that only six remained to command the line. From the want of experienced officers, several columns were under the command of such officers as had seen but little service. There being tents for only about one half of the troops, the rest was put into cantonments, a circumstance at once increasing the want of discipline, and affording the opportunity for desertion. Arriving at Louvain on the morning of the thirteenth, the general found the three divisions of his infantry either encamped or in cantonments, on the heights behind Louvain, having in their front the canal of Malines. The reserve, with a small body of cavalry, was advanced something more than two leagues beyond Boutersem; and the advance-guard was stationed upwards of two leagues beyond Cumptich, having a small post in Tirlemont. The enemy occupied all the villages between Tirlemont and Tongres, and it was evidently their design to turn our right wing,

and thereby occasion the advance posts to fall back upon the rear, whereby our ranks would have been broken, and we should have had no opportunity of rallying, being but little acquainted with the nature of the ground.

The general added the fourteenth regiment to his advance-guard, and without delay made a more solid disposition of his forces. He ordered general Dampierre to Hourguerdé, on the right of Cumptich, and general Neuilly to proceed from Judoigne to Lummen, to support the right column, and annoy the enemy. General Miaczinsky was directed to take his position on the left, between Dieft and Tirlemont, on the side of Halen, having the Gette in his front. General Champmorin's division was ordered to occupy Dieft, and he was advised that he might convert this small town into an advantageous post, and ordered, in case of his being able to get possession of it, to garrison it with two batallions and fifty horse, when he should receive orders to advance.

He ordered general Marlière, after leaving at Aferschett a small post of communication with Dieft, to proceed towards Lier, for the purpose of intercepting the Prussian column, which, it was expected, would enter Campine, and also for covering the retreat of the army destined to the expedition in Holland, which he supposed had relinquished the project of the passage of Mordyk. And indeed this apprehension was but too well founded. He dispatched orders to general De Flers, to effect an entrance into Breda; to send colonel Tilly to station a garrison in Gertruydenberg, and then dispatch his remaining troops to the lines of Antwerp, under the conduct of general Marafsè, to whom Dumourier was in hopes of appointing a successor qualified for carrying on the campaign. At Turnhout, the corps of horse-guards, with the northern legion, commanded by colonel Westermann, was stationed for the protection of the retreat from Gertruydenberg, for driving
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off the enemy, and securing a communication with general Marlière, and through him, with the grand army.

On the fifteenth of March, in the morning, the advanced column of the enemy attacked Tirlemont, from whence the four hundred men stationed there were compelled to retreat, with some loss, having suffered themselves to be surprized. Upon hearing the discharge of cannon at a distance, general Dampierre, accustomed to retreats, took the resolution of abandoning his post at Haugaerde, where he had been appointed to guard one of the passages of the Gette, and of retreating to Louvain; and farther, he recommended general Neuilly to retire to Judoigne. General Dumourier was wholly at a loss to decide whether this improper movement on his right was the effect of fear or treachery. Had the enemy been aware of this misconduct, they might have thrown the whole French army into confusion.

It was now the business of the general to form such dispositions as might compensate for the late failures, which claimed the more serious consideration, inasmuch as being frequently repulsed and put to flight, must have a bad effect upon the dispositions of the soldiers. The same night he replaced the two divisions in their former posts. It is singular, that the conduct of general Miaczinsky, who had the command of the left division, should be similar to that of Dampierre: he fled into the woods near Louvain, where he remained concealed for two days. However, shortly after his departure, his post was occupied by general Champmorin, to whom Dumourier sent orders, on the 15th, to repair with speed to the heights of Oplinter, where Champmorin arrived on the 16th at night. Fortunately the enemy, who had fixed on the 16th for commencing their march, did not observe the retrograde motions on the preceding day, and therefore could not profit by them. The same day, the general advanced with the whole force

force of his army, and stationed his extraordinary night-guards very near Cumtich, being determined the enemy should not anticipate him in preparations for action the next morning. This was an object of importance, for had the general suffered the enemy to retain possession of Tirlemont, he must necessarily have fallen back; a circumstance that could not but prove extremely discouraging to his troops.

The Imperialists protected Tirlemont, and the space between the two Gettes from the road of St. Tron, to a spot facing Hougaerde. On the sixteenth, in the morning, general Dumourier made a vigorous attack upon the enemy, and as the heights of Oplinter commanded the flank of the high road of St. Tron, after some resistance, he made himself master of Tirlemont; when the Imperialists, finding themselves galled by the fire of general Miranda, hastened to pass a small arm of the Gette, in order to retire to the heights of Neerlanden, Nerwinde, Middlewinde, and Oberwinde.

Between the two Gettes, at a league and a half on the right, and in the front of Tirlemont, is a village named Gotzenhoven, commanding the whole plain, being well defended in front, and having a ditch filled with water on the right, and in the rear.

The Imperialists did not appear to be acquainted with the importance of this place, until the French had taken possession of it, and Dumourier had stationed general Marche there with his advance-guard, and some pieces of artillery. They still held possession of the two villages of Meer and Hattendover, which the general caused to be assaulted as the troops successively came out of Tirlemont: but they committed a great fault, in neglecting to throw a strong force into Gotzenhoven, which, from its situation, was able either to defend or cannonade the two villages above-mentioned.

With a very formidable body of horse and foot, the enemy endeavoured to dislodge the French in Gotzenhoven, and though in this attempt they displayed prodigies

prodigies of valour, all their efforts proved ineffectual. The cuirassiers charged the French infantry with the greatest intrepidity, even close to the out-works of the town, and though their loss was very great, they several times repeated the attack. They attempted, but in vain, to pass by Gotzenhoven on the right; for general Neuilly came up with his division, to take the position of Neerhyllsen. It was four o'clock in the afternoon before the enemy retreated. This battle between the two advance columns, nearly of equal force, and equally supported by their respective divisions, was maintained for the space of eight hours. The loss of the Imperialists was much greater than that of the French, who had the advantage of the day, though they were in danger of losing their general at the attack of Gotzenhoven.

The battle of Tirlemont, which had cost the Austrians twelve hundred men, restored to general Dumourier all the confidence of his troops. He posted the right and centre columns from Gotzenhoven to the line of villages upon the field of battle. General Neuilly supported the right at Neerhyllsen. General Dampierre, who arrived on the night of the battle, was posted at Esmaël in front of the centre; general Miaczinsky came up at the head of his cavalry, having left his eight battalions of infantry at Louvaine, and was placed on the bridge of the smaller Gette, facing Orfmaël. Part of Miranda's division, which had remained in camp behind the great Gette, on the left of Tirlemont, was advancing towards Oplinter, where the division of general Champmorin arrived in the night.

After this success, some important resolution was to be taken. In numbers, the Austrian cavalry already exceeded those of France in the proportion of one half; and were besides better equipped and disciplined, and of more experience in the art of war. To contend foot by foot for the mastery of the Netherlands, against a numerous cavalry accustomed to the field,
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was not to be attempted by an undisciplined army, deficient in general officers, uncapable of performing quick marches and skilful manœuvres, and having no secure or fortified place in the rear.

It was, however, necessary to interrupt the progress of the enemy; and that was only to be done by coming to an engagement. In the present conjuncture, it was true prudence to run great hazards, lest the prince of Cobourg should receive all the troops he expected for the commencement of the campaign.—The two armies were of equal force; but the advantage was on the side of that making the attack. The prince of Cobourg had maintained this advantage for a fortnight; but general Dumourier had resumed it by the battle of Tirlemont.

The good fortune of gaining a decisive battle, would have restored to the general's troops their former opinion of his superiority, and at the same time have intimidated the enemy; he would have gained the confidence of the Belgians, and have been enabled very soon to have raised twenty-five battalions of those people, whereby he would have augmented his army with at least twenty-five thousand infantry; he would have re-gained the ground lost on the side of Liege, the Austrians not being able to hold that city, nor even Aix-la-Chapelle, having intrenched themselves under Maestricht, and would have compelled the prince of Cobourg to fall back and repass the Meuse, and have so weakened him as to prevent his renewing the campaign till the month of May, at the soonest.

The general also hoped to form a good defensive position in an intrenched camp between the two Gettes, where general Valence might have observed the motions of the enemy, and received re-inforcements from France and the Netherlands, while general Harville would have been equally recruited from the side of Namur. General Valence, as colonel of horse, might have held the prince of Cobourg in check, while Dumourier, sending general Miranda to take
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the command of the troops at Antwerp, might lead three thousand men against Bois-le-Duc, and resuming his expedition against Holland, at once force the passages of Mordyk and Gorcum. Had he been disappointed in his design of penetrating into Holland, he at least would have been able to gain some places belonging to that Republic, serving to cover his left, and from the inhabitants he might have obtained supplies of provisions, clothing, arms, and money.

From this time, he looked upon himself as independent of the convention, and, perhaps, as having it in his power to establish such laws as would be of advantage to his unhappy country, of avenging the cause of Louis XVI. and of re-establishing a constitutional monarchy.

On the other hand, if the general should be defeated, he meant to have acted according to the following plan: to take a station for covering Brussels for sometime, and recruiting his army; to defend the post of Namur, by ordering to that place twenty-five thousand men, belonging to general Harville's column; and, replacing the division of general Neuilly, to secure, by the way of Judoigne, a communication with the forces retreating to the woods of Soignies, for the purpose of covering Brussels; to station a like force below Antwerp, still holding Breda and Gertruydenberg, with a communication by means of Lier and Diest; to post in the rear a body of fourteen or fifteen thousand men, from the side of Bruges, for the protection of Maritime Flanders; to open a negotiation with the Imperialists for a suspension of hostilities, during the continuance of which, endeavours should be made for convincing the troops of what was but too true; namely, that the irregularity of their discipline, and the disastrous events consequent thereon, naturally resulted from the absurd proceedings of the convention; that the time was arrived for the suppression of the confusion and anarchy,

anarchy, which threatened the ruin of France; and that on the army alone depended the salvation of that country. After having prepared the minds of the people, it was the intention of the general to reinforce his army with recruits from Belgia, where the convention and the Jacobins were held in abhorrence; to make an open declaration against them, in favour of constitutional royalty; to take hostages for the personal security of the prisoners in the Temple; and then to march directly to Paris.

Such was the plan projected by general Dumourier; such were his motives for hazarding a decisive engagement, and determining him to exert his utmost possible efforts for the attainment of victory. He never had the cowardice to suppose himself liable to be conquered. He would even endeavour to controul future events. Although he detested the tyrants of France, whose cruelties and other crimes struck him with horror, he nevertheless deemed himself bound to support the honour of his nation, and prove himself not unworthy of the confidence heretofore reposed in him. Till the last moment he did every thing in his power to prevent foreigners giving law to France, and to save his country from insult or injury; and it is this which has drawn upon him the ill-founded reproach, from misinformed persons, and in particular from the elector of Cologne, of having changed his party only when he was vanquished.

Had he not previous to the loss of the battle of Nerwinde openly declared his hostility to the Jacobins by his proclamations at Antwerp and Brussels? Had he not imprisoned or driven out of the country the rapacious agents of the convention? Had he not written his letter of the 12th of March? Had he not compelled the silver of the churches to be restored? Had not his correspondence with Pache, Bournonville, and Le Brun, (which was printed, and which appeared also in the Monitors of March and April) declared the firmest truths and the freest opinions,

opinions, respecting the authors of the miseries of France. If in those he did not speak of the royal family, it was that he feared his mention of them would become a signal for their death.

He who reads these memoirs, and calls to remembrance the circumstances and the public documents of those times, will see that the opinions of general Dumourier has been consistent. He has been the zealous defender of his country. Her enemies have been his enemies, but the war he has made upon them has been open and generous; for his love of his country was neither fanatical, unjust, nor savage. The emigrants, by whom he is detested as greatly as by the Jacobins, have, on all occasions, found him humane and liberal. In a war, differing from all others in character, a war of opinion, in which instability of principles and conduct might find excuse, he has no shifting of opinion wherewith to reproach himself, no perfidy, no cruelty, no insolence in success, nor weakness in misfortune and disgrace. In a word, moved only by humanity, he restored the Netherlands to the emperor, as was acknowledged by the Archduke Charles, by the emperor's ministers and generals, by his army, and by the people of the country. Nor did he make conditions or reserves for himself. He did not demand an asylum in the emperor's dominions. He demanded nothing of the prince of Cobourg but his marching to Paris, with the object, and in the hope, of delivering his country.

Basely misrepresented to the emperor, denied a place of safety in the emperor's dominions, which ought to have been free to him, though all others had been shut against him, he expects justice from time, which unveils the truth; and consoles himself in saying with Valerius Maximus,—“*Perfecta ars, fortunæ lenocinio defecta, fiducia iusta non exuiter, quamque scit se laudem mereri, eam et si ab aliis non impetrat, domestico tamen acceptam iudicia refert.*”

C H A P. VI.

Battle of Nerwinde.

THE prince of Cobourg advanced between Tongres, St. Tron, and Landen ; and the two armies were in sight of each other. General Dumourier passed the day of the 17th in reconnoitring the position of the enemy, in forming his troops in order of battle, and in preparing his plan of attack. He had, in his front, the Lesser Gette, which rises in the township of Jaudrain, and runs almost parallel with the greater Gette, into which it falls before Leaw. This river ran between the two armies. Both sides of the river were extremely hilly ; and the ground on the side occupied by the Imperialists, formed an amphitheatre rising from the river to the more elevated situations of Landen and St. Tron.

Dumourier judged that the position of the prince of Cobourg was by much the strongest on the side of Tongres and St. Tron ; because of the necessity of his drawing his provisions from Maestricht and Liege ; and that consequently his left, which was considerably extended on the side of Landen, must be more weak, and more liable to be turned, or broken.

Dumourier knew also, that the Prince of Cobourg had neglected to occupy the little city of Leaw, which was a very important post, and which might either serve as a centre to the motions of the army making the attack, or a point of resistance for the army that should be attacked.

In the front of that part of the enemy's line which extended from Landen towards Leaw, were the three villages of Oberwinde, Middlewinde, and Nerwinde. Near Middlewinde was an eminence, called the Tomb of Middlewinde, which commanded the three villages, and a valley which separates them from the city of Landen. He, therefore, who should occupy this place,
must

must be master of all the plain, and must necessarily, in case, of an attack repulse his enemy.

On these facts, Dumourier laid down his plan for the battle, which was as follows : The first column, forming the right flank of the army, composed of the advanced guard, under general La Marche, proceeding by the bridge of Neerhellyffen, was to enter the plain between Landen and Oberwinde ; and to extend itself beyond the left of the enemy, in order to harraßs that flank. The second column, composed of the infantry of the army of the Ardennes, commanded by lieutenant-general Le Venenr, and supported by a strong body of cavalry, entering the plain by the same bridge, was to gain the tomb of Middlewinde by a rapid movement, and to attack the village of Oberwinde, which could not withstand a discharge of 12 pounds that were to be planted on the tomb. And while this attack should take place, the third column, under the command of general Neuilly, entering the plain also by the same bridge, was to fall on the right of the village of Nerwinde.

These three columns formed the right wing of the army, commanded by general Valence, who, in case of success, wheeling to the left, and driving the left wing of the enemy before him, was to continue his march in order of battle, leaving Landen behind him, and having his front facing St. Tron.

The centre, commanded by the duke de Chartres, was composed of two columns. The first (which was the fourth column in the order of attack) commanded by lieutenant-general Dietmann, passing the river by the bridge of Laer, and rapidly crossing the village of the same name, which was only occupied by a few indifferent troops belonging to the Imperialists, was to press forward, and fall directly upon the front of the village of Nerwinde. The fifth column, command by general Dampierre, was to pass by the bridge of Esmaël, and to attack the left of Nerwinde. These two columns were afterwards to follow the right

wing, forming a diagonal line with the point of their departure.

The left wing, under the command of general Miranda, was composed of three columns. The first (being the sixth in the order of attack) under general Miaczinsky, passing the river at Over-helpen, was to charge straight forward proceeding toward Neerlanden, but being careful never to press beyond the head of the fifth column. The seventh column, under general Ruault, was to pass the river at the bridge of Orfmael, and engage the enemy by the high road of St. Tron. The eighth column, under general Champmorin, was to pass the river below Neerlinter, at the bridge of Bingen, and to throw itself into Leaw, which it was to occupy till the end of the battle.

In case of compleat success, the army at the end of the action would be arranged in order of battle, with the left wing at Leaw, and the right at St. Tron, and having its front toward Tongres; which was the only point by which the Imperialists could retreat. And batteries were erected on the banks of the Gette, within reach of the bridges, to protect the retreat of the columns, in case of their being repulsed.

On the morning of the 18th of March, between seven and eight o'clock, the several columns began to move in the same instant, in great order, and passed the river without obstacle. General la Marche committed the first error of that day. He entered the plain of Landen according to his instructions, but finding no enemy there, he made a movement to the left, to fall upon the village of Oberwinde, and thence was thrown into confusion by the second column. Though the second column were retarded in their march by their artillery, yet they attacked the village of Oberwinde, and the out-works of Middlewinde, with such vigour, that by ten o'clock they carried those posts. But general Veneur did not take sufficient precaution to strengthen himself in the latter post. It was soon after re-taken by the Austrians, the possession of it being

ing disputed the whole day. General Neuilly briskly entered Nerwinde with the third column, and drove out the Imperialists ; but almost immediately abandoning the village, he advanced into the plain toward the second column. General Neuilly asserted, that he received an order to that effect from general Valence, who on his side declared, it was a misunderstanding of general Neuilly.

The imperialists soon afterwards re-entered Nerwinde ; but were again driven out, by the fourth and fifth columns, under the command of the duke de Chartres. In this attack general Desforêts, an excellent officer, was wounded in the head by a musquet-ball. This part of the army fell into confusion. The infantry crowded in too great numbers into the village, and were in such complete disorder, that on the prospect of a second attack they abandoned the place.

At this time, general Dumourier arrived, and caused the village to be once more assaulted. It was again carried ; but the troops presently quitted the village again, and all the efforts of the general prevailed no further than to rally them at a hundred paces from Nerwinde, which was filled with the dead and wounded of the two parties. But the Imperialists did not re-enter the village until the evening.

During the disorder in this quarter, the Imperial cavalry rushing into the plain between Nerwinde and Middlewinde, charged the French cavalry ; at the head of which was general Valence, who fought with great intrepidity, but being wounded, was obliged to retire to Tirlemont. The Imperial horse were, however, repulsed with great slaughter.

In the interim, another body of cavalry entered the plain on the left of Nerwinde, and threw themselves with great fury upon the infantry of the fourth column. General Thouvenot, who was at the head of that column, opened his ranks to the Imperial horse, and immediately caused the regiment of Deux-ponts

to make so timely and well directed a discharge of grape shot and musquetry upon that body of horse, that almost the whole of it was destroyed.

The fate of the battle now seemed determined in favour of the French, on their right and in the centre. The troops were again in perfect order, full of confidence and courage, and passed the night on the field of battle, preparing to compleat their victory the following morning. The Imperialists have acknowledged that they were on the point of retreating, and that orders had been actually given to their baggage to retire to Tongres.

But the French on the left, were in different circumstances. The sixth and seventh columns attacked the enemy with great vigour, and were masters of Orsmael, when a panic seizing the volunteer battallions, they fled, leaving the troops of the line exposed. Seeing the disorder, the Imperialists charged the two columns with their horse, and put them to the rout. Major-general Guiscard of the artillery was killed, as well as great numbers of the aids-de-camp and officers of the staff; and general Ruault and general Ihler were wounded.

However, great opportunity still remained of restoring the fortune of the day. It was not more than two o'clock in the afternoon, when the columns fled; and were pursued beyond the bridge of Orsmaël by the Imperialists. At that moment, general Miranda was informed, that the eight battallions of Miaczinsky's corps were arrived at Tirlemont. These troops were quite fresh, and general Miranda might have reinforced himself, by placing them on the heights of Wommorselem, on the side of the Gette, next Tirlemont. But general Miranda, being disconcerted, or which is more probable, seeing the success of his rival, general Valence, he yielded to his resentment, and resolving to sacrifice him, ordered his troops to retreat, and retired behind Tirlemont, more than two leagues distant from the field of battle. Whatever the cause, his
conduct

conduct was perfidious in sending no advice of his retreat to general Dumourier, whereby the right and centre of the army were exposed to the weight of the enemy. The enemy did not avail themselves of this retreat, either by cutting off the left-wing, which they might have done by continuing the pursuit to Tirlemont, or by renewing the attack upon the centre and right, whose flank was entirely exposed to them.

Till the retreat of Miranda, general Champmorin maintained his position of Leaw; nor did he abandon the place till late in the day, when having repassed the bridge of Bingen, he cut it down, and resumed his former post at Oplinter. Perhaps, it was owing to the possession of the post at Leaw, that the Imperialists did not pursue their advantage against the left wing of the French, on the retreat of Miranda, since, in that case, general Champmorin might have taken their right in flank.

During the action, general Dumourier was employed in re-establishing order in the different parts that gave way, and ensuring success in that quarter, which was the more essential, as it was charged with the whole weight of the manœuvres. At two in the afternoon, he observed the firing on his left to cease, and attributed this silence to success. The nature of the ground prevented his seeing the sixth and seventh columns; and, during the firing of these columns he could perceive they were advancing forward. He, therefore, supposed that, the enemy being driven in that quarter, the sixth and seventh columns had halted, that they might not over-run the head of the columns on their right. But no circumstances could lead him to suspect the retreat of general Miranda; and he was, perhaps, happy in being ignorant of it while he was repairing the disorders of his right and centre.

The general observed, towards the close of the day, some columns of Imperialists were moving from the right to the reinforcement of their left; which led him to conjecture the truth: but it was as yet only

only suspicion, having received no message from general Miranda. In this situation, he passed the greater part of the evening before the village of Nerwinde. At length, his suspicions, which he had communicated only to general Thovenot, were succeeded by the liveliest inquietude. He proceeded to the left, accompanied by general Thovenot, two aids-de-camp, and two domestics. Arriving at the village of Laer, at ten at night, he was astonished to find it had been abandoned by order of general Dampierre, who after conducting himself with great valour during the engagement, had in the close of the evening, without orders, repassed the Gette with his division, and retired to his former position at Esmaël.

Continuing his route, general Dumourier arrived near the bridge of Oasmaël, which he supposed to be occupied by part of Miranda's troops, but found it was in possession of the Austrian hulans, by whom he was on the point of being made a prisoner. He turned back; and proceeded by the high road of Tongres to Tirlemont, astonished with the silence and solitude that reigned around him, till he arrived within half a league of that city. He then learnt from three or four battalions, that were scattered in disorder, and without cavalry, along the side of the road, the disaster and disgrace of his left wing.

He found Miranda in Tirlemont, writing to his friends with great composure. General Valence had already used every effort to induce Miranda to return to the attack, assuring him that the French were victorious on their right, and in the centre; and that, by his return, success would be altogether insured. General Dumourier commanded him, in very severe terms, to assemble his troops immediately, even during the night, and to post them on the heights of Wommersem, on the high road, and on the bridge of Orfmaël, as well as that of Neerhelpen, for the purpose of, at least, securing the passage of the Gette, and the retreat of the right and centre, now in the
midst

midst of the enemy's army, with a river behind them.

Thus terminated the battle of Nerwinde; which must have decided the campaign in favour of the French, had Miranda, on first observing the disorder of his two columns, lined the Gette with his troops, and maintained the two bridges of Orsmaël and Neerhelsen. This retreat was the more unfortunate, as the two columns lost above two thousand men, while the rest of the army did not lose more than six hundred, after an obstinate contest, which cost the Imperialists more than fourteen hundred men. The French had about three thousand killed or taken, and more than a thousand wounded, and lost great part of their cannon.

This battle was attended with misconduct in both armies. The attack of Middlewinde, which was the decisive point of the action, was not prosecuted with sufficient vigour, and that post was abandoned by the French, without any visible necessity. General Neuilly, after the first success, put every thing again to hazard by abandoning the village of Nerwinde, on an uncertain order. Miranda, having made himself master of Orsmaël, turned the fate of the day, by yielding to the terror of his troops, and making a retreat.

The Imperialists committed several errors: in not disputing the passage of the Gette; in not falling upon the three columns of the right, both in front and in flank, while marching to the attack, and exposed to the fire of the villages of Laer, Nerwinde, Middlewinde, and Oberwinde; in abandoning the advantageous post of the tomb of Middlewinde, and in not erecting a battery on it previous to the engagement; in neglecting to occupy Leaw on the right; and in neglecting to pursue Miranda in his flight; and in not attacking with their right columns, they having no enemy in their front, the left flank and centre of the French, then engaged in the heat of battle before Nerwinde.

CHAP.

CHAP. VII.

Retreat of the French. Battle of Gotzenhoven.

TO secure a retreat for the right and centre of his army, general Dumourier now considered as a measure of indispensable necessity. The post of Leaw, on which the possession of the field of battle depended, was abandoned by his troops; and after the dismay that had seized the two columns under Miranda, he could only hope to bring them, not to the field of battle, but only to the opposite shore of the smaller Gette. These two columns had lost part of their cannon in their flight; the generals, and other officers of these troops, were in no condition to undergo the fatigues of a fresh combat; and, independent of the real loss of these columns by the sword of the enemy, more than 6000 men had deserted, and were on their road to Brussels and France.

The remainder of the night general Dumourier employed in giving orders for the retreat of his right wing, commanded, in the absence of general Valence, by the duke de Chartres, who conducted himself with great judgment, coolness, and courage.

Though the Imperialists had gained a great victory, still their situation was precarious. They had been so disconcerted with the important advantages gained by the right and centre of the French army, that they made no attempt to pursue their success over the left. They saw the French still in order of battle, and ready for action, and they really imagined that the left wing was about to return to its former position. Hence they threw no more obstacles on the French in their retreat, than the day before on their advancing to the attack.

In this retreat, which was made in open day, the troops repassed the river with the same order and regularity observed when they advanced. Dumourier sent general Thovenot to the right, to receive the columns,

lums, and place them in order of battle from Gotzenhoven to Hackendover, while he took upon himself to assemble the columns of the left wing, and post them on the heights of Wommersem, and at the bridge of Orsmaël. The enemy's troops were already masters of this bridge; and Dumourier, to prevent their advancing further on the causeway, sent orders to general Dampierre, at Esmaël, to move to the left with half of his division, for the purpose of flanking the causeway, and to maintain that position till the centre should have repassed the river, and then to retreat slowly to the new position that the troops were taking, with their right at Gotzenhoven, their left at Hackendover, and having the lesser Gette in their front.

General Dampierre's exact obedience to this order preserved the army from ruin; for the two columns that had fled had acquired such apathy from the shame of the preceeding day, and were so scattered, that it was ten in the morning before Dumourier could form them, so as to march with good order to take post at Hackendover, on the right and left of the high road.

After passing the bridge of Orsmaël, the first column of the Imperialists had already formed with its artillery on the heights of Wommersem. Dumourier could not prevail upon his men to attack that post, commanding the ground on which they were formed; but nevertheless they sustained an incessant and heavy cannonade from those heights with unshaken fortitude.

Dumourier's life was at this time in danger; his horse being killed under him by a cannon ball. The readiness with which he recovered from this situation was the means of preventing new disorder, and probably a second flight, which this circumstance was likely to occasion.

The left columns, which in the action of the preceeding day, had fled with such precipitation, now endured

dured the terrible discharge of the Imperialists, with great intrepidity. But in this conduct general Dumourier perceived nothing more than a blind obstinacy, altogether destitute of that determined courage he wished to excite in them. He exhorted them to charge with bayonets the enemy on the heights of Wommersem, and several times he put himself at their head, without being able to make them advance; happy, however, in seeing them continue firm in their position, which was eminently more dangerous than a vigorous attack on these troops, who, being separated from the rest of the Imperial army, and having the river in their rear, might have been totally overthrown.

From the same cause, the left wing of the Imperialists betrayed a disposition similar to that of the French. These troops suffered the right and centre of the French to repass the river without molestation, and even to range themselves in order of battle at Gotzenhoven, before they could resolve to pass the river in order to attack them. Thus, the whole day passed on both sides in manœuvring, with the exception of some cannonading and discharges of muskets. The two armies rested on their arms, in order of battle, the whole night, very near to each other.

The enemy the more admired this cool and steady retreat, because the troops did not fall back more than three quarters of a league, and seemed to be only returning in great order to the ground they occupied before the battle. In the evening of the 19th, general Dumourier perceived by the apathy which pervaded his troops, that, should he make a stand the next morning against the enemy, he must be infallibly be beaten.

There has been no time when the French soldiery could be conducted successfully, without great regard to their temper and their feelings; and the importance of this circumstance, in leading them in battle, has been eminently heightened by the revolution, which,
after

after destroying military discipline, has increased the force of the intractable and capricious national character. The impetuous disposition of the French is calculated to carry them forward to conquest, but not to preserve conquests. A defensive and methodical war does not diminish their bravery; but it wears their impatient spirit. When once wearied and dispirited, the French troops, no longer restrained by the severity of military laws, abandon their leaders, and desert, without the least thought of the consequences.

Retaining a remnant of their former spirit, the troops of the line continued firm to their general; but the national guards, composing three fourths of the army, declaring loudly that it was fruitless to lavish their lives in Belgium, and that they ought to return and defend their own frontiers, departed by whole companies and battalions. To have attempted to retain them by force would have been ineffectual, as well as dangerous.

An orderly retreat was the only means of concealing the defections from Dumourier's army, and for preventing their being massacred by the Imperialists and peasants of the country. In this condition the general was constrained to pass the Greater Gette, during the night, and to retire to the heights of Camptich, behind Tirlemont. All the movements for this purpose, being performed with a precision that scarcely could have been expected from more disciplined, and even victorious troops, were attended with the greatest success. The Imperialists deceived by the fires that were carefully kept up, and restrained by the vigour of the rear guard, did not put themselves in motion till the 20th, when they reconnoitred Tirlemont, from which the French had time to withdraw their magazines. General Miaczinsky lost one piece of ordnance, in the haste of his retreat from Tirlemont.

C H A P. VIII.

A retreat.—Battle of Neerwelve.—La Grix and Danton arrive at Louvain.—An engagement.

AT Cumptich, Dumourier had the advantage of a situation considerably more elevated than Gette. His camp fronted Tirlemont; and his left was protected from the river Welve, which turning short, ran upon his rear by Boutersem and Wertryk; his right, posted behind Hougaerde, was not so well defended: The general, however, could not maintain himself long in this position, nor was it any protection to Louvain, if the Imperialists should pass by Diest; nor to Brussels if they should turn by Judoigne. Therefore he availed himself of the 20th of March, while the enemy were before Tirlemont, to pass the Welve, and encamp near Boutersem, having his right at Op and Neerwelve, and his left on the heights and in the woods in front of Zuellenberg.

He sent general Neuilly's division, being increased to 6000 men, towards Judoigne, with orders to prevent detachments of the Imperialists from penetrating on that side, to watch their motions, and, if they should appear with a force greatly superior, to fall back to Brussels, by the forest of Soignies. Dumourier gave general Neuilly instructions respecting the defence of this forest, and wrote to general Duval to reinforce Neuilly with as many men as he could spare from the garrison of Brussels, with the new levies which might arrive there. He also ordered general Duval to arrest the deserters and send them back to his army.

He commanded general Harville to place a garrison of 2,500 men in the citadel of Namur, and to hold himself in readiness to march with the remainder of his troops, either towards Brussels, or in such other direction as should seem necessary from the motions of general

neral Beaulieu, who was advancing with 8,000, or 10,000 men, by the rout of Huy.

General Champmorin gave an inaccurate report of the strength of Diest, and Dumourier threw into that place a garrison which he deemed sufficient for its defence. He posted general Miaczinsky at the abbey of Gempes, having a communication with Diest, and reinforced the garrison of Malines. He sent general Ruault to Antwerp, to assist lieutenant-general Marassé, and to take the command of the army in that quarter, which, reinforced by the division of general La Malière, amounted to more than 20,000 men. He recommended to general Ruault to hold the post of Liers as long as it were possible, and then to fall back within the lines of Antwerp, if the Prussians and Dutch should advance upon him in too great force.

The same day, upon the appearance of a detachment of the enemy, inferior in numbers, and unprovided with artillery, the garrison of Diest, in a dastardly manner, abandoned their post, and fled to Malines: but the advanced guard of the Imperialists were repulsed, in an attack upon the villages of Op and Neerwelppe.

La Croix and Danton, commissioners of the convention, arrived in the camp while the general was engaged in repelling this assault; and he joined them the same day. They appeared extremely affected with the recent defeat, but in a still greater degree with the desertion of the troops; having met at Brussels, and in various parts of their route, entire corps returning to France. But, whatever was their concern on these subjects, their minds were more engaged, as they said, in the execution of the commission with which they were charged, to prevail on the general to retract his letter of the 12th of March; which, by its two great frankness, had stirred up the bitterest resentment of the convention against him.

The reply of the general was, that he had expressed no more in his letter than his real sentiments; that the late disasters were the necessary consequence of the evils of which he had complained; that he sought only to remedy those evils by putting an end to the tyranny and injustice exercised in Belgia; that the necessity which they must perceive of his retiring from a country, in which he had no means of defence, ought to convince them of the prudent tenor of his proclamations, against which, the convention were prejudiced, only, because they were misinformed and betrayed; that those proclamations had induced the peasants of Belgia to lay down their arms; had restored confidence between the French and Belgians, and were, therefore, the means of saving the troops who, disorganized, beaten, disgusted, and dispirited, were altogether incapable of defending themselves against the imperialists, more numerous than themselves, and flushed with victory, and at the same against the people of the country, should the resentment of these latter be again excited.

Though they acknowledged the justice of these observations, the commissioners still insisted on the letter being retracted. After stating that the misfortunes that were likely to accrue, must be only the result of the unjust conduct of the convention the general made a positive declaration, that he would in no part retract his letter, since the loss or gain of a battle could not affect any change in his principles, opinions, or character. The commissioners conducted this conference with much address and energy, and endeavoured to win Dumourier by the most flattering condescensions. At length, the general consented to write a few lines to the president, in which he requested, "that the convention would postpone their judgment on his letter of the 12th of March, till he should have an opportunity of sending them an explanation of the reasons of that letter." With this undecisive reply, the two deputies departed.

Upon

Upon receiving information on the 21st of the loss of Diest, the general judged it prudent to take a position nearer Louvain, lest the enemy, passing the canal, should cut off his communication with Malines, or fall upon Louvain itself. He posted the division of general Champmorin on the heights of Pellenberg, flanking his left by that of Miaczinsky, posted at St. Peterfroede; general La Marche with the advanced guard on the heights of Coorbec, skirting the high road: eighteen battallions of the army of the Ardennes, commanded by general Veneur, on the heights, and in the wood of Mezendaël; and the division of general Dampierre at Florival, in communication with general Neuilly's division, which fell back towards Tombeck, at the entrance of the forest of Soignies.

While the troops were making these movements, they were harrassed and cannonaded the whole day by the Imperialists. On the morning of the 22d, the enemy made a general attack on the posts of Pellenberg, Coorbec and the woods of Mazendaël. Blierbeck was between the enemy and general Veneur, and he thought proper to occupy it. A column of Hungarian grenadiers made themselves masters of this village, but were driven out with great slaughter, and the loss of two pieces of cannon, by the regiment of Auvergne, commanded by colonel Dumas. The attack on the advanced guard was less vigorous, but that on the post of Pellenberg was extremely bloody. General Champmorin defended himself with equal courage and ability. He received a strong reinforcement during the attack, and the enemy were unable to make any impression on his lines. This action was extremely hot, and lasted the whole day. The Austrian columns after suffering great loss, and were compelled to retreat.

General Dumourier sent colonel Montjoye, on the evening preceding this brilliant action to the head quarters of the prince of Cobourg, to treat respecting the wounded and the prisoners. He there saw colo-
nel

nel Mack, an officer of uncommon merit, who observed to colonel Montjoye, that it might be equally advantageous to both parties to agree to a suspension of arms. Dumourier, who had deeply considered the dangerous situation of his army, sent Montjoye again to colonel Mack on the 22d, to demand if he would come to Louvain, and make the same proposition to Dumourier. Colonel Mack came in the evening. The following articles were verbally agreed to: First, that the Imperialists should not again attack the French army in great force, nor general Dumourier again offer battle to the Imperialists. Secondly, that on the faith of this tacit armistice, the French should retire to Brussels slowly, and in good order, without any opposition from the enemy. And lastly, that Dumourier and colonel Mack should have another interview after the evacuation of Brussels, in order to settle further articles that might then be mutually deemed necessary.

This stipulation, the first entered into between the two generals, became hourly of more importance to Dumourier. His army was greatly diminished, especially in officers. He had scarcely ammunition for a battle; and, unfortunately, he was well persuaded that, in case of a serious attack, he should be abandoned by his army.

Of this he had convincing proofs the following day, when the Imperialists, not thinking themselves bound by the articles agreed to by colonel Mack, and general Clairfait (who was ignorant of these articles) fell upon the advanced guard and the troops posted at Pellenberg. The action became general along the whole front of the army. Champmorin defended himself with the same bravery as before; but towards the close of the action, when the Imperial infantry were retiring, and there was no enemy before the army, excepting some light troops, general la Marche became terrified, and retired to the abbey of Duparc, and afterwards to the other side of the Dyle, behind Louvain. The

The Imperialists, who acknowledged a loss of 700 men, (that is to say 2000 in both actions) were so much discouraged that they took no advantage of this retreat, which left a dangerous interval between generals Veneur and Champlin.

General Veneur had fought with great vigour during the whole action, but, being abandoned by la Marche, he passed the Dyle, without orders, and posted himself between Coorbeck and Heverle.

After the defection of these divisions, Dumourier was compelled to order general Champlin to abandon Pellenberg, and retreat behind Louvain, passing through the city, and by the abbey of Vlierbecke.

General Miackinsky retired by a bridge on the high road of Dieft, protected by a battery of cannon on the heights above.

Dumourier availed himself of these two days, to remove his wounded, and the flower of his army, in boats, to Malines. Other articles belonging to the troops were thrown into the river; but the confusion attending the evacuation of Louvain caused a great quantity of these articles to fall into the hands of the enemy, who entered Louvain that evening, as the general retired with the garrison, of five battalions, forming his rear guard. The Imperialists took some boats laden with wounded, which the escort abandoned on sight of a few hussars. These wounded soldiers were treated with great humanity, notwithstanding the calumnies of the Jacobins.

The retreat of the French from Louvain, is among the instances that prove how delicate and dangerous is the situation of generals commanding the French armies. Having determined on their plan of attack or defence, and given orders for its execution, they will be continually subject to defeat, if they have not other plans to stand in the place of those ill executed or disobeyed: they can have no reliance on generals under their command, who frequently give the example of disobedience, and sometimes of cowardice: they

they can never depend for a moment on the real strength or position of the corps not in their sight; since officers, as well as men, desert or change their positions at pleasure: they have no means of remedying these ills, since they dare not punish, being certain of making most dangerous enemies of those whose faults they reprove: they are ever in danger of wanting food for their troops, because the ancient system of providing necessaries has been changed, to serve the purposes of ignorant and selfish men: and, they will seldom hazard the great movements that decide the fate of war, with soldiers, who, though brave, are destitute of good officers, ill armed, inexperienced, easily discouraged, mutinous, fond of reasoning, and altogether let loose from military law.

But, if a general be notwithstanding successful, the calumnies of the journals and clubs await him, and he is sure of being accused before the suspicious, blind, and imprudent convention. If unfortunate, the whole weight of responsibility is thrown upon him, and he is branded with the name of coward or traitor. Such is the situation in which France places her generals in a war, on which depends, not only the political existence of the nation, but the individual liberty of every citizen. Dumourier has been replaced by Dampierre, who had the good fortune to be killed in battle; Dampierre by Custine, who perished on a scaffold; the latter by Houchard, who was disgraced the moment that he had defeated the Duke of York, and raised the siege of Dunkirk; and it is the detestable Jourdan, who now commands the army, which alone stands between Paris and the vengeance of the powers of Europe.

In Alsace, and in the interior part of France, we have seen the same succession of generals. Every old and experienced officer has been driven from the service; physicians, painters, and postillions command armies. Caligula made his horse consul. People of France, become as degenerate as you are cruel, you yourselves prepare the instruments of your destruction.

CHAP. IX.

Retreat to Brussels.—Evacuation of Brussels.—Camp of Enghien.—Camp of Ath.—Conference at Ath with Colonel Mack.—The arrest of general Miranda.

THE disorder accompanying the retreat from Louvain utterly checked the energy the army had displayed in the two preceding combats. Happily, night concealed this universal defection of the troops from the enemy, who, notwithstanding the verbal stipulations agreed to by Colonel Mack, would probably have seized upon this opportunity to destroy or entirely disperse the French army.

Dumourier with great difficulty prevailed on the troops to halt on the heights of Coztenbergue, half way on the road to Brussels. And this new calamity induced him to make an entire change in the disposition of the several corps under his command. He sent an order to general Duval to prepare for the evacuation of Brussels. He removed old General la Marche from the command of the advanced guard, which he gave to general Vouillé. He formed this advanced guard, which was to become the rear guard; of a strong body of artillery, of all the cavalry of the army, and of twelve batallions, almost the whole of which were troops of the line. He himself took post in this rear guard which amounted to near 15,000 men, and which indeed might be said to be his army. The other part of the troops marched under the protection of this chosen body, which behaved in a manner worthy the importance of its station.

Dumourier established his camp under the walls of Brussels, by the side of the little river of Woluwe, having his right at San Peters Woluwe, and his left at Vilverde. Having taken the precaution of transporting

ing his park of artillery to Anderlecht, he sent it off on the 23d to Tournay, by the road of Enghien and Ath, keeping only the cannon necessary for his rear guard.

The Prince of Cobourg, who was ignorant of the deplorable condition of the French troops, no doubt deemed himself happy in the suspension of arms which procured him possession of the Netherlands, without further combat. But resistance on the part of Dumourier could only have tended to lay waste the country without enabling him to keep his footing in it. Since the Emperor Joseph demolished the strong places of those provinces, they are destitute of any point that can resist an invading army; a battle gained gives the conqueror fifty leagues of country, or perhaps drives the vanquished to the extreme frontier.

The engagements entered into by Colonel Mack were faithfully observed by the Prince of Cobourg, who remained three days at Lovain, sending only small detachments to hang upon Dumourier's rear guard. The general was therefore at liberty to provide for the safety of Brussels, and of the other great cities through which the French army were compelled to pass on their retreat. Justice and humanity demanded that the Belgians should not be pillaged; and it was essential to avoid every means of irritating them. They had pardoned the excesses committed by the French, and had rendered them new services, and it was a duty to avoid opening the recent wounds of the country, since in that case despair would have again driven them to arms, and the French, surrounded by the Austrians and Belgians, had been entirely sacrificed.

On the 25th, the army passed through Brussels, observing the greatest order and good conduct, and proceeded to Hall, from whence the general designed they should march in two columns to the frontiers of France. No pillage was committed by the troops, nor were any insults offered, or reproaches made on
either

either part. The inhabitants of Bruffels did not forget this service rendered them by general Dumourier. They have expressed their remembrance of it by marks of public esteem. Dumourier reflects on the justice they have done him with pleasure, and he would not have been proscribed, and a fugitive, had he every where found equal justice.

The general's object now was to provide for the safety of the different detached forces, and to concert such movements as that their retreat might keep pace with his.

While general Beaulieu was penetrating with seven or eight thousand men by Huy, the Prince of Hohenloe was advancing by the province of Luxemburg against Namur, which was occupied by 15,000 men, under the command of General Harville. But this division had been formed at the expence of the garrisons of Givet and Maubeuge; and the Prince of Hohenloe, turning by one of these places, might make himself master of it, and penetrate into France.

Dumourier commanded general Harville to leave 2500 men with provisions and ammunition in the citadel of Namur; and, dividing the remainder of his troops in two columns, to send one to Givet under the command of lieutenant-general Bouchet, and to retire with the other toward Maubeuge; halting first at Charleroy, and afterward posting himself on the heights of Nimy above Mons. In this position general Harville would cover Maubeuge, la Quesnoy, Condé and Valenciennes; and, as he would be reinforced at Mons with the division of general Neuilly, consisting of 6000 men, his division would be augmented to 12,000 men, beside the reinforcements daily arriving.

In answer to these instructions, general Harville informed Dumourier, that he had neither provisions, ammunition, nor money sufficient to provide for the citadel of Namur scarcely for fifteen days order; that he must either abandon the citadel or defend it with

the whole of his division; and demanded of general Dumourier determinate orders in what manner to conduct himself. With these dispatches from general Harville, came also letters to the same effect from general Bouchot, and documents from the commissary Barneville that justified his statements.

Dumourier had no need to deliberate upon the orders, it was necessary to give general Harville. To leave this division at Namur, was to risk the loss of Givet or Maubeuge, both in want of troops, and had either of them fallen into the hands of the enemy, the division of Namur would have been easily surrounded; and to leave 2500 men in the citadel, without money and ammunition, was in effect to deliver them to the Austrians. He therefore ordered general Harville entirely to evacuate Namur, and retire in good order to Givet and Maubeuge.

Dumourier considered the six batallions posted in Breda, and the three in Gertruydenberg, as lost, yet their having provisions for four or five months, and great store of ammunition, would, he knew, enable them a considerable time to stop the progress of the Prussians and Dutch. In order to keep open a communication with this division of his army, Dumourier saw it was necessary to secure the citadel of Antwerp, and commanded general Berneron to post himself in that citadel with 2000 men and six months store of provision.

Dumourier appointed lieutenant-general Omoran to the command of Dunkirk, and along the sea coast of the department of the North; and ordered him to repair the lines and forts of the intrenched camp between Dunkirk and Bergues; to form an intrenched camp on Mont-Cassel; to go in person to Courtray to take upon him the command of the army of Holland, and to post it in the camp of Haerlebecke, having the Scheldt in front.

He sent orders to general Marassè and general Ruault, to make their retreat, passing the Scheldt by the extremity

extremity of Flanders through Ghent to the camp of Courtray, or Haerlebecke, while the garrison of Malines should retire to the same place by Dendermonde along the Scheldt; being careful not to precipitate their retreat, and to cut down the bridges after them.

General Dumourier's design was, if he could have held the citadels of Namur and Antwerp, to have formed a strong line, without the territory of France, running from the right to the left by Namur, Mons, Tournay, Courtray, Antwerp, Breda, and Gertruydenberg. In this situation, if the suspension of arms should have continued, he hoped to have greater influence on the re-establishment of order in France. In the case of the suspension of arms being broken, the Imperialists finding themselves in the centre of a semicircle, would be compelled to commence their attack at the two extremities to proceed with safety, which would turn the campaign into a war of sieges on their part, carried on at the expence of their own territory. Thus Dumourier would have gained time to re-organise and reinforce his army; which, having the strong places of France behind it, might have been restored to its former confidence.

On this supposition Dumourier would have occupied the city of Tournay, and the camp of Antoing; from which place, if the enemy had been greatly superior, he could have retired to a very strong position in his former camp of Maulde.

In pursuit of this plan (which had undergone no other change, than that of the evacuation of the citadel of Namur) he marched on the 26th to Enghien, and on the 27th to Ath, while the division of general Neuilly, marched to Mons by Hall, and Braine.

At Ath, he received orders from the convention, to arrest the colonel of the 73d regiment of infantry, (who had abandoned the army without orders, taking with him his two battalions, and returned to France,) and also general Miranda. Dumourier executed the order that respected general Miranda with regret, since he was persuaded that this rigorous measure was less an act of

justice, than the effect of hatred of the Jacobins against Pethion and the Girondists, who were the friends and protectors of Miranda. This general found means to escape the danger in accusing Dumourier, after his quitting the army; an event which was extremely favourable to Miranda.

On the same day colonel Mack arrived at Ath; a verbal agreement was again entered into between that officer and Dumourier; but this was in much more formal terms than the former. The colonel began by expressing the acknowledgements of the Imperialists, for the peaceable manner in which the retreat of the French troops was conducted, in consequence of the prudence of general Dumourier's orders; by which means the country was spared the most frightful disasters. On the other hand, he noticed the moderation shewn by the Imperial general, who, while he forbore to harass the French troops on their retreat, took care, nevertheless, to conceal from both armies the connivance between the two generals.

It was agreed upon by Dumourier, and colonel Mack, that the French army should remain some time longer in the position of Mons, Tournay, and Courtray, without being harassed by the Imperial army; that general Dumourier, who did not conceal from colonel Mack his design of marching against Paris, should, when their designs were ripe for execution, regulate the motions of the Imperialists, who should only act as auxiliaries in the execution of their plan; that, in the case of Dumourier's having no need of assistance, which was to be greatly desired by both parties, the Imperialists should not advance farther than the frontier of France, and that the total evacuation of Belgium should be the price of this concession; but if Dumourier could not effect the re-establishment of a limited monarchy, (not a counter revolution,) he himself should indicate the number and the kind of troops which the Imperialists should furnish

nish, to aid in the project, and which should be entirely under Dumourier's direction.

Dumourier made Colonel Mack acquainted with his design of marching the following day to Tournay, with the march of general Neuilly to Mons, and of the army of Holland to Courtray.

It was finally decided, that in order to combine the operations of the Imperial troops under the prince of Cobourg, and those under the prince of Hohenloe, at the time when Dumourier should march to Paris, Condé should be put into the hands of the Austrians as a pledge; that the Austrians should garrison the town, but without any pretensions to the sovereignty, and on the condition that it should be restored to France, at the conclusion of the war, and after an indemnity should have been settled between the two parties; but that all the other towns belonging to France, should, in the case of the constitutional party needing the assistance of the Imperialists, receive garrisons, one half of which should be French troops, and the other half Imperialists, under the orders of the French. General Valence, general Thovenot, the duke de Chartres, and Colonel Mountjoye, assisted at this conference.

CHAP. X.

Camp at Tournay.

ON the 28th, Dumourier marched to Tournay, and took the position of Antoing, having his advanced guard in Tournay, and the flanking corps of the left, commanded by general Miackzinsky, on Mount Trinity. He sent general le Veneur with the army, of the Ardennes, to occupy the camp of Maulde.

In this city was Madame de Sillery, with Mademoiselle d'Orleans, whom the general had never till then seen. Those ladies had taken up their residence

at Tournay, on the advice which Dumourier had before this given to lieutenant-general Omoran, who then commanded in the Tournaisis; because Mademoiselle d'Orleans, who was no more than fifteen years of age, was proscribed in France by the decree against the emigrants. This young princess (who as well as her brothers, the Duke de Chartres, and the Duke Montpensier, is perfectly well bred, and well informed) is an example of virtue, resignation and constancy.

The Duke de Chartres, who had served the preceding campaign with distinguished valour, and a pure and disinterested patriotism, and who had recently displayed a degree of courage, and civism, reflecting honour on the French name, was included in the decree of banishment, rendered against the house of Bourbon, and would have been subject to the cruellest vexations the moment that he should enter France.

Dumourier, during the two days that he passed at Tournay, testified by every circumstance in his power the lively concern that he took in the fate of this unfortunate and amiable princess. As both she and Madame de Sillery were greatly in dread of falling into the hands of the Imperialists, because of the influence which they supposed the emigrants to possess with the Emperor, Dumourier on his departure from Tournay, caused them to be conducted to St. Amand. When the general's protection, far from serving, might have been fatal to those ladies, they accepted of an asylum in Mons, offered them by the Imperial generals. If the virtues of Mademoiselle d'Orleans do not find their recompense, at least, may she find protection from the hands of a beneficent Providence.

While Dumourier remained in the camp of Tournay, he received intelligence, that general Neuilly's division, on arriving at Mons, instead of encamping on the heights of Nimy, had pillaged the magazines, and afterwards fled in total disorder (without, however, being attacked by the enemy,) to Condé, and Valenciennes. The cavalry only remained with general Neuilly, and Dumourier commanded him to retreat
with

with those to Condé, spreading over as much ground on his march as he could between Binche, Roeux, Soignies, and Leuse; carrying off with him the forage, horses, and carriages, and cutting down the bridges behind him.

The evacuation of Mons rendered Dumourier's situation at Tournay very dangerous, his right being altogether unprotected; but independent of the suspension of arms, his knowledge of the country made him secure of his retreat, which he was unwilling to undertake, till he should have known what movement was made by his left. He, therefore, only took the precaution of commanding general Harville to confine himself within the camp of Maubeuge and Givet, in order to prevent the enemy from penetrating on the French territory, on that side.

On the 29th of March, three deputies from the Jacobins arrived at Tournay. They introduced themselves to the general by saying, that they bore a commission from Le Brun; and, presenting a letter from that minister, conceived in vague and uncertain terms, they declared they had communications to make to him respecting the affairs of Belgium. These three men were Proly, a contemptible adventurer born at Brussels; Desjardines, a writer of little note, who had been formerly driven from Brussels; and Péréira a Portuguese Jew. The first of these we have seen was already known to the general; the second called himself a man of letters, and the third was a furious Jacobin. They were offended that the general refused to enter on the subject of their embassy, before Mademoiselle d'Orleans, to whose apartments they had expressly come to utter a Philippic against the general. He made an appointment to meet them at his own quarters.

The conversation that took place between Dumourier and these men, is pretty nearly such as they have reported it to be. They agreed with him in his opinion of the imbecility of the convention, and on the necessity

necessity of dispersing that assembly, and establishing some other legislature. After that, they founded the general respecting the persons who should succeed the convention in their authority; and one of them ventured to say, that the Jacobins had their president, registers, tribunes, orators, as well as the habit of discussing or determining great concerns; and that, therefore, there was no need to look further. Dumourier, in his usual sincere and decisive manner, utterly rejected this idea; grounding his objection on the immorality, rashness, cruelty, and incongruous qualities of that society; to which all the misfortunes of France, he declared, were to be attributed.

Proby said, *how then will you be able to replace the present representatives of the people, and at the same time avoid the delays and other defects of the mode of election by primary assemblies?* The general answered, *nothing is more simple, or more easily accomplished. The patriotism of the Administrators of the departments and districts is, at present, well tried and approved. For this one time, it is but to take all the procureurs-general of the departments and districts; and to complete the number by members of the departments and districts. These will form a very competent legislature; they will re-establish the constitution of 1789: all divisions will be healed in France; the Royalists will lay down their arms; foreign powers will no longer have any colour for carrying on the war, and France, having a solid government with which they can treat, will listen with readiness to terms of peace: for do not imagine, the general added, that the republic can continue to exist; your crimes and your ignorance have destroyed its possibility.*

These three men made some objection to the general's propositions, but they listened very tranquilly to those *blasphemies* of the general, of which they afterward gave so dreadful an account. Desjardines, who proceeded further than the rest in his address and artifice, said, that he should return to Paris to give an account of his mission; and that he hoped soon to see the
general

general again. They took their leave of Dumourier without molestation; and certainly, he never thought of arresting emissaries of such little consequence.

General Dumourier has no doubt that, had he seconded their idea of replacing the national convention by the society of Jacobins, he had entirely gained the confidence of that society; but he acknowledges that his temper, perhaps too sincere in this instance, robbed him of the possibility of seeming to yield to their measures. He instantly perceived that he could not turn this instrument to his purposes, but by plunging into a series of horrid crimes; and the events that have succeeded, have proved to him, that his judgment was not erroneous.

On the same day, he received a letter from the seven commissioners of the convention, met at Lille, who commanded him to appear in that city, to answer to the charges alledged against him. He answered, that being in sight of the enemy, employed in re-organizing his army, and restoring its courage, (which was indeed true) he could not quit the army for an instant; but if the commissioners would come to him at Tournay, he would answer every accusation with his usual frankness; that when he should have accomplished his retreat, and the army should be safe in the French territory, he would have more leisure to take into consideration his personal affairs; in a word, that he would never enter Lille, excepting it should be with troops to punish cowards, who had abandoned their colours and calumniated the most intrepid defenders of their country.

C H A P. XI.

Retreat to the camp of Maulde.

GENERAL Dumourier was extremely uneasy respecting the fate of the troops at Antwerp; having received no intelligence from that quarter, and fearing indeed, that general Ruault, who bore his orders to general Marasè, had fallen into the hands of the enemy.

The retreat from Antwerp across the Scheldt, by the extremity of Flanders, was long and difficult. But Dumourier knew that the enemy were less numerous in that quarter than the troops at Antwerp. The Prussians and Dutch were before Gertruydenberg and Breda; and colonel Mylius, who presented himself before Antwerp, had not more than 2000 men, and those were irregular troops of the Imperial army.

But the French troops at Antwerp had fallen into still greater disorder than any other part of the army. They were seized with a panic, and the generals were no longer masters of them. On the 26th, colonel Mylius had the audacity to summon the city. Part of the French troops had already crossed the Scheldt, but, instead of waiting for the remainder, they precipitately retired by Bruges to Dunkirk, excepting a small body of them, which colonel Thovenot prevailed upon to halt at Ghent. General Marasè had sunk the Ariel frigate according to Dumourier's instructions, after sending away her masts, rigging, and guns, by the canals, to Dunkirk. He had also sent away part of the magazines of the garrison, but a great part still remained, and more than 8000 men.

As the terror and confusion which before had spread among the troops redoubled on the approach of colonel Mylius, a council of war was held, in which it was unanimously decided, that it was more prudent to
save

save this part of the army, together with the magazines and other effects belonging to the French nation, than obstinately to risk the loss of the whole.

On the 27th or 28th of March, the French troops quitted Antwerp. None of them passed by Courtray, and they were not at liberty to encamp at Haerlebecke, as had been designed. They entered the French territory in different bodies, and at different times, and part of them were disposed of by general Omeran in the camp of Cassel and the lines of Dunkirk, and the remainder helped to form the camp of Madelaine, near Lisle.

It was not till the 29th, that Dumourier received intelligence of this dispersion of more than 20,000 men of his army. The dispersion of the body of troops under Neuilly, and the evacuation of Mons, had exposed his right, and this of Courtray now exposed his left to still greater danger, which the enemy might turn, approaching by the left of the Scheldt, and if he should be compelled to retreat before the enemy in the present disposition of his troops, he had nothing to expect but to be compleatly routed.

For these reasons, he resolved to raise the camp of Tournay in the morning of the 30th. He had before this sent general Le Veneur to occupy that of Maulde. He sent the army of the north, by the bridge of Mortagne, to encamp in the strong position of Bruille, which he ordered to be joined by three bridges to the camp. He sent general Miaczinsky with 4000 men to occupy Orchies, to secure a communication with Lisle, and he established his head quarters with his park of artillery at St. Amand.

By the unexpected surrender of the citadel of Antwerp, the garrisons of Breda and Gertruydenberg were entirely cut off from all communication with the army. They amounted to near 6000 men, that were on the point of being sacrificed without the hope of assistance, and without any service to ensue to France. Dumourier, therefore, sent orders, through the me-

dium of colonel Mack, to general de Flers, and to colonel Tilly, who commanded in those two places, to capitulate, in condition of being at liberty to march to France with arms and baggage. This was accordingly done; and was an important service rendered France, since one half of the army had already deserted.

At this period the safety of the frontier towns in France was entirely owing to the suspension of arms; for had the Imperialists pressed forward, such was the disorder prevailing in the French army, they must have penetrated the frontiers. It being said that the general was to be commanded to appear at the bar of the national convention, their constant language was, that they themselves would conduct the general to Paris, and would share his fortunes.

Dumourier attentively observed this disposition in the troops, which he saw was supported by the complaints of the generals, and of the greater part of the other officers. These latter saw the generals, under whom they had been conducted to victory, outraged in the Jacobin journals, accused of treachery, arrested, and treated without regard to decency or justice. The two parties were now in the greatest fermentation, and the contest tended to an issue which could not but be prompt and violent. Three commissioners of the convention, Lequinio, Cochon, and Bellegarde were in Valenciennes; these already treated the army and its generals as rebels, would not permit any communication between them and the garrison, and stopped their convoys of provision and money.

The garrison of Condé, consisting of four batallions and a regiment of cavalry, under general Neuilly, were extremely divided in opinion, but they seemed to incline to support Dumourier, to whom general Neuilly was altogether attached.

At Lisle, the contest was still more marked and more violent. The commissioners of the convention had

had made this place their point of union, and the Jacobin club instigated an extremely numerous populace against the higher ranks of citizens. On the other hand, the soldiers broke out into tumults, and spoke loudly in behalf of their general, and against the Anarchists.

The commissioners of the convention also endeavoured to accomplish their designs by assassination. On the 31st of March, six volunteers, of the third batallion of La Marne, demanded leave to speak to the general, who ordered them to be introduced. They entered with their hats on, the back part being placed in the front, having the word *Republic* chalked on them. They made a long and fanatical harrangue to the general, the purport of which was, that they, and many others of their comrades, had sworn to send him to the bar of the national convention, or, in imitation of Brutus, to stab him. Dumourier answered with great composure and gentleness, that they were blinded by a mistaken zeal; that they could not but perceive the unfortunate condition of France; and that the rage with which remedies were applied, served only to prove the impossibility of maintaining the republic, since an unjust and unrestrained government could not long exist. While the general spoke, they approached with a design of surrounding him, which, perhaps, would have been effected, but for the intrepidity of the faithful Baptiste, who seized upon the foremost, and called the general's guard to his assistance. The volunteers attempted to resist, but they were overpowered; and the general not only saved their lives, but prevented their being ill treated. He contented himself with securing their persons in prison.

The indignation of the army was general; and on the same day the different corps presented addresses signed by individuals of every rank, professing an inviolable attachment to their general; and the greater part of them expressing their desire of marching to Paris to re-establish the constitution.

After hostilities had been thus commenced by the commissioners of the convention, and after the troops had thus declared their wishes, Dumourier set about the means of making himself master of Valenciennes, Condé, and Lisle; without which he could strike no blow of importance.

It was, to assemble the troops of the line in a camp, apart from the rest, and to disarm and disband the national guard. But this could not be accomplished without a dreadful effusion of blood; for there had long existed an extreme animosity between the national guards, and the troops of the line. There were many of the battalions of national guards, who had served under his command with great valour, and had lately presented addresses to him, couched in loyal and strong terms; and he could not prevail on himself to recompence them with disgrace, or perhaps, with death. And, if he should make exceptions in the execution of the plan, those might include disguised anarchists; and he could no longer rely with safety on his troops.

The love of liberty was a noble passion in 1789. It became licentious in 1790 and 1791. By the successes of the year 1792, the love of freedom, instead of being exalted into heroism, degenerated into a blind, insolent, and barbarous phrenzy; and the period that we are reviewing in these memoirs added to the ferocity of its spirit.

The struggle for ascendancy was not equal between Dumourier and the Jacobins. His means were enfeebled by his scruples. The sect of the Jacobins was not to be annihilated but by a monster more frightful than itself; or by a foreign sword. And hence the sequel of this history is no more than an account of the mistakes of Dumourier; who embraced the incompatible designs of preserving his own esteem, and purging the nation of her crimes.

In a conversation he had formerly held at Louvain with Danton and La Croix, on a proposal made by those commissioners relative to a conduct they wished
the

the general to adopt in Belgium, by no means very reputable; the general observed (and he has since repeated the observation to Camus) that he would never commit an action which he regarded as a crime, even for the salvation of his country. He has since been told that Danton said, *General Dumourier wants energy; his mind has never risen to the true revolutionary pitch.* The revolutionary pitch rose after that period; and Dumourier, who has not changed, could not but fail in the struggle, since to succeed it was necessary to display crimes greater than those with which he had to combat.

Dumourier sent orders to general Miaczinsky, who was at Orchies, to march with his division to Lille; to arrest the commissioners of the convention, and the leaders of the clubs; to proceed from thence to Douay, and remove general Moreton from the command of that town; to proclaim there and at Lille the unanimous resolution of the army to restore the constitution; and afterwards to proceed by Cambray to Peronne, where he was to take post. This unfortunate general did not sufficiently perceive the importance of his charge. He spoke of it to various persons, and among the rest to St. George, the celebrated Mulatto, colonel of a regiment of Hussars, who betrayed the general and drew him into Lille with a very small escort. The moment Miaczinsky entered the town, the gates were shut upon him. He was arrested, conducted to Paris, and brought to the scaffold. This officer was a native of Poland, and was one of the chiefs of the confederation, at the time that Dumourier was charged by the court of France to direct its operations. Miaczinsky had been made prisoner in an engagement with the Russians; and afterwards, claiming an indemnity from France, in which the general could not find means to serve him, he had obtained for him the rank of major-general, and permission to raise a free corps, and had afterwards employed him with great utility to France and the army. Miaczinsky, brave in war,

did not display the same courage in his personal defence when he was taken, nor at his death. He accused Dumourier of various crimes against the nation; and even of some gross frauds, that were no doubt suggested to him by the enemies of Dumourier. He also accused La Croix, which was the cause of his ruin.

Miaczinsky's troops, after they were quitted by that officer, wandered on the glacis of Lille, into which place the garrison would not admit them. Dumourier, receiving intelligence of this, sent one of his aids-de-camp, colonel Philip de Vaux, to put himself at their head, and to conduct them to Orchies and Douay. De Vaux was arrested through the treachery of a brother officer, taken to Paris, and executed. He died with great courage and constancy.

Philip de Vaux was born at Brussels, had served in Austria, and had afterwards taken part against the emperor in the revolution of his own country. Dumourier had known him at Paris, and appointed him his aid-de-camp. He was a man of capacity, of great courage, and of an exalted and feeling mind. In fine, he possessed the qualities necessary to make a general officer.

The garrison of Valenciennes was commanded by major-general Ferrand, whom Dumourier had raised to the rank of colonel, and afterwards to that of major-general; and whom he believed to be attached to his interests. This officer was of an age not very liable to be heated with opinions; and, till this period, had appeared to be well informed and moderate. But characters moulder away before opinions, and Ferrand became one of the most intemperate of Dumourier's accusers, and one of the firmest supports of the anarchists.

The grand provost of the army, named l'Ecuyer, demanded of Dumourier as a favour, the charge of arresting the deputies at Valenciennes. He was no sooner in that city, than he became their confident,
and

and instrument; although by a strange accident he perished afterwards on the scaffold. While he was in Valenciennes he wrote a circumstantial letter to the general, respecting the arrangements he had made for arresting the deputies, and this letter was found in the pocket of the general's great coat, on the 4th of April.

These two men, Ferrand and l'Ecuyer, undermined the general's plan for making himself master of Valenciennes; these being at first confidentially communicated to them; and they effected an entire change in the disposition of the troops which he had contrived to send there.

Dumourier's design on Lille and Valenciennes being thus suddenly defeated, he had no other resource than to make himself master of Condé. The situation of the army, on the extreme frontier of France, was become altogether embarrassing. The army depending upon the strong towns for subsistence, Dumourier was compelled either to disband them, or to join the Imperialists, unless he could obtain possession of one of the strong towns. The first of these measures would have deprived him of all resource, and given a decisive victory to the Anarchists. The second was repugnant to the feelings of the general, and the troops, inspired by the laudable principle of national honour; and he could not have obtained the universal consent of his army to this measure, since the opinions of the troops were divided, and since the indefatigable intrigues of the Jacobins had wrought such a change in the disposition of the soldiery. And the latter was impracticable, because the general had no artillery to undertake a siege; his artillery being sent to Lille when he retreated from Belgium. The third of these measures also must have produced a civil war. A regular siege would have demanded length of time, during which the soldiery would have made the same reflections that operated on the mind of Dumourier, and which continually restrained him in the plans that seemed necessary to his object: these reflections regarded

garded the horror of seeing Frenchmen combat each other, having foreigners for spectators, to whom both parties would have become a prey, when they should be mutually incapable of further resistance.

Dumourier therefore thought of leading his army to Paris. But he could succeed in that, only in having the majority of opinions with him. Every other expedient was at once painful and uncertain. Every day, every hour diminished his hope. He beheld his situation, without deceiving himself, and without being subdued by his difficulties: He regarded them under every aspect, and he cannot now recollect the first five days of April without horror.

C H A P. XII.

Arrest of the commissioners of the convention, Camus, La Marque, Bancal, and Quinette; and of Bournonville, minister of war.

ON the first of April, general Dumourier, in order to be nearer his army, and to favour a project of surprising Valenciennes, (which had been proposed to him, and which failed by the misconduct of the general officer who was charged with its execution) removed his head quarters from the city of St. Amand to the suburbs; where was stationed a chosen body of cavalry, and where he was also nearer Condé. Various circumstances had prevented his proceeding in the first instance to the latter city, but in that neglect he committed a great error, and perhaps it was the cause of completing the ruin of his affairs. Perhaps it had been better if he had at first established his head quarters at Condé; but the events that passed in that period were so sudden and unforeseen, he was so effectually shut out from intelligence, and was so compleatly ignorant of all that passed beyond Valenciennes and Lisle, and he was so entirely occupied in observing and moulding to his purpose

purpose the dispositions of his army, that to blame or justify the conduct into which he was driven by this strong chain of circumstances, it is necessary to have been in his situation.

Perhaps even it is well for him that he did not make himself master of Condé, for if the inconstancy of the French character had then caused a defection in his army, being in the centre of that strong city, he had been delivered up to his enemies, or massacred by his own troops.

The commissioners of the convention availed themselves of Dumourier's hesitation in this respect to visit Condé, and to issue proclamations, circulate assignats, and fill the town with emissaries of the Jacobins. The sixth regiment of infantry, the only corps of troops of the line which had discovered a decided spirit of Jacobinism, and a battalion of national guards of Versailles, struck terror into the mind of General Neuilly, who thenceforward was no longer master of the place; although he persuaded himself that he was, and continued to assert it to Dumourier, who too long relied on his ill-founded confidence.

In this battalion of Versailles, was a captain of the artillery company, named Le Cointre, son of the celebrated deputy of that name of Versailles. This young man declaimed vehemently against the advocates of the constitution; and, being rudely handled on that account by some dragoon officers, he quitted the garrison to lay his complaints before Dumourier, who caused him to be arrested, that he might have an hostage for himself, in the person of the son of one of the most furious among the members of the *mountain*. Dumourier also caused to be arrested a lieutenant-colonel, an officer belonging to the staff of the army, who declaimed openly and vehemently against him: and having no secure place in which he could keep these prisoners, he sent them, together with the six volunteers, who had attempted to assassinate him, to Tournay; requesting general Clairfait to keep them as hostages in the citadel.

Lieutenant

Lieutenant-general Veneur, who at the time of La Fayette's desertion had followed that officer, and who was indebted to Dumourier for his pardon, and his re-establishment in his rank, now came to Dumourier to demand permission to retire from the army, on the pretence of being in an ill state of health. His object was, to obtain the command of the army of the anarchists. Dumourier granted him permission to retire, and also to a general named Stetenhoffen, a foreigner whom Dumourier had made major-general. Dampierre was at Quesnoy with his division, and carried on a treaty with the commissioners of the convention, as did also general Chancel, who was cantoned at Fresnes. And their example was followed by general Rosieres, and general Kermorvan, who had the command of the Belgians in the camp of Bruille.

Dumourier was the more affected by these instances of treachery, because all those officers had been indebted to him for their rank, had complained more loudly than any others against the anarchists, and had pressed with more seeming impatience the execution of his design of restoring order. Excepting Dampierre who died in the command of the army, and Chancel, who replaced Neuilly at Condé, and was obliged to surrender after a long siege, these officers have been punished for their ingratitude, by the suspicions and disdain of their patrons, and the loss of their employments. This unhappy example of the treachery of superior officers, who were in appearance most attached to the cause of the general, could not fail to produce a pernicious effect on the soldiery, and add strength to the party of the Jacobins.

Dumourier now saw that he could no longer hope to march to Paris without opposition from his army, as the temper of his troops at first seemed to promise. He saw that he would have to commence by a civil war, which he had always thought of with repugnance; and to compel one part of his troops to combat the other, was a dreadful extremity for a general who
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regarded his soldiers as his children, and who had never conducted them but by his kindness, and the influence of a mutual affection.

Another circumstance rendered him timid, and deprived all his measures of energy. This was, the danger of the prisoners confined in the temple. It was to be feared that the Jacobins would instantly sacrifice these unfortunate victims, whom they already treated too unworthily to afford any hope that they would spare them in the first moments of their fear and resentment.

General Dumourier, from the time of his being at Tournay, incessantly meditated on this dreadful circumstance. Beside general Valence, the duke de Chartres, and general Thovenot, who partook of his councils, he also confided his thoughts on this subject to colonel Montjoye, and colonel Nordmann, colonel of the regiment of Berchiny. He proposed to send those two officers with three hundred hussars to Paris, on the pretext of arresting deserters, and sending them back to the army. He meant to give them dispatches to the minister of war to justify their going to Paris. They were to proceed by the forest of Bondy; and reaching the prison of the temple, force the guard, and carry off the four illustrious captives, placing each of them behind an hussar, having a carriage in the forest, to push forward to Pont St. Maxence, where a body of cavalry were to receive them.

To this end it was necessary to be in possession of either Valenciennes, or Lille; but the circumstances that followed defeated the project; there remained no means of saving the illustrious prisoners from the Jacobins. To form a conspiracy in Paris demanded time, and the emigrants had so ill succeeded in attempts of that nature, that it had been madness to have placed confidence in such a plan. Deprived of all hope of delivering the prisoners, the general had no other resource, than to possess himself of hostages for their safety. Hence he had so anxiously sought to
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seize the commissioners at Lisle, and Valenciennes; and he was now determined to detain such as might put themselves into his power.

On the morning of the 5th of April, a captain of chasseurs, whom Dumourier had posted at Pont-a-Marque, with fifteen trusty and resolute men, with orders to arrest any couriers, but above all the commissioners of the convention, on the road from Lisle to Paris, brought advice that Bournonville had passed them on his road to Lisle, and informed him that he should proceed to the head quarters of Dumourier, who was astonished that he had received no courier from Bournonville, nor any advice respecting his journey, at a time when the general could not doubt of his being proscribed. This was the only intimation the general received to prepare him for the important scene that followed.

About four in the evening, two couriers announced the arrival of the minister of war with four commissioners of the convention. Terror and despair were painted on their countenances; they did not hesitate to say, the commissioners came to conduct Dumourier to the bar of the convention, but that he would never reach Paris, assassins being planted by bands of twenty and thirty, at Gournay, Roye, and Senlis, in order to murder him. They also indicated these assassins belonged to two new regiments, called the hussars and dragoons of the republic. The general had broken a squadron of the hussars for refusing to obey their colonel, and sent them to France on foot, and without arms, which the Jacobins had restored them in order to assassinate their general. The dragoons consisted of men who had committed numerous crimes at Paris, from whence they had been sent to the army. Their conduct was cowardly and atrocious, and the general was compelled to act with severity toward them on his retreat from the Netherlands. They afterwards deserted to Paris, whence they were now dispatched to be the accomplices of the hussars.

Immediately

Immediately afterwards the minister of war appeared, followed by the four Commissioners, who were Camus, La Marque, Bancal, and Quinette. The minister, after embracing the general, informed him that the commissioners came to notify to the general a decree of the national convention. General Valence was already with Dumourier, and the rest of the staff officers now crowded into the apartment. Partaking of the opinions of their general as they had partaken of his fatigues, dangers, victories, and defeats, his fate was not to be separated from theirs; and indignation rather than inquietude was expressed in their looks. Dumourier saw that this temper of mind might break out into violent consequences, which induced him the more to preserve the composure with which he was determined to act in this critical moment.

Dumourier would be unjust if he did not offer the homage of his esteem and gratitude, to those generous men, who in the midst of his disgraces preserved the constancy of their friendship to him, and their attachment to principle, by sacrificing emoluments and honours to follow him in his retreat. Nor can he forbear here to record the magnanimity of general Valence, who being offered the command of the armies, on condition of arresting Dumourier, not only spurned at the offer without hesitation, but concealed the dangerous temptations laid before him by the commissioners of the convention from the knowledge of Dumourier.

Camus spoke for the members of this deputation. In a manner that expressed some degree of irresolution, he requested the general to go into another room with the deputies, and minister of war, in order to hear a decree of the convention respecting him. The general answered, that as all his actions had ever been public, and as the subject of a decree passed by seven hundred persons could be no mystery, he saw no reason for complying with the request,

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and thought that the officers who were present ought to be witnesses of whatever should pass in this interview. Beurnonville, however, as well as the deputies, urged the request with such appearance of respect that the general went with them into an inner room, but his staff officers would not permit the door to be closed, and general Valence entered the room with him.

Camus presented the decree to Dumourier; who, having read it with perfect composure, returned it, and observed, that forbearing within certain limits to condemn a decision of the national convention, he could not but judge this order to be untimely, since the army was disorganized and discontented, and since his quitting it in that condition would be followed by its total dissolution; that it would be prudent to suspend the execution of the decree, till he should have restored the army to its proper footing, when he would be ready to render an account of his conduct; and when it might be decided whether circumstances required or permitted his appearance at Paris; that he read in the decree an article empowering the commissioners to suspend him from his functions and appoint another general, in the case of his disobeying the order; that the convention having charged them with a commission including such severity toward the general, and of so delicate a nature with respect to themselves, had certainly relied no less on their prudence than on their firmness; that therefore he would throw himself on their discretion, and would not positively refuse obedience, but merely demand a delay in the execution of their order; that, in fine, being now judges of all the circumstances, they could easily resolve on the conduct that became them, and if they were determined upon suspending him, he would meet them half way, by himself offering his resignation to them, which he had so often tendered during the last three months to the convention.

Camus

Camus replied, that the deputies had no authority to receive the general's resignation ; and then said, " But if your resignation were accepted of, what would be your conduct afterward ? I should act as should become me, the general answered ; but I have no hesitation in declaring to you, I will neither by going to Paris subject myself to be treated unworthily by fanatics, nor to be condemned to death by a revolutionary tribunal.—Then you do not acknowledge the authority of that tribunal, said Camus.—I recognise in it, replied the general, a tribunal of blood and of crimes, to which I will never submit while I have a sword that will not deceive me. I moreover declare, that had I the power I would abolish it, as being a dishonour to a free nation."

The other three deputies, who were men of much more temper and moderation than Camus, perceiving that the conversation became intemperate, interposed, and endeavoured to convince the general that the convention had no designs against him ; that he was loved and esteemed by every one, and that his presence in Paris would destroy the calumnies of his enemies ; that his absence from the troops would not be long, and that the deputies and minister of war would remain with the army till his return. Quinette offered to accompany the general to Paris, to be the pledge of his safety, and to return with him, making the most fervent protestations that he would personally expose himself to all danger in the general's defence. After this, the conversation became cool and temperate. Bancal, a man of reading and talent, endeavoured to win the general by his regard for his name, and cited examples of obedience and resignation to the laws in the most celebrated of the Greeks and Romans. " Let us have done with mistakes, Sir, said the general ; we degrade the Roman history ; and disfigure the Roman virtues, that they may serve as an excuse for our crimes. The Romans did not mas-

sacre Tarquin. The Roman republic possessed a stable government and just laws. They neither had a Jacobin club, nor a revolutionary tribunal. We are in a state of anarchy. Ferocious men thirst for my blood, and I am not willing to give it them. Since you seek your examples among the Romans, I tell you, that I have often acted the part of Decius, but never will that of Curtius."

The deputies assured Dumourier that he had formed an unjust idea of the state of Paris; and that indeed he was neither called before the Jacobins, nor the revolutionary tribunal, but to the bar of the national convention, and that he would speedily return to his post.

"I passed the month of January at Paris, said the general, and surely that city has not become more reasonable since, especially in this moment of public danger. I know, by the most authentic of your journals, that the convention is governed by Marat, the Jacobins, and the tumultuous tribunes filled with the emissaries of the Jacobins. The convention has not the power of saving me from the fury of these men; and, if it became the respect that I owe myself to appear before such judges, even my deportment would provoke my death."

Camus then returned to his categorical question. "You refuse to obey the decree of the Convention?" The general answered that he had already stated to the deputies his view of the subject. He urged them to take a moderate course, and exhorted them to return to Valenciennes, and from thence to make a report to the convention, setting forth the general's reasons, and supporting those, by shewing the impossibility of taking the general from his army at this instant, without incurring the greatest risk of disbanding it.

Dumourier acknowledges that, had they yielded to these counsels, he should have been imprudent enough to have permitted their departure. The
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colleagues of Camus appeared by no means to be unwilling to listen to reason, although on his part, he rudely repulsed every conciliatory measure.

"Call to mind, said one of them, that your disobedience in this case will cause the ruin of the republic. —Cambon said in your tribune, amidst bursts of applause, answered the general, that the fate of the republic rests not upon any one man. I have, besides, to observe that the name of republic does not belong us; our condition is an absolute anarchy. I swear to you that I have no desire to elude enquiry. I promise you on my honor, a pledge that is inviolable with a military man, that when the nation shall have a government, and laws, I will give a faithful account of my actions and motives. I will myself demand a trial. At present, it would be an act of insanity in me."

The conference lasted more than two hours, but this which has been stated was the exact purport of it. The deputies retired into another chamber to decide on the course they should pursue.

Dumourier was at this period deceived respecting the designs, and conduct of general Beurnonville; in consequence of which he has made unjust complaints of that minister. He learned afterwards from a virtuous and impartial man, that Beurnonville was constant in his friendship to Dumourier; and the gross accusations of Marat against that minister is an additional proof of the fact: and Dumourier is eager to make this public avowal of his error.

It is certain that Beurnonville, being several times appealed to by Dumourier respecting the conduct he would observe in this case, constantly said, "I cannot advise you. You know what it becomes you to do." As soon as the deputies were withdrawn, the general complained that Beurnonville had foreborne to give him intelligence of the approach of this important event, at the same time however requesting him to join the army, and again to take upon him

the command of the advanced guard. Beurnonville answered, "I know that I shall fall a sacrifice to my enemies, but I have resolved to die at my post. My situation is terrifying. I see you are decided, and that the step you will take is of the most desperate kind. I demand as a favor at your hands, that you will not separate my fate from that of the deputies."—"Be assured that I will not," answered the general. Dumourier was at that moment unjust to the magnanimity of Beurnonville, whom he considered to be perfidious, or at the best, unworthily carried away by circumstances. May he receive some consolation in this justice rendered to him by Dumourier. And may his heart, justly offended, be open to receive the atonement of his friend!

Beurnonville, Valence, and Dumourier returned to the officers, who impatiently waited the result of this long conference. But their inquietude was not entirely dissipated, for the general did not then acquaint them with the resolution he had taken. These officers have since told him that, had he consented to go to Paris, they would have prevented it by violence.

When the deputies first arrived at the general's quarters, the regiment of Borchiny was drawn up in the court yard; and the general had commanded colonel Nordmann to select an officer on whom he could rely, together with thirty men, and to hold them in readiness to execute his orders. The passions by which the troops were agitated were forcibly expressed in their looks, and the general exerted his influence to moderate them.

In the interval, while the deputies were deliberating, Dumourier in walking met doctor Menuret, surgeon to the army, and said to him, "Well doctor, what remedy shall we apply to this wound?" Menuret answered quickly, "The same as in the preceding year at the camp of Maulde: a grain of disobedience."

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In about an hour the deputies returned to the general's room. Camus much agitated, said harshly, "Citizen general, are you ready to obey the decree of the national convention, and to go with us to Paris?" The general replied, "Not in this instant."—"Then," said Camus, "I suspend you from your functions. You no longer command the armies. I forbid all persons to obey you, and command every one to assist in arresting you. I will go myself and place the seals on your papers."

A murmur of indignation was heard. "Give me the names of those persons," Camus cried out rudely, pointing to the officers around him. The general answered, "They will themselves give you their names."—"I have now other employment," replied Camus, who no longer knew what he said: "I demand your papers."

Dumourier now saw that the emotion of his officers was at its height, and on the point of producing some rash action. He said, in a firm tone, "This is insufferable. It is time to put an end to such insolence." And, in the German language, he commanded the hussars to enter. He then ordered the officer of the hussars to arrest the four deputies, and the minister of war, but not to do them any personal injury, and to leave Beurnonville his arms.

Camus then said, "General Dumourier, you are about to destroy the Republic."—"Say, rather it is you, old madman," the General replied to him.

They were conducted into another chamber; and after having dined, were conveyed in their own carriage to Tournay, escorted by a squadron of the hussars of Berchiny. Dumourier sent a letter to general Clairfayt, saying that he sent him hostages, who would be responsible for the excesses that might be committed at Paris. He requested general Clairfayt to treat the minister of war, with more distinction than the rest.

Such

Such were the facts relative to the arrest of the commissioners of the convention, which was a measure forced on the general by circumstances. As to the act of delivering them into the hands of the Imperialists, it is to be remembered that Dumourier had no fortress in which he could keep them in safety, and that the Imperialists being as deeply concerned as himself in the fate of the prisoners of the Temple, they could not be placed in any hands so sure. They could be detained merely as hostages, nor was there any danger to their personal safety, their detention being simply an act of precaution in the part of Dumourier. Besides, it is to be recollected, that the Prince of Cobourg consented to act on the footing of an auxiliary to general Dumourier, in this war, for the overthrow of the Jacobins, and for the re-establishment of the constitution. Hence these hostages were not really prisoners of the Imperialists, but those of general Dumourier, for whom they held them. The deputies and the minister of war were sent to Maestricht, where they were kept till a change of circumstances required their removal.

This event is one more instance of the blind precipitation attending upon all the measures of the national convention. It is to be remarked also, that Camus, who went post from Liege to vote for the death of Louis the XVI. had in this last instance suddenly quitted the frontier, to procure the arrest of general Dumourier, had himself dictated the decree, and had demanded to be charged with its execution. It was therefore that he was so unrelenting during the conferences, lest his colleagues should have yielded to persecution, and should have returned to Valenciennes, as they were counselled to do by the general.

C H A P. XIII.

Attempt to assassinate General Dumourier. Events in April. Departure of General Dumourier.

IMEDIATELY after this important event, Dumourier sent colonel Montjoye to acquaint colonel Mack with the circumstance; and to appoint a time and place, for a conference between the general and colonel Mack, for the purpose of finally concluding upon the terms of their treaty, and for settling the measures that should be reciprocally taken, according to the conduct that should be adopted by Dumourier's army after this decisive period. Being informed that a congress of the ministers of the Combined Powers would speedily be held at Antwerp, Dumourier sent general Valence to Brussels that he might be nearer the neighbourhood of the congress. During the night, Dumourier composed a short manifesto, which was digested and put into form the following day. In this, he drew up a recital of the facts of that day, and exposed his motives for arresting the commissioners of the convention. He particularly insisted on the necessity of possessing hostages, a regard for whose safety might prevent the crimes in which the Jacobins might otherwise indulge on learning the event.

On the morning of the 3d of April, the general went to the camp, and addressed the troops on the part he had acted, who appeared to approve of it with enthusiasm. He went afterward to St. Amand, in which place were the corps of artillery, who testified the same approbation of the general's conduct, as the troops in the camp, although the most indefatigable zeal to seduce this corps was employed by the emissaries of the Jacobins of Valenciennes, and especially by two of Dumourier's superior officers, one of whom, a Lieutenant-colonel
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named Boubers, had received very particular obligations from the general.

Dumourier deemed it prudent to sleep at St. Amand, for the purpose of marking his confidence in the troops there; and at this place colonel Montjoye brought him the answer of colonel Mack. It was agreed that the following morning the Prince of Cobourg, the Archduke Charles, and the Baron de Mack should meet general Dumourier, between Bouffu and Condé, for the purpose of resolving on the movements of the two armies, and respecting the direction of the succours that should be granted of Imperial troops in the case of Dumourier's having occasion to demand them.

The whole day of the 3d of April passed with as great success as the general could expect. The army appeared of one mind, with the exception of some murmurs that were heard among some of the battalions of volunteers: and a movement which the general prepared to make on the fifth, was calculated to banish the secret means of intrigue. The general designed to take a new position with the greater part of his army near Orchies, by which means he would remove the troops from the dangerous neighbourhood of Valenciennes; would destroy the leisure that belongs to a permanent camp, and in which intrigues have the greatest scope for action; and would be able to menace Lisle, Douay, and Bouchain. He acknowledges that, had he adopted this plan immediately on his entering the territory of France, he would probably have been more successful. But, at that period he relied on Valenciennes and Condé; and, perhaps, it is to this error that the sequel is to be attributed.

It is, however, difficult to determine at present what would have happened in that case. The character of the events of that period, is such as no prudence could foresee; since they were the sudden acts of the caprice of the people, which were subject to

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no calculation, and that followed each other with a rapidity to which neither foresight nor talent could oppose any obstacle. And it must be acknowledged, that the principle, which so abruptly detached the French soldiers from a general whom they had previously adored, has an aspect that cannot be regarded without approbation. They were in arms for the liberty of their country. They saw their general treat with the enemy. They thought themselves betrayed, and they passed from an esteem for their general, to the hatred of him. They were not informed of the purport of his negotiations, nor of the care the general had taken in that treaty, of the interests, and honor of his country. He had not been able to do more, with respect to his troops, than to state to them in general terms the necessity of changing the government, and putting an end to anarchy. They applauded the design; but, as the general had not aided his plan by seductions, nor by terrors, the first impresson wore easily away; and the activity of the Jacobins, more constant, more vigilant, and of a nature much more adapted to make impressions upon them, was employed with the utmost success.

The grossest calumny takes root speedily in the minds of men; but, more than in any other time, in a period agitated by the dæmon of anarchy. Suspicion ripens in times of revolution. The word *Traitor* being once pronounced, the multitude endeavoured to find, in the definition of this word, the exact portrait of the general, whom proclamations, but still more the baser intrigues of corruption, devoted to disgrace. His prudence was now artifice; his love of the public welfare, personal ambition; and a silence dictated by his judgment, knavery. One quarter of an hour employed in the concealed labour of falsehood, supported by the powerful engine of corruption, effaced all sober reflection in men, whose condition

condition precludes them from much thought, and who delight in barbarous and bloody scenes.

If we coolly examine the progress of this revolution, we shall see that the activity of the *guillotine* is the motive of the high patriotism of the French. The spectacle of severed heads, of torn limbs, carried in procession throughout Paris and other cities, has begotten a terror in some, and in the rest an audacious barbarity; and in both cases has produced a decisive effect, leading the former by fear, and the latter by the necessity of providing for their impunity, to the endless multiplication of murders. The consequence is, that the blood spilt by this dreadful engine has converted the nation into a mass capable of effecting astonishing objects.

Frenchmen, do not be led to suppose that the indulgence with which Dumourier judges you, is an eulogium on your conduct. He detests your crimes. He regards the species of liberty you enjoy, as wild and incompatible with the interests of society; and he would rather perish on your unjust and permanent scaffold, than be the apologist or partaker of your phrenzy!

This digression faithfully paints the feelings of Dumourier's mind, at the dreadful period which perhaps decided the fate of France. Agitated by the various passions springing from his situation, but still directed by principles, he resisted the temptations of ambition. His justice would not permit him to be Cromwell, nor Monk, nor Coriolanus. His power was extreme, but his wishes moderate. And it is now a consolation to him, that he is unfortunate rather than criminal.

Dumourier received various reports every instant, respecting the disposition of the garrison of Condé. Previous to his moving with his army to Orchies, he saw the necessity of assuring himself perfectly of Condé; in order to arrange the movements of the Imperialists, his treaty with whom he dared not
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avow, till he should have made a declaration to his troops of his ultimate views, and should have commenced his march to Paris.

On the morning of the 4th, he departed from St. Amand for Condé. He had left general Thouvenot at St. Amand, to regulate various details relative to his projected movement, and to watch the public temper. An escort of fifty hussars, which he ordered to attend him, not arriving as he expected, and the time for his conference with the prince of Cobourg approaching, he left one of his aids-de-camp to follow him with the escort, and departed with the duke de Chartres, colonel Thouvenot, colonel Montjoye, some aids-de-camp, and eight hussars; forming together a company of about thirty persons.

Dumourier proceeded towards Condé without any apprehension, his thoughts being deeply engaged on subjects far different from the fatal event which was about to arrive, and of which he had not the least presentiment.

Being within half a league of Condé, between Fresnes and Doumet, he met an officer dispatched by general Neuilly, to inform him that the garrison were in the greatest fermentation, and that it would not be prudent for him to enter the place, till the commotion should have ended, whether it should be in his favor, or against him. Dumourier sent back the officer with an order to general Neuilly, to send the 18th regiment of cavalry to Doumet to escort him.

He had a little before overtaken a column of three battalions of volunteers, marching toward Condé, with their baggage and artillery. Surprised at this march, for which he had given no orders, he demanded of the officers where they were going. They answered to Valenciennes, and he observed to them, that they had turned their back on Valenciennes, and were proceeding to Condé. At this time he was in the midst of them, and had stopped by the side of a

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ditch to suffer them to pass. He does not conceive why they did not then arrest him.

While they were yet in sight it was that general Neuilly's messenger arrived. Then comparing in his mind the tumult of the garrison of Condé, and the unexpected march of these three battalions, he withdrew an hundred paces from the high road, with a design of entering the first house in Doumet, for the purpose of writing a formal order to these three battalions, to return to the camp of Bruille, to which they belonged.

At this instant, the head of the column suddenly quitted the high road, and ran towards him, uttering dreadful cries. He then remounted his horse, and proceeded at a moderate pace towards a broad ditch, on the other side of which was a marshy ground. Shouts, insults, reproaches, and above all the words, *stop, stop*, forced him to pass the ditch. His horse having refused to take it, he was obliged to clear it on foot. He was no sooner on the other side, than a discharge of muskets succeeded the former tumultuous cries. The whole column instantly was in motion; the head and the centre endeavoured to overtake him, and the rear quitting the high road with equal rapidity, to get between him and the camp of Bruille, which he was endeavouring to regain.

He was now in the most imminent danger. He was on foot. The baron de Scomberg threw himself from his horse, and insisted on the general's mounting, though with the certain sacrifice of his own life. The general refused. At length he mounted a horse belonging to a domestic of the duke de Chartres, who, being extremely active, fled on foot. Dumourier's horse was taken and led in triumph to Valenciennes. Two hussars were killed, as well as two of the general's domestics, one of whom carried his great coat. Colonel Thouvenot had two horses killed under him, and saved himself at last by mounting

ing behind the faithful Baptiste, who also lost two horses. The unfortunate Cantin, the general's secretary, was taken and perished on a scaffold. This young man possessed great understanding, courage, fidelity, and patriotism. The three battalions fired more than ten thousand ball.

The general, unable to regain his camp, proceeded along the Scheldt, and arrived, still pursued though not so closely, at a ferry, a little distance from the village of Wihers, which was situated on the Imperial territory. He passed the river, accompanied by five other persons. The remainder gained the camp of Maulde, through a discharge of musketry. As soon as the general had passed the river, he proceeded on foot, through a morass, to a neighbouring house; where, at first, he was refused admittance, but on announcing his name was immediately received by the worthy owner. Thence he continued his route on foot to Bury, where was quartered a division of the Imperial regiment of dragoons of la Tour. Here he wrote to colonel Mack, and took some refreshment, of which he stood greatly in need. He was already joined by the faithful Baptiste, who passing through the whole of the camp, had turned by Mortagne, and had every where spread an alarm.

Dumourier learnt from Baptiste, and other persons, during the course of the day, that the designs of the three battalions were entirely unknown to the troops; that, on the news of their desertion and attempt to murder the general being spread, the strongest indignation was expressed by the soldiery; and that the escort of hussars and some other horse had pursued the three battalions, who, suddenly wheeling, had fled to Valenciennes. Baptiste added, that the whole camp was in a state of the greatest inquietude, and importunately demanded the return of the general.

It was now too late to rejoin his army, and it was necessary that he should wait for colonel Mack, to whom he owed an account of the reason of his fail-

ing in the appointment of the morning. That officer arrived in the evening; and Dumourier having recited to him the attempt which had been made on his person, observed, that this was the crime of individuals, which far from corrupting the disposition of his troops, would necessarily strengthen their attachment to their general, and destroy all their remaining connection with the anarchists; that consequently, far from being discouraged, his design was to return to his camp by day-break the following morning, to put himself at the head of his soldiers, who loudly demanded his return, and to pursue his plan openly and with the utmost vigour.

Colonel Mack, to whom the military virtues were familiar, has since acknowledged that this species of courage then appeared to him more astonishing than that which is displayed in the dangers of a battle. Had he then seen all the soul of Dumourier, he would have found this apparent security mingled with apprehension, excited by the example and fate of la Fayette. But the general's resolution was taken. He resolved to sacrifice himself throughout; and would not give his army occasion to say, that the desertion was on his part, or that, being recalled by his soldiers, he had resisted their wishes.

Dumourier passed part of the night in digesting, with colonel Mack, the proclamation of the prince of Cobourg, which appeared on the 5th of April, with that of general Dumourier. The Imperial general in his proclamation declared, that he was now no more than an auxiliary in the war, against the anarchists of France; that it was not the intention of his sovereign to make conquests, but to co-operate, in restoring peace and order to France, with general Dumourier, whose principles, as they were expressed in his proclamation, he adopted.

It was again agreed by colonel Mack, and Dumourier, that, as soon as the latter should be master of Condé, he should deliver it to the Austrians, in order

order to serve as a magazine and place of arms for the Imperial army, in the case of aid being demanded by Dumourier; that he should be instantly furnished with such succours as he should demand; that he should specify the number of infantry and cavalry to be granted him, the mode in which these should serve, whether by a junction with his troops, or by making one or more separate diversions in behalf of the cause; that, however, Dumourier should not call for succours but in case of absolute need, it being more agreeable to the mutual object of the parties, that he should endeavour to accomplish it by his own troops only; and that, in case of his being able to do so, the Imperialists should remain neuter, and should not pass the frontiers of France.

The proclamation of the prince of Cobourg, made in consequence of this negotiation, has been condemned, but unjustly. Of what real advantage had it not been to the Imperialists, and what solid glory had they not acquired, if, by enabling Dumourier to march to Paris, they could by this noble moderation have spared the blood and treasure that will be wasted in this quarrel, for which the towns that may be acquired with infinite difficulty will be no manner of compensation!

It is to be feared that an avidity for conquests among the belligerent powers is the real obstacle to the termination of this destructive war. By this passion they were prevented from seizing upon the occasion offered, by the departure of general Dumourier, and the consequent annihilation of his army, of pressing forward to Paris. The combined powers have since lost their time in making a methodical war, while the French have been able to recover themselves, and their armies have become more numerous, and better disciplined.

On the 5th of April at day-break, Dumourier proceeded with an escort of fifty Imperial dragoons to the advanced guard of his camp at Maulde, where

he was received with the greatest joy. He harangued the several corps, by whom he was answered with expressions of affection. Notwithstanding, he remarked that there were some indications of a contrary spirit, and several factious groupes assembled in different parts.

His next design was to go to St. Amand, to prepare for the movement of his troops to Orchies, according to his former plan. As he was entering the city, one of his aids-de-camp came toward him on the full gallop, and informed him that during the night the corps of artillery, excited by the emissaries of Valenciennes, who had spread the report that the general was drowned in the Scheldt, in flying to the enemy, had sent a deputation to Valenciennes, and that on the return of their deputies, they had instantly rose upon their generals, driven them from the place, and were preparing to march to Valenciennes.

Dumourier had with him two squadrons of the regiment of Berchiny, a squadron of the hussars of Saxe, fifty cuirassiers, and a squadron of the dragoons of Bourbon. Yielding to his emotions of passion, he resolved to fall upon St. Amand with this body of cavalry. His officers, however, represented the danger and inutility of this step, as he had no infantry at hand, and would subject his escort to be mown down by the artillery. He gave way to their reasoning. He learnt shortly after that the corps of artillery went to Valenciennes. The money belonging to the army and the equipages of the officers remaining in the city without guard, he commanded them to be conducted to Rumegies, at the distance of a league from his camp, on the road to Orchies; that village being protected by a part of his advanced guard cantoned there.

The corps of artillery was the flower, and strength of the French army. Feeling its importance, it abounded more than the others in clubs and orators, and

and indeed might pass for the Pretorian guard of the revolution. When its desertion was known in the two camps, part of the troops followed, and confusion and dismay were spread among the rest. Several of the general officers who waited for the opportunity were eager to lead entire divisions to Valenciennes. Those who still remained attached to the person, or principles of Dumourier, instead of shewing themselves to their troops, and setting an example of courage, were struck with terror, concealed themselves, or thought only of their own safety. General la Marliere had been among the most forward of the enemies of anarchy, and possessed the entire confidence of general Valence; who, when he departed for Brussels, confided the whole of his baggage and effects to him, with a request that he would send them after Valence to Tournay. La Marliere appropriated the money, horses, and property of his general to his own use, and deserted to Valenciennes.

Dumourier was at Rumegies, dictating orders to be issued to the different parts of the army, when he heard of the defection of the troops in camp. Nothing was left him now but to provide for his personal safety. He mounted his horse, attended by general Thouvenot and his brother the colonel, the duke de Chartres, colonel Montjoye, and lieutenant-colonel Barrois, two or three others of his staff, and some aids-de-camp, having no escort; and retiring to Tournay alighted at the quarters of general Clairfayt. He was followed in about an hour afterwards, by fifty cuirassiers, half a squadron of the hussars of Saxe, and the whole of the regiment of Berchiny. Those brave and worthy men brought with them the equipages belonging to the general and the staff officers, excepting the saddle horses of the general, which were stolen by one of his grooms, who joined the anarchists.

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The troops of which we have just spoken, and a few others that arrived shortly afterwards, amounting to about seven hundred horse, and eight hundred infantry, followed the general without any sollicitation on his part; and this circumstance renders him the more anxious respecting the fate of those men, the companions of his former glory, and of his last disgrace.

Dumourier in retiring from France invited no one to follow him. His plan had totally failed, and a few men, more or less on either side, would not influence events. The individuals attached to his cause had ties of family and of interest in France, and he resolved not to multiply misfortunes without benefit. Those who followed him, therefore, had the real merit of being guided by principle.

In the confusion that succeeded the general's departure, none of the orders that had been issued were executed. Lieutenant-general Vouillé, who commanded the advanced guard, did not receive the order of withdrawing it within the camp of Maulde till the 6th, when it was no longer in his power. This general retired to Tournay, as did also Major-general Neuilly, who had abandoned Condé, Major-general de Bannes, Second, and de Dumas, and some of the principal officers of the battalions of Volunteers; where they were afterwards joined by lieutenant-general Marassé, major-generals, Ruault and Berneron, and colonel Arnaudin.

The treasury of the army contained two millions of livres in specie. It had been carried from St. Amand to Furnes, between Condé and Valenciennes, by a battalion of chasseurs, who at first deliberated respecting the dividing of it among themselves, but afterwards being likely to quarrel, in order to avoid the bloodshed that would ensue, made a merit of their patriotism and conducted it to Valenciennes. Soliva, a commissary of the army of the Ardennes, pursued these troops with a squadron of
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the dragoons of Bourbon, retook the money on the Glacis of Valenciennes, and led it back to Furnes; but being pressed by new battalions was again obliged to abandon it. Soliva and the dragoons retired by Mons. They might have brought off the money had they passed by Bruille, and Montagne, but the confusion of the moment prevented recollection and foresight. If the treasury of the army had been saved, the general's situation had been very different; and the little army that followed his misfortunes, would have increased rapidly, being in a state to pay them, instead of being as he really was, without money. This circumstance proves, that the pay of the army was not embezzled by him, nor employed as a means of corruption. Dumourier placed little confidence in means of corruption, in which as the leader of a party his conduct was greatly erroneous.

Dumourier had not the qualities that were requisite for the leader of a party. It is probable that he would have filled the station of a general or an ambassador with success, under a stable government, whether monarchical, or republican. But the violent state of things in France, destructive of all his preconceived ideas of justice, and injustice, threw him entirely out of his sphere. His activity, so greatly spoken of even by his enemies, was repressed by his dread of committing crimes; and he preferred his own esteem to success. Thus in his first reflections, after his retreat among the Imperialists, he saw the cause of his failure in himself, but he felicitated himself on the fact. To have swayed the fortune of France, had undoubtedly given him a noble place in history; but to have been indebted for it, to the flagitiousness of his conduct, was too severe a condition; and he was happy in resigning one to escape the other.

He invites men of high stations to examine themselves with the same austerity; and moralists, to study the influence which character has on events.

Cæsar

Cæsar and Pompey determined a noble quarrel by noble means, and on both sides were displayed greatness of mind, virtues, and talents. Had those men been surrounded with the lowest vices of the meanest classes of society, they would have fled, or would have fallen victims. It demands a Maaniello to conduct the populace. But when a great nation becomes an entire populace, neighbouring nations are thrown into the greatest embarrassment; because the electric spirit spreads with more rapidity among the people, than among the higher orders of men.

CHAP. XIV.

Colonel Mack accompanies Dumourier to Mons. Establishment of the French at Antwerp. Prince of Cobourg's proclamation. Dumourier departs for Brussels.

GENERAL Clairfayt gave orders for the reception of the French troops which might arrive, in the villages round the town of Leuze, which was fixed upon for the residence of the French general officers; and Dumourier departed for Mons, accompanied by the duke de Chartres, colonel Thouvenot, colonel Montjoye, and lieutenant colonel Barvois, passing by Bury, to concert measures with the officer commanding the Imperial advanced post, for protecting the retreat of such of the French as should join the Imperialists.

The Imperialists were faithful to their truce. It is certain had they fallen on the French camps on the 5th of April, they might have utterly destroyed the army. Their conduct was therefore highly honourable; yet, without incurring the blame of perfidy, perhaps on that day they ought to have made a
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movement with their army, taking possession of the camp of Maulde, and shewing themselves at St. Amand: they not only would have found no resistance, but probably would have been joined by several battalions of the French, which during more than four and twenty hours, appeared by their movements to be irresolute as to the conduct they should pursue. But however this may be, the fidelity of the Imperialists to their engagements, is to be applauded. Their motives were most worthy, as well as the generosity with which they received the French refugees, who certainly had been among the bravest of their enemies.

Dumourier found colonel Mack at Bury, from which place, they departed together for Mons, in the general's carriage. It was agreed between them, that the Imperialists should instantly besiege Condé, and that the place should be summoned in the name of general Dumourier, who accordingly wrote the summons and sent it the following day to the Imperial head quarters. It was further agreed, that a return should be made of the officers and soldiers which accompanied or followed Dumourier; that, considering their having unfortunately lost their military chest, they should receive the pay of their respective ranks, at the rate that officers of the same rank in the Imperial service were paid, and should be placed on the same footing; that a commissary of war belonging to the Imperial army should be attached to these troops, together with a French commissary, to certify the justice of the returns; that an advance should be made from the Imperial treasury of 30,000 florins, which should be put into the hands of the French staff officers for the pay of their troops; that Dumourier should have the rank, and establishment of *Feld-zeugmeister* (general of artillery); and that finally, this pay and advance should be only regarded as a loan to the party of Dumourier, and that the general should engage, as soon as any progress should
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be made in France, to reimburse this sum to the Imperial treasury.

It is a consolation to general Dumourier, that the companions of his misfortune continue to enjoy this establishment: Indeed they have, since that period, been subjected to the condition of taking an oath, which was not in the first instance required; but at that period they were the soldiers of a party which no longer exists, and it has been since deemed necessary to demand that security for their fidelity. Dumourier would himself become their pledge with readiness, having throughout the war tried their fidelity, courage, and resignation. Let them accept of this testimony of the esteem and affection of their general, and may they be recompensed for their virtues in contributing to the success of the power whom they will faithfully serve.

In pursuance of these arrangements, Dumourier caused, by the order of the prince of Cobourg, 10,000 florins to be advanced to the French troops at Leuze; unwilling, through motives of delicacy, to take the whole of the money agreed to be advanced, because in penetrating speedily into France this sum would have served till they could have proceeded further into the interior part of the country; and Dumourier appeals to the prince of Cobourg, colonel Mack, and the other principal officers of the Imperial army, respecting the clearness and disinterestedness of his conduct. It was further decided, that the general, till he should be employed with his troops, should be provided with quarters, near those of the prince of Cobourg; and the Imperial head quarters being established at Bouffu, general Dumourier's quarters were fixed at the abbey of St. Ghislain.

Dumourier makes here an avowal of his gratitude to the general officers of the Imperial army, by whom he was treated with distinguished marks of regard, and more particularly by the archduke Charles,
and

and the prince of Cobourg. At this time was formed a friendship between colonel Mack, and Dumourier, which on the part of the latter will never be diminished. Colonel Mack, is an officer of uncommon virtue, and military talents, and the unbounded confidence placed in him by the Imperial army, is the just recompense of his services. It is greatly to be hoped, for the interest of the house of Austria, that the health of this officer will be restored.

During two days that Dumourier was at Mons, he was treated by the inhabitants in a manner that is flattering to his own honour ; and his reception was the same at Tournay, Leuze, and indeed, throughout the whole of that country ; these worthy people being sensible of the services he had rendered them, especially on his return from Holland, and during the retreat of his army to France.

It would be injustice not to name an instance of the delicate attention of the prince of Cobourg to Dumourier's situation. The general seeing a corps of two hundred chasseurs belonging to the emigrants, as they passed through Mons, on their route to join the advanced guard of the army, represented to the prince of Cobourg, that this mingling of the emigrants with his troops could not but produce fatal effects, especially on entering France ; and the prince of Cobourg instantly gave counter orders to the chasseurs ; sending them by Namur, to serve in the advanced guard of the prince of Hohenloe.

The prince of Lambesc-Lorraine testified also to the general his gratitude for the essential service rendered to his house by Dumourier when he was minister of foreign affairs, in preventing an unjust confiscation of his property, and of that of the princess of Vaudemont.

On the 7th of April, the prince of Cobourg departed, with colonel Mack, to attend the congress, held at Antwerp ; from which place he returned on the evening of the 8th. Dumourier passed those two

days at Leucz, in the midst of his comrades, whose uneasiness he dissipated by informing them of the establishments made for them by the Imperialists. General Vouillé took the command of these troops ; and Dumourier, assisted by general Thouvenot, began to reform them, according to the regulations of the Imperial army ; which was the more necessary, as the refugees were composed only of fragments of the different corps : with the exception of the regiment of Berchiny. Dumourier quitted the companions of his misfortunes on the evening of the 8th, and felt some presentiment that he should not return to them. On the morning of the 9th, he arrived at Mons, where he found the prince of Cobourg, setting off for his head quarters. Dumourier went there also ; and, after treating further on what regarded their mutual interests, he went in the evening to the quarters which had been prepared for him at the abbey of St. Ghislain.

On the morning of the 10th of April, a proclamation of the prince of Cobourg was sent to Dumourier, dated the 9th, which entirely annulled the former proclamation of the 5th ; and declared expressly, that the prince of Cobourg would thenceforth carry on the war against France, in behalf of his sovereign, and would hold such towns as he might take, by the right of conquest, and on the ground of indemnity.

The emigrants have had the impudence to rejoice in the issuing of this latter, and to condemn the former. It might be demanded if these emigrants were Frenchmen. But, setting aside the influence of passions, by which not only individuals, but also the governments interested in this war are influenced, it will appear but too true, that the second proclamation of the prince of Cobourg, in depriving Dumourier's party of all means of acting in concert, and in setting forth the belligerent powers as rapacious conquerors, has attached the whole of the French armies to the interest of the national convention, which the greater part of them had previously detested ; has compelled the

the cause of royalty to be forgotten, in the danger of the country ; has pointed out the salvation of France as resting on the existence of the republic ; has rallied the different parties round the standard of the national honour ; and has certainly been injurious to the success of the campaign, and rendered the issue of the war extremely uncertain.

This second proclamation was issued at the conclusion of the congress at Antwerp, in consequence of the determination of the ministers of the combined powers. Dumourier now saw that this treaty with the Imperialists was entirely destroyed ; and, without offering useless complaints of this sudden change in the councils of the Imperialists, he consulted only his character, and principles, and resolved to sacrifice all his personal interests.

He repaired instantly to the head quarters, and told the prince of Cobourg frankly, that he came to thank him for the personal kindnesses he had rendered him, and that he hoped to continue to merit his esteem ; that when he entered into a treaty with the prince of Cobourg, his object was the regeneration of France, and not its dismemberment ; that he would not enter into any discussion concerning the motives of the combined powers ; but that for his part, he could have no share in lessening the territory of France, or employ either his influence, or his moderate talents, in that task ; and that therefore he felt himself obliged to withdraw from the coalition, and must beseech the prince of Cobourg to grant him a passport.

The prince of Cobourg could not forbear to express his high esteem of his delicacy, The arch duke Charles, and colonel Mack, also expressed their esteem, for the general, and he departed for Brussels. Dumourier can have no doubt, that after a direct violation of the principles of the treaty that had taken place, and after an open disavowal of the proclamation issued in consequence of the treaty, his presence must have been embarrassing to the Imperialists, and that

they regarded the resolution he took with pleasure. But it was not long that he left them in any perplexity, his resolution was taken the moment he perceived their designs.

Before Dumourier quitted the Imperial army, he had the satisfaction of knowing that his former companions would be continued in their rank and employments. They are well treated and serve in the Imperial army, where assuredly they will support their reputation.

Being arrived at Brussels, he explained the motives of his conduct to the count de Metternich, the emperor's minister in the Netherlands, who received him with the greatest friendship, and gave him a passport for Germany.

In this place the memoirs of the public life of general Dumourier are concluded. The remainder of his life has been filled up with difficulties dangers, persecutions, and calumnies of every kind, of which he may one day render an account to the public. But this history can only interest those who are truly his friends, and they are not many: or real philosophers, and such are indeed rare.

C H A P. XV.

Conclusion.

SUCH is the series of events in the three of the most disastrous months of general Dumourier's life. In this short period he experienced all the miseries, and all the dangers, that the weakness and wickedness of man can inflict upon a public character. Calumny and injustice form the outline of this dark picture, which may serve as a lesson to men of every description, and from which philosophy alone can extract those consolatory reflections which propriety of conduct and rectitude of motive supply. He hates neither those who have defamed his character, nor those who have pursued his life, nor those who have refused him an asylum,

asylum, and whose ungenerous and ill-founded resentment persecutes him wherever he flies. The first are ignorant of the true state of those facts, which, from their very singularity, are exceedingly liable to misrepresentation. The second are actuated by that spirit of fanaticism, which is reason-proof. The third are prejudiced by calumny, and consider him as a dangerous character.

The ministers of foreign courts have given it out, after the emigrants, that he is a proper object of suspicion, and that they can never be sure he will not veer about and put himself at the head of the French.

He avows that he passionately loves his country, and that he will never hesitate a moment to sacrifice his life to its welfare; but he declares, at the same time, that whilst it is polluted with crimes, and delivered over to the horrors of anarchy, he will never enter it again; that, proscribed as he is, and an out-cast of society, he prefers all the miseries and all the dangers he may incur, to the most splendid situation in which the oppressors of his countrymen, and the inciters of their mad excesses, could place him.

He has been the open enemy of those powers who wished to interfere in the internal affairs of his country, both whilst he was a minister, and whilst he was a general, because he was most firmly persuaded, that the revolution, which was doubtless, expedient, and inevitable, would have been accomplished, not only with innocence, but glory, if foreign interference, and the open encouragement given to the emigrants, had not exasperated to madness a people by nature impetuous and violent. After licentiousness and anarchy had destroyed every thing in France, he wished to avail himself of the same foreign powers to re-establish order, not merely without injury to his country, but with the most tender regard for its interest and its glory.

When he saw that this became impracticable, he formed the plan of a diversion, by which he conceived

he might essentially serve the cause of his country and of Europe. Distrust, or other motives, prevented its execution. He grieves at the protraction of the sufferings of human nature: he sighs impatiently for the termination of this calamitous war, without foreseeing the means of its accomplishment; for nothing which now takes place in Europe, with respect to France, can be reasoned upon after the common maxims of policy and prudence.

It has been said, that he was bribed over by the Dutch patriots, and afterwards sold to the prince of Orange a list of the principal conspirators. This absurd imputation appears in a German work on the French revolution, called *Minerva*, much esteemed for the beauty of its style. The author has certainly been deceived in this, as well as in many other circumstances of general Dumourier's life, which the natural love of the marvellous has constantly magnified and blackened. He declares, that he never possessed a list of the Dutch patriots; that he knew only a very small party of these refugees in France; that he knew these only because they formed a Batavian revolutionary committee at Antwerp; that he does not know the names of any of those who may entertain the same opinions in Holland; that he has never had any communication, either before or since, with the stadtholder's party; that it is even impossible such a communication should have existed, as that court never forgave the manifesto which preceded his expedition into Holland; that he never received a bribe; that he is poor, and glories in being so.

He will conclude these memoirs with some observations on the three classes of French emigrants. Foreigners are surprised, that they should not unite in their distress, because they are unacquainted with their distinguishing characters. Their divisions are a great misfortune, but they are almost without a remedy.

The first class, of which the princes of the house of Bourbon

Bourbon are the leaders, consists of the old court, the higher order of ecclesiastics, the parliaments, and the principal financial department. Allured by the seductive influence of this party, on the one hand, and terrified by the extravagance of the Jacobins on the other, [the lower nobles have been induced to join them in military array. This class is composed of pure royalists: they wish and demand the re-establishment of the ancient monarchy, and, of course, of absolute despotism; and regret the old institutions with all their abuses, institutions which it is impossible should ever re-appear, since a new order of things has rendered France no longer the France of former days, but a new nation, requiring, as a new nation, a new moral and political constitution, to re-establish, on the broad basis of general utility, the security of the government, and the confidence of the people.

The second class, of which Fayette is the apparent leader, consists of the constitutional monarchists, men who desire a great reformation, or rather a total regeneration in the principles and forms of the old government. The greater part of this class were employed in the first national assembly in the great work of forming the new constitution; but falling, as they soon did, a sacrifice to the cabals of the people of Paris, and, above all, to the frantic excesses of the Jacobins, they paid dearly for the propagation of these principles of liberty and equality, which, having been originally laid down by themselves without any modification, and taken up by the people in too gross and literal a sense, were pushed to that extravagant extent, which has brought about the subversion of all the estates, and the general anarchy of France.

The third class, which is scarcely distinguishable from the former, but by the later date of their defection, consists of the military who followed general Dumourier; and all the nobles proscribed on this occasion, who could escape from their country. This class includes also those members of the national convention,

vention, who had the courage to vote in favour of Louis XVI. and against all the abominations which resulted from his execution ; and who, having attested their wishes in a protest, had the good fortune to escape.

The first class, the most numerous, the most splendid, the most diffused over Europe, and the most favoured by its attentions—by little effectual aid, but great promises, and still oftener by humiliations and caprice, possesses the most decided aversion to the two others, and confounds them in its ignorant presumptions with the Jacobins themselves. The unjust imprisonment of Fayette excites in their bosoms no mercy for that unfortunate general : but against general Dumourier they all level their rage ; and the zeal with which they calumniate his character, augment his distresses, and encourage his universal proscription, is truly surprising.

This class has preserved all its pride and all its pretensions. It will have every thing or nothing. The last success of the combined armies fills them with frantic joy ; and nothing is heard but offensive schemes of revenge and personal ambition. If the operations of the same armies slacken for a season—they are betrayed, they are deserted, and undone—and this moment the king of Prussia and his generals, and the next the emperor's, are assailed with their reproaches. Always extravagant and always disgusting to the people where they reside, who coolly observe their motions, and conclude, with some plausibility, that selfishness is their sole leading principle, they have the presumption to think that all Europe is only armed for their sakes, and that when they re-enter their country, where they will recognize nothing—not even the vestiges of their demolished villas,—they shall take possession again of their town-mansions, their country cottages, their elegant luxuries, their domestics, their dependents, and above all their power and their credit.

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The intolerance of this class of emigrants towards the two others, precludes that union which is so essentially necessary in their present unfortunate situation, were it only to excite the attention and compassion of the several states where they have fled for protection, and rove without a settlement. There are notwithstanding in this class, some few individuals of sense borne away in the general mass by their unlucky situation, and the prejudices of their birth, who form an exception to the general rule, and sincerely reprobate the extravagance of the rest, but they are little attended to. This class is divided too, within itself, into factions as active, as intriguing, as full of bickerings and jealousies, as when it glittered at Paris or Versailles. It is a court itinerant, which has lost nothing of its occupation, though deprived of its stability.

The other two classes of emigrants are infinitely more moderate and reasonable, and might soon be brought to coalesce. Fayette and Dumourier, if they met in any other place than a prison, would soon understand each other; and the shades of difference, which have hitherto only separated them, perhaps for want of a due explanation, would melt away, and vanish before the common interest of their country, and the common sufferings of themselves; for these two chiefs, and these two classes, have both been strenuous for the establishment of liberty in their country, and the reformation of abuses. They have supported with firmness the great cause of human nature, and, if they have differed in the means, they have agreed in the principle.

General Dumourier declares to the emigrants of every description, whom force or inclination has separated from their country, that it is only by a well cemented union they can acquire that consideration, which alone can better their situation at the close of the war, whether they succeed in returning to their country, or whether they are doomed to relinquish it for ever; that it is the advantage of misfortune to

purify the mind, and to temper it for the hardier virtues; that it is time to renounce the language of prejudice, since it is no longer understood in France; that that country is more different from the France of 1788, than from Gaul in Julius Cæsar's time; that it even changes every six months; and that, unfortunately, the Jacobins have been more prudential in the gradations of their crimes, than the emigrants, who, without giving themselves the trouble to examine the progress of the national genius, build all their schemes on the state of France at the point of time that they left it.

Their unfortunate situation may continue a long time; it may become utterly without a remedy: the worst should always be supposed, that we may not be misled by fallacious expectations. If they don't reform themselves, if they don't persist in shaking off their arrogance, their extravagance, their imprudence, their internal discord, they will soon disgust the people who give them shelter, and whose tempers will infallibly be soured on a thousand occasions by the war; their minds will not be fortified to bear the triumphs of success, or the desperation of a failure: in the first case, they will abuse their return, and be driven into a banishment more hopeless than their present one; in the second, they will become the most wretched men upon the face of the earth.

Banishment, like every other condition of human nature, has its advantages. It gives us objects of comparison, of which we should never otherwise have had an idea; it gives us information; it calls forth our energies by its difficulties; it renders us indulgent and sociable; it excites between ourselves and our protectors a reciprocation of sensibility and benevolence. The upright man, the man of wisdom and reflection, brings back from this involuntary pilgrimage a store of those hardy, and of those gentle virtues, which qualify him better to benefit his country, and lead to that universal philanthropy which diminishes the dismal effects of national partialities.

General Dumourier gives them another piece of advice, which he carefully observes himself—to be indulgent to their countrymen, and not to revile a whole nation by too indiscriminate reproaches. It is *imprudent*, at least, to brand as rebels twenty millions of men, who rise against a hundred thousand. These twenty millions form such an immense majority, that the hundred thousand are more deserving of the name of rebels. The emigrants of every description, who love their country, and are worthy of returning to it, may fairly, under the dismal apprehension, lest anarchy should produce the total subversion and disorganization of the empire—may fairly detest five or six hundred scoundrels, who lead that amiable people astray, and hurry them beyond the reasonable bounds of true liberty, of true patriotism, of feasible equality, and of the possible means of public happiness and order; but they should surely preserve, in misfortune especially, that love for their country which maintains their title to it blessing.

They should never calumniate the nation at large; they may justly lament that the French are blindfolded, and led through crimes into every extravagance. But there is still one point of view, which is consolatory to a true Frenchman; he sees through all this anarchy a most determined courage, and the greatest frankness of opinion. With these qualities the French may be brought from their errors, by reason, and not reproaches. Let the emigrants, whose situation may call them to the duty of re-establishing order in France, fit themselves for reclaiming public opinion, by sacrificing their resentment, and ceasing to exasperate the people of France, whose character may be eclipsed for a time, but will never be entirely obliterated; but what is crime in some individuals, is energy in the nation at large.

The history of the world does not present an instance of a nation assailed by so many enemies at once, less terrified at the thunder of the charge, or keeping them at bay in every quarter with such obstinate resolution. The last campaign, which was enough to

have crushed them at once, only displayed one general mass of valour ; and if they yield the next campaign, they will be subdued, but they will not be degraded. It is greatly the interest of the emigrants that the French should not be despised ; for whatever their nation may suffer in the estimation of Europe, will be a loss to themselves. They have already, for the last two years, been guilty of a great mistake in representing to foreign powers that the French armies were contemptible, and utterly incapable of making any resistance. This mistake, which has proved so fatal to the Prussians, has taken away all credit from their reports. Let us never hear such misrepresentations again—they are much too serious.

The French nation, collectively taken, will always be amiable. She is labouring at this moment under a moral distemper, whose dreadful convulsions only render her a greater object of alarm. Foreigners may employ the sword, but her emigrant offspring should only approach her with the soothing accents of persuasion :—it is their interest to do so ; their superinducing order on that confusion which has driven them from their country, will, otherwise every month, and every week, become more perfectly hopeless.

This advice is not the result of base compliance, or personal interest, or ambition. General Dumourier declares, and his Memoirs will prove, that he reprobates the present state of things in France ; that he sees in them only the subversion of every rational principle, and the utter impracticability of promoting public happiness ; he declares, that he never will warp to such an order of things ; and that he would chuse beggary, proscription, wretchedness, and perpetual exile, in preference to any re-establishment in his country that must be purchased by the sacrifice of his moral principles ;—but he declares, too, that he loves his countrymen, and that, where he poignarded in their delirium to-morrow, he would breathe out his last accents, in a lamentation of their errors, and a benediction to his country.



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